Cultures in Conflict or in Dialogue?

Proceedings of

3rd Afro-Asian Philosophy Conference
Cairo, 31 October — 3 November, 1990

Editor

MOURAD WAHBA

1991

Other Conferences

By the Same Editor

- Philosophy & Civilization, Ain Shams Univ. Press, Cairo, 1978.
- Brain Drain, Ain Shams Univ. Press, Cairo, 1979.
- Cultural Tolerance, Anglo Egyptian Bookshop, Cairo, 1982.
- Rural Women & Development, Middle East Research Centre, Cairo, 1981.
- Islam & Civilization, Ain Shams Univ. Press, Cairo, 1982.
- Youth, Intellectuals & Social Change, Anglo Egyptian Bookshop, 1983.
- Unity of Knowledge, Ain Shams Univ. Press, Cairo, 1983.
- Youth, Violence, Religion, Anglo Egyptian Bookshop, Cairo, 1983.
- Roots of Dogmatism, Anglo Egyptian Bookshop, Cairo, 1984.
- Philosophy & Mass-Man, Anglo Egyptian Bookshp, Cairo, 1985.
- Cultural Identity in Time, Anglo Egyptian Bookshop, Cairo, 1985.
- Future of Islamic Civilization, Anglo Egyptian Bookshop, Cairo, 1985.
- Philosophy & Physics, Ain Shams Univ. Press, Cairo, 1986.
- Creativity & General Education (Arabic), National Centre for Education and Development, Cairo, 1990.
- Culture & Enlightenment, Goethe Institute, Cairo, 1991.
- Goethe in Modern Egypt (Arabic), Goethe Institute, Cairo, 1991.

CONTENTS

Page

Page

AKNOWLEDGEMENTS

On behalf of the Afro-Asian Philosophy Association I would like to acknowledge, with gratitude, the generous support given to the Third Afro-Asian Philosophy Conference by the following institutions :

- The Afro-Asian Peoples' Organization, headed by Dr. Morad Ghaleb, the co-sponsor of the conference.
- The Pontifical Council for Culture, presided by His Excellency Cardinal Paul Poupard, as initiator in proposing to organise this conference jointly with the Afro-Asian Philosophy Association.
- The International Federation of Philosophical Societies, presided by Prof. Evandro Agazzi, for accepting to have the conference under its auspicise,
- The UNESCO for financial support.
- The Ministry of Foreign Affairs, headed by His Excellency Dr. Boutros Ghali, for his material and spiritual support,
- The Minister of Culture, headed by His Excellency Farouk Hosni, for the cultural support,
- The President of the State Information Department, Dr. Mohamed El-Biltagui, for giving us the technical assistance,
- Goethe Institute, thanks to its director Mr. Gunther Lennertzs and the Programme director Mrs. Ioanna Ilse Heinle for the financial support which facilitated the organization of the conference.
- Fulbright Binational Commission headed by its Executive Director Dr. Ann Radwan for financial support for the publication of the proceedings.

Mourad Wahba

President of AAPA



Opening Addresses



Dr. Boutros Ghali
Minister of Foreign Affairs
delivered by Ambassador Dr. Mahmoud Osman

Distinguished Professors,

Ladies and Gentlemen,

I am honoured to express to this distinguished body my profound thanks and gratitude for giving me the opportunity to take part in such vital discussion, the theme of which revolves round evaluating possibilities of dialogue and conflict among cultures. Let me start by saying that such theme could have never been chosen for serious discussion — compatible with your prestigious forum — in a more timely juncture. It is timely because societies across the world have a legitimate right to know what prospects are there to preserve and maintain the human achievements attained so far through collective human endeavours — across boundaries of place and origin of ingenuity. It is equally timely because the persistent question — as posed by Bertrand Russell, "Has man a future ?" — cannot possibly be convincingly answered unless man, be he in East or West, in North or South, is assured that inter-human relationships allow more room for dialogue than for conflict.

The logical function runs as follows : dialogue bridges existing gaps, therefore promotes harmony which is conducive to peace. Conflict, contrarily, insures the prevalence of only one eventuality, namely annihilation.

"Freedom" and "Choice" are invariably essential components in modern philosophical inquiry. As far as the "dialogue" — "Conflict" equation, however, these two components are reduced to irrelevance. Thinkers are bound to cultivate formulae permitting dialogue and averting conflict. Failing this, human civilisa-

tion — as known to us with its present postures — can very well be teetering the menace of extinction — yet another facet that bestows full pertinence upon this conference.

While I am fully aware of the exclusively specialised nature of this conference, I must admit, nevertheless, that Political Science has exhibited over the last few decades due concern to issues related to conflict, though on a totally different scale and through a basically different perspective. I am merely pointing out that Philosophy and Political Science have at least one tangential point in common, namely studying dynamics of conflict.

The interest on the part of Political Science in methods of conflict resolution could perhaps be emanating, though indirectly, from philosophies or relations that — by necessity — involve elements of conflict.

As back as 1920's interest in Marxism, based as it was on the concept of class conflict has taken few steps forward by becoming interested in Conflict among ideologies. Exactly how seriously elements of Conflict are a matter of empirical investigation. The marxist utopianism about the classlessness of the society has brought dynamics of conflict into closed focus as indicated in the modern literature related to issues of Conflict.

By the 1950's a great ideological conflict of vast magnitudes has drawn a deep line separating inter-state relationships : the proponents of merits of capitalism or free enterprise system on one hand — and the socialist block on the other.

The advent of Cold War was indeed an ominous development in modern international relations. It is curious that in this Conflict ,ideologists of both camps almost completely overlooked the instinctive tendency of human societies to engage in dialogue rather than in war.

The termination of Cold War as evinced by recent developments in Europe and by structural changes in relations between the two Super Powers, are, in my view, a live testimony to these instinctive tendencies, immanent in human race : to embrace dialogue and abandon conflict. The end of Cold War is therefore a triumph to man's propensity towards peace. Thinkers and philosophers urged to safeguard this attitude so as to avert occurence of any setbacks.

A good deal of this credit also goes to the unweavering enthusiasm by human sciences to focus on topics of cooperation, integration, pacification, disarmament, techniques of negotiations, and role of communications.

These are but few topics among a plethora of others which were intensively discussed and researched during last decades, resulting in promoting dialogue as a vehicle for reaching peace. As of late the pattern of cooperation based on negotiations or dialogue, if you like, has been added to these patterns. Therefore, Political Science is not oblivious of these two components of conflict and dialogue, as media of building structural relationships among nations.

The melting pot for all these techniques combined is undoubtedly the United Nations. It is no coincidence that the stature, role and efficacy of the United Nations have clearly been enlarged and emphasised concurrently with the dissipation of Cold War.

Let me address for a moment a cross-cultural problem of serious nature due to the conceptual dichotomy inherent in it. Conflict between East and West has been invariably termed as one between values and technology ; between established ethics and unbridled pragmatism. Such arbitrary schism contributed over the years in further deepening cultural apprehensions between the two, in as a strikingly tone as stated by Kipling who

ruled out any possibility, even remote, of establishing confluence between East and West. Clear manifestations of these apprehensions were reflected, though in varying degrees, in conflicts between Caliphate and Papacy, the Arabic Empire and Byzantium, between Ottoman Empire and Western colonisation.

Studying philosophy of cultures comparatively has amply demonstrated that cultures are distinctively unique and unmistakenly unsimilar. To use the Spenglerian definition of culture: culture is essentially a hostage of its own destiny, its process is irreversible since it is predetermined by its own becoming. Therefore cultures are, both organically, structurally and functionally different. This, in turn, negates possibilities of establishing channels of dialogue among them; only room for an inevitable interaction is conceivable.

Should we employ Spengler's methodology in examining possibilities of establishing constructive dialogue among cultures ; chances may end up in a blind alley. According to this most dogmatic, unrelenting and formidable argument; similarities between any given two cultures are but pseudo morphological segments — which actually reflect inherent dissimilarities. The Pantheon is thus considered the first Islamic mosque ever built in history. Contemporarities among cultures could also be discerned ; notwithstanding the fact that centuries stand inexorably separating them. Applying such visionary and highly intuitive approach, Pythagoras is contemporary to Descartes, Plato to Laplace. City of Alexandria, by same criteria, is an incarnated formula which preceeded the Abbasid capital of Baghdad; which is in turn, a contemporary relic preceeding Washington.

Invoking this approach, while philosophers reassure that dialogue among cultures can indeed be established, for political scientists, on the other hand, would prove to be very frustrating probability. Whereas the former will be gratified by simply con-

juring up the symmetrical pattern concluded by sets of variables and strenous research, the latter cannot practically settle for less than to witness any similarities, if any, except in the present; i.e. the present and not in any metaphorical sense. In the absence of any discernment of any such eventuality, feelings of concern and disquitude inevitably emerge.

In modern history, however, attempts were assiduously made to establish dialogue between political entities that are vastly separated, not only by virtue of geography, but by virtue of their respective ideologies which are diametrically opposed. To cite only few examples, channels of dialogue between marxist movement on one hand and nationalist movements in Africa and Asia, on the other. Serious endeavours were even carried out to establish theoretical links between marxism and Islam, as sought by Galiev and Muzaffar as early as the twenties.

Such attempts were abortive, simply because the pre-Gorbatchev communism had — as a point of departure — a preconceived idea of basic irreconcilable differences, even within Soviet Union itself, i.e. between masses of Uzbekstan and masses in Leningrad, let alone reconciling all those with their counterparts beyond national boundaries.

The Afro-Asian movement, hence, served as a golden medium to bridge the gap and to provide a palatable formula guaranteeing common grounds among nations and preaching common issues and common destinies irrespective of their unjuxtaposed situations.

The Afro-Asian movement was, still is, therefore one of the most instrumental vehicles in bringing about sense of "togetherness" among nations, across national boundaries. As such it represents an embodiment of a noble cause, periodically conceived by progressive thinkers and humanists. Egypt takes pride in

being an advocate and proponent of the Afro-Asian movement since its inception.

It is very heartening that international relations have come a long way since Malik Ben Nabi attributed — almost forty years ago — the crisis of our age to a predominantly Western hegemony, both morally and politically, over the Third World. The Afro-Asianism was therefore considered the anti-thesis to this hitherto accepted contention.

Ladies and Gentlemen,

The theme of this Seminar suggests, perhaps unwittingly — the presence of an option between conflict and dialogue as formulae of inter-relations among cultures. Having contemplated the risks involved in the absence of dialogue, I submit that there should be no option, in other words, all efforts and endeavours should consecrate just the option of dialogue. There should be no alternative to dialogue. To choose between conflict and dialogue is as superfluous as to choose between "Being" and "Nothingness". Philosophical research is expected to underline this postulate relentlessly. By so doing international relations and policy makers would be sailing on a smoother and safer course of action. I am pleased that the Afro-Asian Philosophy Association, by organising this Seminar, is already accentuating this approach. For that I wish to express once again my sincere thanks.

الاستاذ فاروق حسـنى
وزير الثقـافة

يلقيها الدكتور طارق على حسـن

رئيس هيئة المركز الثقافى القومى

السيد رئيس المؤتمر

سيداتى سادتى أعضاء المؤتمر الفلسفى الأفروآسيوى الثالث

يسعدنى نيابة عن السيد الأستاذ فاروق حسنى وزير الثقافة أن القى هذه الكلمة الافتتاحية تأكيدا لاهتمامه بمؤتمركم الرفيع وبتقديره العميق لأهمية الموضوعات المطروحة فيه ·

الاختلاف صراع أو حوار ـ تناحر لا طائل منه أم تكامل تطورى وثراء كـامن ؟

يمر العالم بفترة فريدة من تاريخه ·

ثورة الاتصالات ـ ثورة المعـلومات ـ تقلص المسـافات ـ ذوبان الحواجز ـ تحول المواجهة بين القوى العظمى الى حوار وتفاعل فكرى ـ ثقافى ـ أدائى ـ انتاجى ·

ولا يعقل أن تظل المفاهيم السائدة وقت أن أصبح الحدث ينتقل بالصوت والصورة الى الملايين من أقصى الأرض الى أقصاها فى جزء من الثانية هى المفاهيم التى سادت وقت أن كان الانتقال من دولة الى دولة يمثل مغامرة وكان هذا الانتقال مقصورا بالضرورة على عدد محدود من الأفراد ·

الملايين ينتقلون فى ثوان عبر التليفزيون الى أى مكان والى كل مكان بل والى الفضاء الكونى ·

كل تغير يفتح أمام المجتمعات البشرية أفرادا أو جماعات وقيادات عدة

مسالك مثل المسالك الثلاث التى فتحت أمام أوديب فى رحلته العجيبة بل ان التغيرات تضع التحدى الأكبر أمام الفلاسفة والمفكرين والمنظرين مثل حضراتكم ٠٠٠ أى طريق ؟ أمام التحديات الهائلة ٠٠٠ أين الطريق ؟ أى طريق ؟

١ ــ طريق رد الفعل الردى ٠

٢ ــ أم طريق رد الفعل الاندفاعى الانبهارى ٠

٣ ــ أم طريق التفاعل الصحى (الحوارى) مع المتغيرات والتحديات ويشمل هذا الطريق الوعى بالتاريخ والاستفادة منه والقدرة على القفزات الابتكارية الخلاقة من أجل البناء حيث انتهى الآخرون ومن أجل الوعى بايقاع المسيرة البشرية والمشاركة الفعالة فى هذا الايقاع ٠

تتداعى الى الذهن عند تأمل طريق رد الفعل « الردى » ظواهر الرفض الضحل ــ التقوقع ــ السلفية ــ الانفراد ــ الانعزال ــ التعصب ــ التشنج ــ العنف ٠٠٠

وكلها لا حوار ٠٠٠ لا حوار ٠٠٠ لا حوار ٠

كما تتداعى الى الذهن عند تأمل طريق رد الفعل الاندفاعى الانبهارى ظواهر التقليد النمطى فى العلوم والفنون والسلوك بلا تأصيل وبلا تجذير وبلا جذور ٠٠ الانبهار بكل ما هو ناجح وقوى وثرى دون القدرة على توليد النجاح المادى بلا خيال أو قدرة أو ابتكار أو عمل فعال لتخليق هذه المقومات فعلا ٠

لعلنا نتفق أنه لم يعد لدينا خيار عاقل الا خيار التكيف الثالث وهو تكيف التفاعل الصحى الخلاق مع تحديات العصر الهائلة ــ وهذا التفاعل بالضرورة يحتم مفهوم الحوار الخلاق ــ أى أن الحوار الخلاق ضرورة صحة وضرورة حياة وضرورة انتاج وضرورة كينونة ٠

فاذا اتفقنا على أن الحوار التفاعلى الخلاق هو ضرورة حياة وضرورة وجود للعالم وللدول الآفرواسيوية ، وجب عليكم كقيادات فلسفية

لمجتمعاتكم التأمل والتعمق والتحليل فى ما يمكن أن نسميه مقومات الحوار من جهة ومضادات الحوار من جهة أخرى ٠

ومن عجب أن الدعائم الأساسية للحوار يمكن بتحوير مفاهيمى طفيف أن تتحول فى ظل فقر الثقافة الى مضادات للحوار التفاعلى الحقيقى ٠٠٠ يمكن أن تتحول ركائز الحوار فى ظل غياب مفاهيم حيوية الى معوقات حقيقية ضد الحوار ومن أهم مهام مؤتمركم الرفيع وهو مكرس للدفاع عن الحوار وتأكيده تشخيص هذه التحولات المفاهيمية الحيوية ٠

اسمحوا لى فى عجالة أن نتعجب معا من أن بعضا من الدعائم الأساسية للحوار يمكن أن تتحول الى مضادات للحوار ٠

١ ــ الفن : (التكرارى ؟ ــ التقليدى ؟ ــ المقلد ؟ ــ الاستكشافى ؟) ٠

هل تنغلق المجتمعات فى رد فعلها الأول أو الثانى فى مجال الفن التكرارى المقلد ــ المقلد للمفاهيم المسبقة عن هذا المكان أو ذاك عن هذا العصر أو عن هذا المجتمع أو ذاك ؟ أو ينطلق الفن الى تحدى الاستكشاف والاستقصاء والتعبير ؟

ــ هل يضيف الفن الى مهامه الحيوية مهمة المباشرة والمعاصرة والتواصل بالجديد والمجهول والمختلف ــ التواصل بالمغامرة والخيال لا الانغلاق فيما هو معروف مسبقا ؟

٢ ــ العلم : (التكرارى ؟ــ التقليدى ؟ ــ المقلد ؟ ــ الاستكشافى ؟)

هل العلم تقليد لم يحدث فى عالم الشمال ؟ أم علم معرفة وبحث واستقصاء ابداعى استكشافى يواجه مشاكل المجتمعات الانية وتحدياتها الحقيقية ويولد من المعطيات الموجودة القدرة والطاقة والثروة والانتاج وما هى مقومات التحول من هذا الى ذاك ؟

٣ ــ التعليم : (النمو ــ الاستكشاف ــ الابتكار ــ الفكر التحليلى الحوارى ــ أم التعليم المرتكز على الكم والترديد والمحاكاة) ٠

هل التعليم تعليم حوارى حقا ؟ أم هو نشاط يحول الآلاف أو الملايين الى متلقين سلبيين لكم من المعلومات الغير موظفة والمعطلة للفكر والخيال وللقدرات والمهارات المتعددة والكامنة فى الانسان والتى هى الثروة الحقيقية للمجتمعات ٠

٤ ـ اللغة : (حاجز ضد التواصل ـ أم أداة للتواصل)

هل فى ظل التعليم اللاحوارى اللانمائى تتحول اللغة الى كليشهات تقود الناس من خلال « تفاعلاتهم » اللاتفاعلية فى الواقع ومن خلال أجهزة الاعلام الجماهيرى الغير حوارية الى ردود فعل ميكانيكية غير مرشدة هى أبعد ما تكون عن مراد الوعى والتوعية والفهم التبادلى اللازم للتواصل والحوار ؟

٥ ـ الدين : هل هو مصدر للثقة الايمانية التى تتيح للانسان الصفاء والطمأنينة للتواصـــل بالآخر أم تقـوقع منغلق لا يسمح مفاهيميا بوجود « آخــــر » ؟

دعائم التواصل هل تقودنا الى التعامل الخلاق مع التعــــددية التى أصبحت واقع العالم فى عصرنا أم تولد العزلة والاحادية فى غير مكانها بما يولد فقر الخيال وفقر الابداع الذى ينشىء الاعتمادية والفقر المادى والانتاجى وما يؤكبه من طاقات العنف والتدمير ؟

ما هى العوامل الحساسة والدقيقة التى تحدث التحول بين هذا وذاك ؟

سيداتى سادتى

نعيش حقبة فريدة فى تاريخ العالم انبثقت من المعارف فى الخمسين سنة الأخيرة ما يفوق كل ما انبثق منذ بدء التاريخ ٠

ذابت حواجز بين الشرق والغرب لم يكن يحلم أحد بأن تزول ٠

ـــ أوربا المتحدة على وشك الميلاد ٠

ـــ عقد الثقافة العالمى أعلن رسميا ٠

ـــ انتقلت المواجهة المصيرية من مواجهة باردة/ساخنة بين الشرق والغرب الى مواجهة ثقافية حضارية بين الشمال والجنوب والى مواجهة بين الجنوب بعضه وبعضه الآخر ٠

هل يستفيد العالم الأفرواسيوى من دروس الحضارة الأوربية وانجازاتها وأخطائها فى حاضرنا المحمل بالفرص الثرية ؟ أم هل يتكرر تاريخ أوربا التى اكتشفت أهمية الحوار والتصريف غير العنيف للخلاف والتناقض عبر قرون الصراع الدموى التدميرى الرهيب قبل الوصول الى نضوج الحـوار والتفاعل كضرورة حياة ٠

سيداتى سادتى

مهمتـــكم النبيـــلة الـوعى بهـذه اللحظـــات التـاريخية وتحـدياتها الهائلة من أجل حـوار خلاق بين الشـــمال والجنــوب ٠٠ من أجــــل حوار خلاق بين الجنوب والجنوب ٠٠ من أجل التعامل المبدع مع تعددية اصبح لا مناص منها ٠٠ حوار بلا ردة تقوقعية ٠٠ بلا انبهار مسطح ولكن بتاصيل وابداع واضافة وباستفادة خلاقة من دروس الآخرين ومن التاريخ ٠

Cardinal Paul Poupard

President, Pontificium Consilium De Cultura

delivered by Mr. Amin Fahim, Member of PCC

An international meeting on the dialogue of cultures constitutes in this singular moment in history, and now particularly in the Middle East and Europe, an event of relevant interest.

On the threshold of the third millennium, the Pontifical Council for Culture considers scientific reflection indispensable to dialogue between cultures, religions, and peoples. I applaud, therefore, with particular satisfaction the realization of this meeting, in which experts of national and international fame are taking part.

The problems to be discussed are complex and must be confronted with a great sense of responsibility, competence, and with an openness of mind and heart, as is suitable to such a conference of scholars and experts. The goal is to uncover the best within cultures of our day, to understand the importance of one's own cultural and religious identity, and to respect it in another, without excluding the necessary confrontation of all cultures with modernity. This requires an ability to discern those values which enrich culture from those which ruin it. Today more than ever, men and women of culture are invited to discover the factors of conflict in relations between human groups and to look for solutions based on reason, justice, and fraternal love.

I am pleased to underscore the uniqueness of this present conference, due above all to its location and to the prevalence of representatives from the noble Egyptian Nation. The cradle of Mediterranean civilization, source of admiration for centuries

through its treasures of art and civilization, Egypt remains to this day an original example of rich encounter among cultures of East and West, where peoples of Europe, Africa, and Asia meet.

The Pontifical Council for Culture, faithful to the mission entrusted to it by the Holy Father, promotes cultural initiatives in the world, but it can realize them only with collaboration of official agencies and institutions. This is certainly true in this case, due to the efficacious initiative of Professor **Mourad Wahba,** President of the Afro-Asian Philosophy Association, to whom go my appreciation, gratitude, and cordial greetings for a successful meeting. The Pontifical Council for Culture is represented by Rev. P. George Anawati, O.P., former Director of the Dominican Institute of Oriental Studies, and by Prof. Amin Fahim, President of the Christian Association of Schools and Social Promotion in Upper Egypt.

To all authorities, civil, academic, and religious, to the distinguished speakers, and to all invited participants, I send my respectful and cordial greetings.

دكتور ابو الوفا التفتازانى

شيخ مشـــايخ الطرق الصوفية

١ ـ نستطيع أن نعرف الحضارة بوجه عام بأنها مجموع الفكر والعمل، فليست الحضارة هى التقدم المادى وحده يقال فى مقابل الثقافة التى هى الصورة المعنوية للارتقاء الانسانى المتمثلة فى الآداب والفنون والعلوم ، أو مجموعة المعارف النظرية التى قد لا نمارسها عمليا ، فان مثل هذا التصور للحضارة فى رأينا قاصر كل القصور · ولابد بعد هذا أن ترتبط الحضارة بالقيم الخلقية ، اذ الحضارة المادية وحدها قد تتهيأ لشعب من الشـــعوب ولكنها تفقد صفة الأخلاقية ، وعندئذ تكون حضارة غير جديرة بالاحترام ·

٢ ـ وقد انطبق هذا المفهوم للحضارة على الحضارة الاسلامية قديما، اذ أنها جمعت بين الفكر والعمل ، ولم تقدس الفكر وحده وترفعه فوق العمل كما كان الشأن فى الحضارة اليونانية القديمة ، وربطت بين العلم والايمان، وبين العلم والحياة ، وكما استفادت من الحضارة اليونانية ابان حـــركة الترجمة فى العصر العباسى وما بعدها ، فهى قد أعطت للغرب خلاصة فكرها وعلومها فى العصر الوسيط وحتى أوائل النهضة الأوروبية من خلال حركة الترجمة للكتب الفلسفية والعلمية العربية فى أوروبا فى الفترة ما بين القرنين الحادى عشر والثالث عشر الميلاديين ·

٣ ـ وانطبق مفهوم الحضارة السابق وهى أنها مجموع الفكر والعمل على الحضارة الأوروبية الحديثة ، فهى قد استطاعت أن تحرر العقل البشرى من قيوده منذ عصر النهضة ، وقدمت للبشرية من المذاهب الفلسفية ما نعتد به الى الآن ، كما طورت العـــلوم الطبيعية والتكنولوجيا ، وتقـــدمت فى مضمارهما تقدما هائلا ، ومجدت العمل وجعلته وسيلة النجاح فى الحياة ، وتحقيق الرخاء ·

٤ ـ ولا يغيب عن بالنا تلك الصلات الوثيقة التى قامت بين الحضارتين الاسلامية والأوروبية فى العصر الوسيط ، فقد تناول مفكرو الحضارتين نفس المشكلات الفلسفية تقريبا ، وتأثر فلاسفة أوروبا آنذاك بفلاسفة الاسلام كالكندى

والفارابى وابن سينا وابن باجة وابن طفيل وابن رشد ، وتأثروا بعلوم العرب خصوصا فى مجال العلوم الطبيعية والطب والفلك والرياضـــة ، وتشابك الحضارتين على هذا النحو جعلهما دائما فى علاقة حوار ٠

٥ ـ وقد جعل تقدم الغرب فى العصر الحـــديث فى مجال العـــلوم والتكنولوجيا العالمين الغربى والاسلامى فى علاقة حوار مستمر مع الغرب ٠ وقد نادى كثير من مفكرى الاسلام بضرورة اللحاق بالحضـــارة الأوروبية الحديثة فى مجال العلوم والتكنولوجيا ابتداء من السير السيد أحمد خان فى الهند فى القرن الماضى وحتى جمال الدين الأفغانى ومحمد عبده فى العصر الحديث ، وذلك ليتجاوز العالم الاسلامى دائرة التخلف الذى نشأ عن انصراف المسلمين عن تطوير العلوم الطبيعية فى وقت ما ، وللأخذ بأسباب القوة فى مواجهة الاستعمار الأوروبى لكثير من بلدان العالم الاسلامى ٠

وبداية الحوار الحضارى على التحديد كانت منذ الحملة الفرنسية على مصر ، والتى بدأ معها اكتشاف هوة التخلف بين أوروبا وعالم الاسلام٠ وبدأ محمد على حاكم مصر فى أعقاب الحملة الفرنسية ارسال البعثات الى أوروبا ، وانشـــاء الكليـــات الحديثة كالهندســـة والطب فى مصر فى أوائل القرن الماضى ٠

واستمر بعـــد ذلك الحـــوار الحضـــارى ، ومن أهـــم مظاهره انشـــاء الجامعات الحديثة لتكون نافذة على الفكر الأوروبى ٠ ومن أقدم تلك الجامعات الجامعة الأهلية فى مصر والتى عرفت فيما بعـد بجامعة القاهرة ، والتى أنشئت عام ١٩٠٨ ٠ ومن أهم مظاهره كذلك تحديث برامج التعليم ، وتطوير العلوم ، وتطوير الثقافة ، مع الحفاظ فى نفس الوقت على الهوية الحضارية من ناحية القيم ٠

٦ ـ ومن مظاهر الحوار الحضارى بين الحضارات المختلفة فى عصرنا ذلك الحوار بين الديانات الثلاث اليهودية والمسيحية والاسلام ، وهو حوار تعقد له مؤتمرات عديدة فى أنحاء مختلفة من العالم ، وهو فى رأينا مفيد من ناحيتين : الناحية الأولى ايجاد الفهم المتبادل بين الأديان ، خصوصا وأن الأديان السماوية ، بما فيها الاسلام ، تؤكد جميعا على القيم الانســـانية

الرفيعة ، كالصدق فى القول والعمـــــل والفعل ، وحب الخير للآخرين ، والتعاون ، ومحبة الله ، وغير ذلك من القيم · والناحية الثانية السعى الدائم نحو تحقيق السلام ، اذ السلام هدف رئيسى فى الديانات الثلاث ، وليس المطلوب فى رأينا أن تتعايش الديانات معا ، وانما أن تتعاون فيما بينها حتى يتحقق السلام فى العـــالم ·

٧ ـ ولكن كان هناك ولا يزال بعض أنواع الصراع بين الحضارتين الاسلامية والاوروبية فى العصر الحاضر وذلك فى مجال الفكر أساسا ·

وقد أدت سهولة الاتصال بين شعوب العالم فى عصرنا الى انتقال كثير من الافكار والفلسفات الى عالمنا ، ومنها ما يؤمن بالتفسير المادى للوجود ، فليس ثمة الا المادة وقوانين تطورها ، وما العقل الانسانى الا أسمى نتاج المادة ، والعالم لم يوجد الا اتفاقا أو صدفة ، فلا خلق ولا خالق · ومنهـا ما يبدأ سيره من ايمان لا حد له بمنهج العلم التجريبى بحيث يجعل معيار الحقيقة التجربة الحسية وحدها ، ومن ثم لا مجال للتفلسف الذى يجاوز عالم الحس الى ما وراءه ، فقضايا الفلسفة التى تتحدث عما وراء الطبيعة لا معنى لها اذ لا يمكن التحقق من صدقها أو كذبها وأصحاب هذه الفلسفة يعنون بالتحليل المنطقى للعبارات والألفاظ على أساس أن كل لفظ ليس له ما يشير اليه فى عالم الحس زائف ، وبالتالى فان القضية التى يستخدم فيها مثل هذا اللفظ فارغة المعنى · ولو امتد منهج هذه الفلسفة الى نطاق الدين لأصبحت بعض قضايا الدين التى تتحدث عن غيبيات لا معنى لها · وثمة فلسفات أخرى من فلسفات العصر تنطلق من القول بأن حياة الانسان لا معنى لها ولا هدف منها الى الالحاد ، ويرى بعضها وجود الانسان مجرد مأساة وأمرا غير مفهوم · ويرى بعضها الآخر حرية الانسان باطلاق فى تحقيق ماهيته ، اذ لا اله يخلق وفق ماهية سابقة ، ولذلك يكون الوجود سابقا على الماهية ، ومآل الانسان الى العدم ، فلا بعث ولا ثواب ولا عقـــاب · ومن الفلسفات ما يؤكد على عدم الايمان بأى قيمة أخلاقية أو حقيقة مؤكدة ، ويتجه أصحابها بعنف الى الهدم ، فتوصف فلسفاتهم بالعدمية · وجميع هذه الفلسفات الأخيرة فى رأينا عبثية من حيث أنها ترى الوجود الانسانى مجرد عبث ، وتشاؤمية الطابع · ومن أسف أنها شاعت شيوعا غير عادى عن طريق الكتابات الأدبية والمسرحية المعاصرة فى أوروبا ، وهى كفيـــلة

بالقضاء على أعظم ما انتجته البشرية من حضارة ، لأنها تقتل فى الانسان طموحه ، ولا تجعل له هدفا يسعى اليه ·

وكل المذاهب التى أشرنا اليها لها فى العالم الاسلامى دعاة وأنصار الى جانب من دعاة بعض المذاهب الأوروبية فى السياسة والاجتماع ، كدعاة القومية ، والقومية نشأت فى أوروبا أساسا ، والعلمانية بمعنى عزل الدين عن الدولة وحصر نشاطه فى أضيق نطاق ، والماركسية التى ترى أن نمـو الحياة الانسانية فردية أو اجتماعية يتوقف تماما على الظـــروف المادية والاقتصادية · وكل هذه المذاهب تعتبر فى صراع مع الحضارة الاسلامية فى الوقت الحاضر ·

٨ ـ ولكن تطورا هاما حدث فى الوقت الحالى فى الاتحاد السوفييتى على يد جورباتشوف حين أعلن البروسترويكا والجلاسنوست ، وانتقد بشدة ما آل اليه التطبيق الماركسى من أزمات اقتصادية حادة ، وحين أعلن الاتجاه الى الأخذ بالتعددية الحزبية ، وديمقراطية الحكم ، والأخذ التدريجى بأساليب الاقتصاد الحر والسوق الحرة ، والاتجاه الى العدول عن الحرب الباردة مع الغرب ، والتفاهم بينه وبين الغرب على القضايا السياسية العالميـــة ، والسعى الى ايجاد نظام عالمى جديد أساسه العمل على رفاهية الشعوب والبعد عن الصراعات ، وكانت كل هذه أمور مستبعدة تماما فى ظل النظام القديم للاتحاد السوفييتى · وقد حدثت أيضا تطورات كثيرة فى دول شرق أوروبا كالهجوم على الماركسية والثورة على حكوماتها ، مع الأخذ بالنظام الديمقراطى الغربى ، والتسامح الدينى ، وكل أولئك عــلامات دالة على اضمحلال شأن الماركسية فكرا ونظاما للحكم والاقتصاد ، وتلاشى أو كاد الصراع الايديولوجى بين الشرق والغرب ·

وقد كان لهذا كله انعكاساته على عالم الاسلام ، اذ نشط مفكرو العــالم الاسلامى فى الدعوة الى الديمقراطية على أساس أن الاســـلام يدعو الى الشورى ، وأنه ضد انفراد حاكم واحد بالرأى والحكم ، أو مجموعة حكام بالتحكم فى مصائر الشعوب ·

٩ ـ خلاصة القول ان الحضارات القائمة فى عصرنا تتفق حول أمور

كثيرة والحوار بينها مستمر ، ومن أبرز نواحى الاتفاق أنها تتفق على قيمة العلم منهجا وأسلوبا فى الحياة ، ودافعا الى التقدم الحضارى ورفاهيـــة الشعوب ، وتتفق على أهمية منجزات العلم فى عصرنا ، وكذلك التكنولوجيا، بالنسبة لحياتنا الحاضرة ٠ ولا يمكننا أن نقول مثلا هناك عـــلوم طبيعية ماركسية وعلوم طبيعية رأسمالية ، أو علوم طبيعية اسلامية وعلوم طبيعية بوذية ، وانما العلم هو العلم أيا كانت الحضارة التى ينتمى اليها ٠ والخلاف الايديولوجى فى عصرنا آخذ فى الاضمحلال ، وما يهم العالم المعاصر الآن هو التأكيد على قيمة الانسان وحريته ، والأخذ بالنظم الديمقراطية فى الحكم، ومحاربة القهر والظلم السياسى والاجتماعى ٠ وسيزيد التعاون بين شعوب العالم ، وقد بدأ فعلا ، وكل الشواهد تبشر بأننا مقبلون على حضارة جديدة للبشرية دعائمها التعاون بين الشعوب من أجل رخاء البشرية ٠

والسلام عليكم ورحمة الله ،

Gunther Lennertz
Director, Goethe Institute

In this world man does not live alone. He always lives in community with other human beings at a certain time and at certain places. There man forms his surroundings, creates ethical values, makes sense of his existence.

Thus we arrive at the term "culture".

Culture always refers to a definite time and place.

Culture emerges from the way people choose to live their lives and shape their surroundings. Thus, culture might manifest itself in many ways.

In other regions of the world and at other times, culture has grown in its own particular way. That is why we have many different cultures. Mankind as a whole does not live monocultural.

At any time, cultures can be in conflict with each other. Therefore it is of utmost importance that cultures get to know each other and respect each other. They should be able to tolerate their being different. Therefore a dialogue among cultures is necessary.

To promote this dialogue is the mission of this conference. It is also the most important task of our Goethe-Institute to serve such a cause. In fact, the German Culture Center always seeks to promote international cultural relations.

In this spirit and on behalf of the Goethe-Institute I would like to thank the assembled honorable ladies and gentlemen that we could meet at this forum. Thanks also go to the organizers of this distinguished conference. We feel honoured that we were chosen to take part in it.

....

Evandro Agazzi

President of FISP

Easy to say "in dialogue", but which are the conditions for an intercultural dialogue ?

1. The consciousness that every culture is 'single' in a sense similar to the singularity of any human individual : with characteristic features, values, material and spiritual traits.

2. The consciousness that, at the same time, all cultures, as far as they are expression of communities of human beings, share the intrinsic dignity of man as such. Equal dignity of cultures is the parallel of equal dignity of all human beings.

3. The consciousness that every culture contains in a more accentuated degree certain values, but at the same time does not express the highest level of other human values. Again, similar in that to every human individual, which has special gifts, but never is perfect under all possible respects.

4. The admission that there is always something to learn from other people's experience, reflection, achievements, even from people which we might consider to be less advanced than ourselves from certain points of view. This is true for individual contacts within one and the same culture, but is true also between cultures.

5. Spirit of reciprocity. This means at the same time inclination towards understanding, but also desire to be understood. This attitude is important, because it presupposes that those who are sincerely entering a dialogue are ready to sub-

mit themselves to a 'judgment', and not only inclined to judge other people.

6. The said attitude implies recognition of the relativity of cultural values, not in the sense that there are no absolute values (i.e. values that are such in themselves, and not simply because they are recognized by a given individual or group), but in the sense that the concrete expression and evaluation of these common values is relativized by a great deal of historical, geographical, social conditions, so that the result is different from case to case. For example, without denying that poetic value is in a way absolute, we are usually ready to recognize that great poets are different in their poetry, since this also depends on their personal and cultural characteristics.

7. Recognition of a common ground to all cultures, which is represented by the fact that all of them try to respond to basic human needs and ideals, so that it is really possible to establish a mutual understanding because the same needs and ideals are to be found everywhere, in spite of having given rise to different forms of expression and satisfaction.

8. Recognition that variety means richness, that a garden is more beautiful if it contains many different flowers instead of just one or a few species. From this point of view dialogue of cultures means enrichment for every culture which is able to undertake a dialogue.

9. Absence of any spirit of dominance. This does not mean that a culture, in order to enter the dialogue, must forget its own identity. Quite the contrary, it is only through a consciousness of one's identity that one may spell out the specific contribution that one can bring into the dialogue. The condition is simply that of not pretending that this identity becomes a 'model' that others should imitate.

10. Openness towards a certain assimilation. Assimilation means the capability of taking elements and inspirations from other sources and making them a vital part of ourselves. In this sense assimilation is very different from passive imitation, and presupposes a deep awareness of one's identity, in order to organically develop this identity to a more advanced level through the incorporation of additional aspects.

... .

Dr. Morad Ghaleb
President of AAPSO

On behalf of the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization (AAPSO) I would like to thank you for honouring this inaugural session of the Third Conference of Afro-Asian Philosophy Association.

This joint initiative of our two Organizations is not surprising for the ties linking both are evident. The Afro-Asian Philosophy Association is the offspring of the spirit of Bandung whose immediate consequence was the establishment of AAPSO at the end of 1957, the first Afro-Asian Peoples Organization, and the first Third World peoples institution.

Thus it is appropriate to congratulate the Afro-Asian Philosophy Association for holding its Third Conference dedicated to "Cultures in conflict or in dialogue ?" at a time the world is passing through dramatic changes and is facing a real cultural crisis.

Since its inception, in the wake of the Bandung Conference in 1955, AAPSO had not ceased to believe in the Third world ideal of Bandung and has kept the flame ablaze in defiance of winds and floods and vacillation of history.

Its faith in a true dialogue of cultures that necessarily goes through acceptance of others had never wavered and continued to remain intact despite the dramatic deterioration of living conditions in the South as opposed to prosperity enjoyed by the North.

From the outset, our Organization whose essence merges with cultures in dialogue had placed this problem according to two levels : **The first** is the intra AAPSO dialogue of culture and

that is between the Afro-Asian peoples. **The second** level is the relation between the dominated and dominating cultures.

During the bipolar system of the World Order, we had been able to carry out an independent non-aligned policy by sticking to our culture and refusing to surrender it to one of the blocks. But this did not save us from political interference.

Today it is incumbent upon such organisations as ours in Africa and Asia to confront new challenges. The wave of democracy which had swept the Eastern European Countries is now tapping the societies in our Continents. Unfortunately the old demons lurking in the dark started to break out. Racial, ethnic, cultural intolerance are becoming an associated features of the "Perestroika" and "Glosnost". But we have to look at such features as the pains accompanying the delivery of newly born democratic societies.

A new World Order is emerging with the scientific and technological revolution as its spearhead. The revolution of communications and information had transformed our planet into a small village cancelling differences of time and distances.

This revolution had put in the hands of humanity and especially who are domineering its development, the capability and the ability to utilize it for their own interest and the spread of their own culture and language. From the satelites covering the space of our planet, transmissions of sophisticated and attractive programs are invading our societies and imposing themselves on our television and radio sets dwarfing our own national programs. Can we stop such transmission or boycot them ? Is it in our interest to do so ? What about our culture and consequently our identity ?

Surely what we are facing now is a real challenge to our

societies and cultures. But certainly it is in our interest not only to adapt ourselves to the new realities but to deal with them positively. We are in need of such a challenge to improve our way of thinking and our performance. We cannot isolate ourselves from the world progress and the world cultures under the pretext of protecting ours simply because we cannot do that practically and physically.

I want to end my modest words being a non-philosopher among philosophers by a problematic question and that is : are we advancing towards a universal culture on the global level and subsidiary cultures on the regional and national levels ? It is left for you dear friends philosophers to clarify this for us if you think that this is a valid question ?

At the end I wish the Afro-Asian philosophy Association all the success and for you dear participants an interesting and fruitful discussions.

....

Mourad Wahba
President of AAPA

I have the honour and the pleasure of addressing today this select gathering of philosophers from Africa and Asia who are meeting to discuss a crucial philosophical issue, that of cultures in their conflicts and dialogues which is, I think, the distinguishing feature of the twentieth century as it is coming close to an end, giving way to the twenty first century.

The proof that the issue of cultures in conflict and in dialogue is of major significance is demonstrated by the fact that the United Nations has lately acknowledged that development is nothing but a cultural perspective. Hence, a decision was passed by the United Nations General Assembly on 8 December 1986 proclaiming the World Decade of Cultural Development which was inaugurated in 1988 and which ends in 1997 shortly before the third millennium.

But first, please allow me to remark that the issue of culture is the major issue that concerns the Afro-Asian Philosophy Association ever since its inception at its first conference held in 1978 in Cairo on the topic "Philosophy and Civilization", followed by the second conference held in Nairobi in 1981 on "Philosophy and Cultures". And today the third conference is being held on the topic "Cultures in Conflict or in Dialogue ?". In the interim between the second and the third conferences, a national seminar was held in Cairo in 1989 on the topic "Enlightenment and Culture."

Please permit me also to tell you about the process of the present conference. On the 10th of April 1986, I received a letter from Rev. Fr. Carrier, the Secretary of the Pontifical Council for Culture at the Vatican, expressing the wish of the Council which is presided by His Excellency Cardinal Poupard, to organize a

conference jointly with the Afro-Asian Philosophy Association on the topic "Cultures in Conflict or in Dialogue ?". After that I met His Excellency Dr. Boutros Ghali, the State Minister of Foreign Affairs, and discussed the proposal with him. He kindly accepted to sponsor the conference. In the same way, His Excellency Mr. Farouk Hosni, the Minister of Culture, kindly agreed to support the conference. Mr. Mohamed El-Biltagui, the President of the State Information, has equally agreed to give all the assistance needed as far as publicity is concerned.

At an early stage of the preparation for the conference, I proposed the idea to my dear friend Dr. Mourad Ghaleb, the President of the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization. He was very enthusiastic and, in turn, proposed the idea to the Permanent Secretariat of the Organization who agreed to support the conference financially, to co-sponsor it and to share in the organization.

The same support and assistance were graciously provided by the Goethe Institute, represented by Mr. Gunther Lennertz, the Director, and Mrs. Ilse Ioanna Heinle, the Programme Director. And last, came the support of the Fulbright Binational Commission, represented by its Executive Director, Dr. Ann Radwan.

As the Afro-Asian Philosophy Association is an international organization affiliated with the International Federation of Philosophical Societies, represented here today by Prof. Evandro Agazzi its President, our conference is held under the auspices of the Federation and is sponsored by the International Council of Philosophy and Human Sciences which is a body of UNESCO.

I would also like on this occasion to mention the great effort and assistance given during the preparation for the conference by the members of the Afro-Asian Peoples Solidarity Organization, and in particular Dr. Antoine Aissi the member of its Per-

manent Secretariat. Also deep thanks are due to Mrs. Bustani and Mrs. Magda of the Goethe Institute.

This is the path of the conference. However, it was highlighted by a tragic event which greatly affected it, namely, the Gulf crisis which has led the Pontifical Council for Culture to request the postponment of the conference due to the present Gulf crisis. But it was difficult to respond to this request as we had already taken major executive steps towards the finalization of all the arrangements of the conference. The Pontifical Council responded to our decision and delegated. Rev. Fr. George Anawati and Mr. Amin Fahim to represent it.

Ladies and Gentlemen, as you see, the Gulf crisis has shaken the structure of the conference, a very modest shock however if compared with other shocks currently underway. However, the significance of our conference goes beyond the shock. For, if one deeply meditates on the Gulf crisis, one will immediately observes a conflict and a dialogue of cultures. And, from this perspective, one could say that this conference participates in the confrontation of the crisis, and that this participation is not without benefit.

....



Conference Papers



CULTURE AND CREATIVITY

Mourad Wahba (Egypt)

The term "culture", in its French and Spanish origins, has a religious meaning, that is, cult. It then took on the meaning of agricultural husbandry, or culture of earth. In the edition of 1762 of "Le Dictionnaire de l'Académie Française", culture is defined as "our concern of arts and spirit." In German the term had a different connotation. In his book **Primitive Culture** (1871). E.B. Tylor defines culture as "that complex **whole** which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society."(1)

The complex whole, mentioned in Tylor's definition, could be considered as the common denominator of the various definitions of culture. However, one has to ask about the nature of this complex whole. Is it static or dynamic ? If it is static, one cannot explain the evolution and diversity of cultures. Thus, it is, necessarily, dynamic. But one has to search for the cause of the dynamism which might not be in culture itself.

In the preface to the **Philosophy of Right,** Hegel states : "... to comprehend what is — this is the task of philosophy because what is, is reason ... To recognize reason as the rose in the cross of the present, and thereby to enjoy the present, this is the rational insight which reconciles us with the actual."(2)

Thus, according to Hegel, reason is used within the horizon-

---

1. E.B. Tylor, **The Origin of Culture,** Part I of **Primitive Culture,** New York, Harper & Row Brothers Publishers, 1958, p. 1.
2. Hegel, **Philosophy of Right,** (trans) T.M. Knox, Oxford, 1942, pp. 11-12.

tal level of reality, that is, the actual reality. Certainly, reason has to perceive the actual reality, but, in my own view, from the pre quo and not from the status quo, and this is due to the fundamental distinction between man's relationship with reality and the animal's contact with it. In this sense, the animal lacks this basic human quality, which Marx refers to in his example of the bee as "... what distinguishes the worst architect from the best of bees is this, that the architect raises his structure in imagination before he erects it in reality. At the end of every labour-process, we get a result that already existed in the imagination of the labourer at its commencement."(3)

Thus, human activity, within this dimension, implies the concept of purpose, and this concept involves transcending the actual reality for the sake of transforming it. And transformation means, in this sense, creating new relations. Look at the origin of civilization and you will grasp this concept of creativity as embodied in agriculture, and immortalized by Plutarch in his famous metaphor : the soil produces ripe and sweet fruit only once cultivated by an ingenious and skilful farmer who selects the seed of top quality. Accordingly, it could be stated that, in his relation to reality, man is creative and, consequently, human reason is creative by its very nature.

But as long as creativity involves transcendence, it, inevitably, implies time. Consequently, the future is the beginning, and not the past. But we have noticed that many thinkers have neglected the concept of the future, such as the psychoanalysts and the **philosophes** of Enlightenment. Freud discarded the concept of the future and was satisfied with the two dimensions of time, that is, the past and the present, with a certain emphasis on the past. The term 'future' occured once and that was when he

---

3. Karl Marx, **Capital,** Moscow, 1958, vol. 1, p. 178.

entitled one of his books **The Future of an Illusion,** in which he argues precisely that one has to discard the future because of the nature of culture. He says that "when one has lived for long within a particular culture and has often striven to discover its origins and the path of its development, one feels for once the temptation to turn one's attention in the other direction and to ask what further fate awaits this culture and what transformations it is destined to undergo. Bu one soon finds that the value of such an enquiry is diminished from the outset."(4)

Also, the **philosophes** of Enlightenment in the eighteenth century have been struggling for a better future but they conceived this future in an atemporal form. Thus, they envisaged the future as a mere repetition of the past. For example, Condorcet argues that general laws, directing the phenomenon of the universe, whether known or unknown, are necessary and constant, and that is why forecasting the future is based on the past.

Kant, who provides a very accurate expression of the meaning of enlightenment in his essay "Answer to a Question : What is Enlightenment?", bases his philosophy on the concept of apriori which is a direct hindrance to creativity whether in science or in ethics. For Kant considers that the basis of science, or the moral obligations, must not be sought in the circumstances of the world or in the nature of man but a priori simply in the conception of pure reason.

If culture is the total sum of human production, according to Tylor's definition, and since this human production is subject to constant and necessary laws, culture, in this sense, becomes autonomous and is independent from man and, hence, takes on

4. S. Freud, **The Future of an Illusion,** London, Hogarth Press, 4th ed., 1949, p. 7.

an absolutist form which, in turn, blocks creativity. However, since man is a creative animal, therefore culture can never be absolute. And if culture is not absolute, what is its origin ?

In origin, culture is a futuristic view directed towards changing reality. This futuristic view could be called an ideology. In my own opinion, ideology could be defined as a value system projected in the pro quo and when it is realized in reality it becomes culture. For instance, the bourgeois ideology, before being realized, was conceived as a value system representing a new style of thought and life with the purpose of replacing the feudal culture. But in case the bourgeois culture is absolutized or dogmatized, an optical illusion emerges taking the form of either "ethnic culture" or industrial culture."

The forerunner of the concept of ethnic culture is Spengler in his famous work "The Decline of the West". In this book, Spengler thinks in terms of separate cultures, each of which runs into its characteristic course. Cultural borrowing or assimilation is incidental and entirely subordinate to the inner evolution, and when one culture, through imigration or invasion, is superimposed upon another, the result is likely to be a "pseudo-morphosis" which is of no intrinsic significance. All history is, thus, a succession of cultural cycles, not in any sense, a continuous process. Hence, each system of development is closed and complete in itself.

In my own view, this theory of the closed cultures distorts and obscures the oneness of the process of human development, which is marked by a global evolution from mythos to logos, due to the common struggle for the conquest of nature for the sake of humanizing it by means of the processes of transcendence and transformation.

As for the concept of industrial culture, it has been elabo-

rated by Herbert Marcuse in his famous book **One-Dimensional Man**, to reveal the prevailing technological rationality which is embodied in the productive apparatus and which continues to function effectively although revolutions break up the existing relations of production. In this sense, industrial culture negates ideology.

But this concept contradicts with the nature of the origin of civilization which was accompanied by class-divided societies where citizens were graded according to their wealth, including priests, merchants and free craftsmen and, on the other hand, domestic slaves, and outside the city, the peasants who were virtually temple serfs.[5] From these classes emerged ideologies paving the way for clearcut class-divided societies. And with time these ideologies turned into what is called classical cultures.

Thus, culture is objectivization of an ideology and, at the same time, its end. Accordingly, the changing of culture necessitates the adoption of a new ideology. In this sense, one may conclude by saying that culture is an interlude that lies between two ideologies.

....

فى سبيل التقريب بين الثقافات البشرية

سيد محمد على الشهرستانى (ايران)

أحمده جل وعلا ، وأصلى على خير بريته محمد المبعوث رحمة للعالمين وعلى أهل بيته الطيبين الطاهرين وصحبه المنتجبين ٠

أصحاب السيادة رجال الفكر واعلام الرأى ،

ان مفهوم الثقافة ومدلولها من الأمور العسيرة التى تاهت مخيـلة المفكرين والباحثين فى تعريفها ووصفها ٠ وقد قال أحد المتتبعين وارباب التحقق أنه جمع مائة وواحد وستين تعريفا للثقـافة ٠ وهذا ان دل على شيء فانه يدل على عظمة مفهوم هذه الكلمة ، وتحديد المراد الخاص منها ، وعلى وجه الاجمال فمهما كان المدلول لهذا اللفظ فى اللغة أو الاصطلاح ، عند القدماء والمعاصرين ، وعند الاعلام الشرقيين والغربيين ، فانه يبقى عنصرا أساسيا من حياة الانسان ، بل من حياة الأمم والشعوب ، يتوارثه جيل بعد جيل على مر التاريخ ٠

فالمدلول اللغوى للفظ الثقافة أن عرفه ابن منظور فى (لسان العرب) بالحذق والفهم ، وابن السـكيت بسرعة التعـليم ، والفيروز ابادى فى القـاموس بالحـذق والخفة والفطنة وصـاحب معجم الوسـيط بالتأديب والتهذيب والتعليم ،

أو ان عرف ماثيو ارنولد المدلول الاصطلاحى لهذه الكلمة فى كتـابه (الثقافة والفوضى) ب (ان الثقافة هى محاولتنا للوصول الى الكمال الشامل عن طريق العلم بأحسن ما فى الفكر الانسانى مما يؤدى الى رقى البشرية)، وعرفه مالك بن نبى فى شروط النهضة (الثقافة هى دستور تتطلبه الحياة العامة بجميع ما فيها من ضروب التفكير والتنـوع الاجتماعى) وادوارد تايلور فى كتابه (الثقافة البدائية) (الثقافة هى ذلك المركب الكلى الذى يشتمل على المعرفة والمعتقد والفن والأدب والاخـلاق والقانون والقـدرات والعادات الأخرى التى يكتسبها الانسان بوصفه عضوا فى المجتمع) ٠

أو مانسب الى المفكرين الأوروبيين فى عصر النهضة ولا سيما الى الألمان منهم أنهم (جعلوا الثقافة تشير الى المعرفة غير الوصـــفية ذات الأحكام التقويمية كالديانات والاعتقادات والاخلاق والفلسفة والآداب والفنـــون) أو ما عرفه العلماء والاكاديميون السوفييت فى الموسوعة الفلسفية (ان الثقافة هى كل القيم المادية والروحية التى يخلقها المجتمع من خلال سير التاريخ)٠

كل هذه التعاريف تشير الى حقيقة واحدة ، وهى أن الثقافة عبارة عن مجموعة التعاليم والأنظمة والطقوس والقيم التى يستفيد منها الانسان فى حياته للوصول الى الكمال والرقى البشرى ٠ والتثقيف هو كيفية فرض أو اقناع المجتمع بقبول وتنفيذ هذه التعاليم والأنظمة والطقوس ٠ والمثقف هو الانسان أو المجتمع المستوعب لهذه التعاليم والأنظمة والطقوس ٠

أما الحضارة فانها باعتقادى من ترشحات وافرازات ونتائج الثقافة ولم تكن الحضارة هى الثقافة نفسها كما يعتقد الكثيرون لأن الحضارة لم تتحقق لولا الثقافة فان كانت تالية تلو الثقافة فلا يمكن أن تكون نفسها ٠ بل الثقافة حينما تطبق على الساحة وتخرج من حيز القوة الى الفعل تصبح حضـــارة ٠

واما الخلاف الجذرى بين أصحاب الرأى ، فلم يكن على تعريف الثقافة أو التثقيف أو المثقف انما وقع الخلاف فى أصول ومصادر أخذ هذه التعاليم والأنظمة والطقوس من جهة ، وفى صـــحة بنود هـــذه التعاليم والأنظمة والطقوس أو سقمها من جهة أخرى ٠

فالسؤال الأول : من هو صاحب الصلاحية فى وضع هذه التعاليم ؟

والسؤال الثانى : هل هـــذه التعاليم تؤدى الى الهدف المنشود ، الذى هو الكمال والرقى البشرى أو تسوقه الى الويل والثبور ؟

ها هنا وقع الخلاف الجوهرى ، فلو كانت الأمم والشعوب والملل والنحل جميعها متفقة على مصادر ثقافاتها ومجتمعة على اليقين من الوصول الى غايتها ، لما وقع الخلاف بينها اطلاقا ، وكانت للبشرية ثقافة واحدة موحدة ٠

ولكن هذه الثقافات تتباين بتباين العقائد والأديان والمذاهب والآراء ٠

والثقافة ما هى الا مجموعة من التعاليم والانظمة والطقوس الاعتقادية لكل ذى عقيدة وان شاهدنا بعض القيم والطقوس خارجة عن الاطار الاعتقادى الفعلى لقوم ما ، فانها لم تكن الا رواسب من عقائد سالفة سكت عنها المعتقد الفعلى لهم أو اقرها ·

كما أن مصادر وجذور هذه الثقافات اما سماوية من مبدء تشريع الهى أخذه أفراد البشر عن طريق الانبياء والرسل ايمانا منهم بصحتها ويقينا بضرورة العمل بها ، أو وضعية من مبدأ تشريع بشرى وضعه فرد من أفراد البشر أو جماعة من نخبة الناس ، واعتقد الآخرون بصحتها وضرورة العمل بها أيضا ·

وهى عبارة عن طقوس وعقود وحقوق أو بعبارة أخرى : عبادات ومعاملات تشتمل على جميع أو معظم شؤون الحياة الانسانية ولكن مصادر هذه الثقافات كما ذكرنا تتباين من حيث التشريع بين مصدر الهى ومصدر بشرى ، ثم تتباين بين المصادر البشرية الى ما لا تعد ولا تحصى كما تتعارض أيضا فى بنود أحكامها وأساليب طقوسها ومفردات قيمها وبيان حقوقها ، وهذا التعارض فى البنود والمفردات أوسع من التعارض فى مصادر التشريع·

هذه التباينات الثقافية من حيث مصدر تشريعها ، وبنود أحكامها وطقوسها ، كانت السبب فى الحروب الدامية ، والغزوات المتلاحقة ، والصراعات الدائمة بين المجتمعات البشرية ·

فالثقافات البشرية باعتقادى فى صراع دائم وخلاف قائم · وهذا رأى أدلى به الى هذا المؤتمر الموقر فى سؤاله (هل الثقافات فى تعارض أم تقارب ؟) ·

ولدعم هذا الرأى أرانى مضطرا لتحليل الموضوع بايجاز ، وأملى أن لا أترك الداء بدون دواء ، بل أحاول تقديم مشروع للتقريب بين الثقافات البشرية الى هذا المؤتمر الجليل ، لعلنا نخرج بالحل من معضلة تعارض الثقافات التى أورثت الشقاء والعناء للبشرية جمعاء ·

لم تكن ثقافة أى مجتمع بشرى كائنا ما كان الا وسيلة

يتوسـل بهـا لنيل غايتين فى حياته ، فهى اما طقوس وعادات وتقـاليد يتشبث بها لدفع الشر والخوف والوحشة والهلاك عن نفسه ، أو تعاليم وأصول وأنظمة يتبعها للوصول الى حياة أفضل تمنحه اللذة والبهجة والراحة فى الحياة ، وما يعتقد بها الانسان ويعمل عليها من ثقافة فهى كل غايته فى الحياة ولولاها لم تكن للحياة عنده قيمة · وهذه خاصية ذاتية للانسان ولا علاقة لها بتعلمه وفهمه ودركه · فهو يشعر ويؤمن من أن الحياة لا قيمة لها بخوف مستمر يلازم وجوده أو بعيشة حيوانية يستعبده فيها الغير ويسخره كما تسخر الدواب ·

هذا الشعور شعور ذاتى فطرى ملازم لوجود الانسـان فهو ينساق تلقائيا الى اكتساب شىء يقيه شر الخوف والوحشة فى الحياة ، ويعطيه الامل للتقدم فى سبيل الكمال ·

هذه هى الثقافة أو الدين ، أو العقيدة سمها ما تشاء ولا أرى فرقا بينها اطلاقا · وهذه الثقافة هى المقدس الذى لولاه لما كان لوجود الانسان قيمة فى الحياة · والخلاصة أن أى انسان مهما كانت له من ثقافة ـ فهو يعتقد بأن أصول ثقافته هذه هى المقدسات التى يجب أن يتمسك بها ويدافع عنها ، ولو أدى ذلك الى فنائه وموته ، لأن الحياة لا قيمة لها بدون هذه المقـدسات ·

ولو استعرضنا مثالا واحدا لهذا الواقع لربما ازدادت قناعتنا بهذه الحقيقـة ·

لنأخذ مثلا العقيدة الاسلامية أو الثقافة الاسلامية ، ونستعرض أحكام السماء نرى أن أهم الطقوس والواجبات تتغير طبيعتها وأحكامها باعتبارات ثانوية · فمثلا : الصوم يحرم على المريض والصلاة تسقط عن الخائف ، وأكل الميتة يحل للمضطر · كل ذلك لأن هذه الأحكام شرعت لوجود الانسان وسلامته وصلاحه ، فان تعارضت هذه الأحكام مع الهـدف من تشريعها فانها تتبدل الى عكس ما كانت عليه · ولكن اذا تعرضت الشريعة نفسها الى الخطر وخشى ضياع ذلك أو القضاء عليه نرى أن الحكم يتغير ويجب على هذا الانسان المعتقد بهذه العقيدة أن يدافع عن عقيدته ولو بهلاك نفسه والشهادة · فهذا

الانسان الذى تغيرت جميع الاحكام لسلامته وحفظ وجوده نراه عند تعرض العقيدة للخطر ملزم بتضحية نفسه من أجلها ٠

اذن فالاحكام نسبية أمام مقدس الوجود ، والوجود الانسانى نسبى أمام مقدس العقيدة ٠ فأقدس المقدسات عند المسلم هو عقيـدته وثقافته ، والحالة نفسها فى جميع المعتقدات والثقافات وان شذ عن ذلك من شذ فلا يقاس عليه ٠

فلو آمنا بهذا الواقع واقتنعنا بأن الوجود الانســانى يتلاشى أمام مقدس العقيدة والثقافة فطبيعى من أن نعتقد بأن الثقافة هى أقدس المقدسات عند جميع البشر مهما اختلفت مستوياتهم وتفاوتت ألوانهم وتناقضت طباعهم ٠

وبتباين الثقافات تتباين المقدسات وهنا تظهر حالتان :

الحالة الأولى : هى حالة الاستقرار والركود ، وعدم التعارض والتضاد فيما بين هذه الثقافات على الساحة فى الأمور الحياتية ٠

والحالة الثانية هى حالة الحركة والتضاد والتعارض على الساحة فى الشؤون اليومية للحياة ٠

ففى الحالة الاولى نرى التعايش السلمى والعيش المشترك بين شعوب العالم مع تضاد ثقافاتها وتباين معتقداتها ، بينما نشاهد فى الحالة الثانية الحروب والغزوات وقتل النفوس البريئة ونهب الأموال والخراب والدمار ٠

والحالتان فى مرحلة القوة مشتركتان ، ولكن فى مرحـــــلة الفعل مختلفتان ٠ فاصل الخلاف والتضاد بين الثقافات ذاتى ثابت بينما التعايش والتفاهم عرضى متغير يتغير بالمصالح المشتركة والظروف المحيطة والقيادات والزعامات المسيرة لأصحاب هذه الثقافات وما الى ذلك من أسباب ٠

لذا نرى أقواما وشعوبا متضادين فى العقيدة والثقافة يعيشون جنبا الى جنب فى عيش ملؤه الاستقرار والتفاهم ، واذا ببريق يشعل الفتيل ، وتنفجر القنبلة ويزول العرض فيرجع كل قوم الى أصلهم ، وتندلع الحروب أعواما

طوالا وسنوات متمادية ، ثم يظهر العرض ثانية من جديد ويتمكن من تجديد الأصالة الذاتية فيرجع الوئام لبرهة لا يعلم مداها ، أقصير أم بعيد ٠

هذه سنة الحياة ولنا من التاريخ المعاصر نماذج وعبر نستعرض منها الخلاف والصراع الهندى الباكستانى والعربى الاسرائيلى ، والايرانى العراقى لتعرف مدى مصداقية دعوانا وصحة تحقيقنا ٠ وهذه الأمثلة الثلاثة فيها عبرقيمة،فالهندىوالباكستانى يعيشانبين شعبين يشتركانفىالتقاليد والبيئة ، ويبتعدان كل البعد فى العقيدة الدينية ، فلا يتفقان الا فى أصل واحد وهو كونهما من البشر ٠ والعربى والاسرائيلى يتنافران فى التقاليد والطباع ورغم اشتراكهما فى الاعتقاد برسالة السماء ، أى قبول مصدر التشريع ولكنهما يختلفان فى الدين أى مفردات التعاليم والأصـــول والطقوس ٠ والايرانى والعراقى يتفقان فى كثيـر من التقـاليد والطبـاع ويختلفـان فى بعضها ، ويشتركان فى مصدر التشريع وفى معظم بنود التعاليم والاصول والطقوس ولكن يختلفان فى بعض الأمور الجوهرية منها ٠ فهذه الأمثلة الثلاثة لها ان تعطى جميع أوجه الفرض والاحتمال لبحثنا وتحقيقنا ٠

للوقوف على العقيدة الهندية بصورة دقيقة ، وأخـــذ المعلومات من مصادرها الموثوق بها سافرت الى الهند ، والتقيت بعـدد من اعـلام العقيدة الهندية ، وفى مقدمتهم البروفسور S.S. Antarkar رئيس قسم الفلسفة فى جامعة بومبى ، وهو أحد المعتنقين لهذه العقيدة ومن أصحاب الرأى فى الثقافة الهندية ، وكان لى معه حوار حول أصـــــولها ، ومبدأ تشريعها ، والمقدسات الأساسية فيها ، ونظرتها الى الاديان والثقافات الأخرى ٠ وكانت النتيجة أن الديانة أو العقيدة الهندية لم تكن فى الواقع كما يتصوره الناس ديانة واحدة ، أو ثقافة موحدة ، وانما هى مجموعة فدرالية من المعتقدات أو الثقافات ولكنها تشترك فى أصول واحدة ٠ فهم لا يعتقدون بوجود خالق للعالم بل العالم فى معتقدهم قديم ، والهدف من الحياة أمور ثلاثة :

— معرفة الطبيعة Sat
— معرفة النفس Chit
— التمتع ببهجة الحياة Ananda

وعند سؤالى اياه : ما هى التعاليم والأصول والطقوس التى تسوقكم

الى تحقيق هذه الأهداف ؟ ومن المشرع لهذه التعاليم ؟ أجاب قائلا : أن المشرع لهذه التعاليم نحن أنفسنا ، وهى أصول وطقوس نراها مناسبة لنا بتناسب البيئة والطبيعة والمكان ، واتباع هذه الثقافة وهذه التعاليم يختلفون فى مفردات أحكامهم وطقوسهم ، باختلاف المكان وفقا للطبيعة والبيئـــة التى يعيشون فيها · ولذا فان العقيدة الهندية مجموعة فدراليـــة من المعتقدات والثقـــافات ·

كان الشعب الهندى بعقائده هذه ولا يزال يعيش جنبا الى جنب مع المسلم الذى يعتبر الأصل الاساسى فى عقيدته هو الاقرار بالوحـــدانية لله الخالق المكون ، ولا يجوز له العمل برأيه ، بل أن ضمان سعادته فى الحياة هو العمل بالتعاليم والاصول والاحكام والطقوس التى يأخذها من الله عز وجل عن طريق نبيه فقط · ولا شك ولا ريب من أن هذه المقدسات التى هى من مبدأ بشرى مخلوق ، متضادة متعارضة مع تلك التى من مبدأ الهى خالق ، وهذه المقدسات تمثل وجود كل من الطائفتين ، وهذا الخلاف ذاتى ثابت · غير أن المصالح المشتركة كانت من الاعراض التى جعلت الفريقين لا يحركان ساكنا حتى أشعل المغرض الفتيل وقتل ثورا أمام معبده وألقى بجثة خنزير فى ساحة مسجد ، فاندلعت النـــار وكان ما كان حتى اليوم ، وشـــظاياها مشتعلة. اذ تقوم فى هذه الأيام مسيرة هندية تسمى بمسيرة عشرة آلاف ميل ، تطالب بتهديم مسجد قال أحدهم أنه كان مسقط رأس (راما) ·

أما اليهودية التى هى عقيدة الهية ، ولها كتاب سماوى هو التوراة فهى أيضا تتمثل فى مجموعة من المذاهب المتعارضة غير أنها جميعا تشترك فى أصل توحيد الله ، ونبوة موسى بن عمران عليه السلام ، فهى متفقة فى مبدأ التشريع ولكنها مختلفة فى أصولها ، فمنهم من يعتقد بضرورة العمل والاعتماد على كتاب العهد القديم كله وليس التوراة وحدها (٩) ، كفرقة القرائين اذ ترفض التلمود وتقول ما هو الا بدعة ابتدعها الحاخامون ولفقوها وقالوا للناس أنها شريعة شفوية مصدرها الاله ، وانها يجب أن تقدس بينما المذهب الرئيسى لليهود هو مذهب التلموديين الذى يعتبر التلمود هو المصدر الرئيسى الآخر لدى اليهودية بعد التوراة ، ويطلقون عليه اســـم الشريعة الشفوية مقابل الشريعة المكتوبة (التوراة) · والتلمود هـــو مجموعة من التعاليم والأحكام التى دونها الأحبار والحاخامون باللغة الارامية ، كما أن

المذاهب اليهودية تشترك فى أصل واحد آخر هو الحفاظ على الشريعة (هلخا) والشريعة باتفاق المذاهب تقول : ان خلاص اليهود من الجور والظلم يتم بخلاص الأرض المقدسة أورشليم وفى هذا الخلاص تنعم البشرية بالسعادة والعدل والاستقرار ٠ وان كانت المذاهب اليهودية تختلف فى كيفية الخلاص فمنهم من يعتقد بالخلاص الطبيعى دون حرب أو اراقة دماء عند ظهور المسيح الموعود ، ومنهم من يعتقد بوجوب التخليص ولو بالقهر والقوة ٠ وقد استفادت الصهيونية العالمية (التى هى حركة دينية سياسية) من هذا الرأى وحاولت بتجنيد قواها اقامة الدولة الاسرائيلية التى تعد فى نظر بعض الفرق اليهودية غير شرعية ، رغم أن الحكومة التى شكلتها الصهيونية بادىء ذى بدء ، والى الآن تتكون من عناصر علمانية ، ولكن حاولت أن تعطى الحكومة الاسرائيلية صبغة شرعية دينية للدفاع عنها ضد اليهود الذين ينتقدونها من وجهة نظر دينية ٠

أما العرب فقد اعطوا الصراع جانبا اسلاميا أيضا ٠ والدفاع عن الشريعة والعقيدة من أقدس المقدسات عند المسلم ٠ ولهذا تعارضت المقدسات ولعب الأصل الذاتى دوره واختفى دور العارض ، والمصالح المشتركة التى كان يعيش فيها اليهودى الى جانب المسلم فى معظم البلدان ، فبقى الصراع قائما الى يومنا هذا ٠

والمثال الأخير هو الحرب الايرانية العراقية ، فرغم اتفاق الشعبين فى العقيدة والدين والثقافة الاسلامية والايمان بوحدانية الله ، ورسالة محمد صلى الله عليه وآله ، والاتفاق على معظم التعاليم والاحكام والعبادات واتباع كتاب سماوى واحد هو القرآن ، والمشاركة فى قبلة واحدة فالخلاف يتمثل فى بعض أصول المذهب وفروعه الفقهية ٠ فالايرانيون الذين يعتنقون مذهب أهل البيت ، الجعفرى الامامى الأصولى ، يختلفون مع معتقدات أهل السنة والجماعة التى يعتقد بها القائمون على الحكم فى العراق ٠ وان هذا الخلاف وان لم يكن جذريا وأساسيا ، واعلام المذهبين يحاولون على مر التاريخ الاسلامى حل الخلافات ولكن هناك خلاف جوهرى على نظام الحكم ، وكيفية أخذ الاحكام بعد وفاة الرسول صلى الله عليه وآله ٠ فالسنة يعتقدون أن الخلافة بعد رسول الله أمر متروك للأمة والشورى ، وقد أجمع المسلمون على خلافة أبى بكر الصديق ، والخليفة ولى أمر المسلمين أمره مطاع ، وحكمه

فصل ٠ ومصدر التشريع هو الكتاب والسنة استنادا لحديث نقله الامام مالك ابن أنس فى الموطأ : (انى تارك فيكم الثقلين كتاب الله وسنتى) بينما يعتقد الشيعة الامامية أن الخلافة والامامة امتداد للرسالة وضمان لصحة التشريع، ولذا فانه يجب أن يكون بالنص الصريح من قبل الله ، والآية الكريمة (انما وليكم الله ورسوله والذين آمنوا ، الذين يقيمون الصلاة ويؤتون الزكاة وهم راكعون) فيها التصريح على ولاية الامـــام على بن أبى طالـــب عليـــه السلام ٠ هذا بالاضافة الى حديث الغدير المتواتر وغيره ٠ كما يعتقدون بأن القرآن وحده لا يمكن أن يكون مصدر التشريع بشهادة القرآن نفسه (منه آيات محكمات من أم الكتاب وآخر متشابهات فاما الذين فى قـلوبهم زيـغ فيتبعون ما تشابه منه ابتغاء الفتنة وابتغاء تأويله وما يعلم تأويله الا الله والراسخون فى العلم) (١٣) واستنادا الى الحديث المتواتر من رسول الله (ص) : (انى تارك فيكم الثقلين كتاب الله وعترتى أهل بيتى (وانهما) لن يفترقا حتى يردا على الحوض) ٠ واستنادا الى ما ذكر فان نظام الحكم بعقيدة أهل السنة والجماعة أن ولى أمر المسلمين هو الحاكم العادل القائم بالسيف ، بينما يعتقد الامامية بأن ولى أمر المسلمين بعد رسول الله هو الامام على عليه السلام واحد عشر أماما معصوما من ولده آخرهم المهدى المنتظر الذى يملأ الله به الأرض قسطا وعدلا بعد ما ملئت ظلما وجورا ، وهو الغائب عن الانظار ، وفى فترة الغيبة الكبرى فان ولاية أمر المسلمين مفوضة الى الفقيه بنص من الامام الغائب : (واما الحوادث الواقعة فارجعوا فيها الى رواة حديثنا ، فانهم حجتى عليكم وانا حجة الله) ٠ ويجمع فقهـــاء الامامية على أن هذه الولاية لم تكن مطلقة كما هى للولى المعصوم ، بل هى فى أمور أربعة : الولاية فى بيان الاحكام والفتـــوى ، والولاية فى الحكم والقضاء ، والولاية فى الامور الحسبية ، والولاية فى المصالح العامة المشتركة للمسلمين واقامة الحدود وحتى القسم الاخير يختلف فيه الفقهاء بالنسبة لمبسوط اليد ، وغير مبسوط اليد ٠ ولكن الامام الخمينى تفرد من بين فقهاء الامامية فاجتهد ، وقال ان هذه الولاية تسرى حتى على الامور الخاصـــة الشخصية للمكلف ، وولاية الفقية كولاية الامام المعصوم وولاية رســـول الله ٠ وعلى كل حـــال من الأحوال وكيفما اعتبرنا هذه الولاية فالفـــرق بين العقيدتين بالنسبة لنظام الحكم والولاية جوهرى مهم ، واستفاد حاكم العراق من هذا الخلاف العقائدى فتقمص بلباس الدين رغم أن نظامه بعثى اشتراكى علمانى وأثار شعبه ضد النظام الاسلامى الايرانى ونسب اليهم

المروق عن الدين ونعتهم بالمجوس واعداء الاسلام واستفاد من هذا الخلاف أيضا فى استمالة الدول العربية المسلمة الاخرى وسحب الاموال الطائلة منهم لأنه عرف أن تعارض المقدسات العقائدية ذاتى ثابت ٠ وأما الزعيم الروحى الايرانى الذى أقام الجمهورية الاسلامية الايرانية على أساس العقيدة والثقافة الاسلامية فقد استفاد من نفس التعارض الذاتى المقدس فى تجنيد جيوشه وأفراد أمته الذين كانوا يفجرون أنفسهم بالالغام ليعبدوا الطريق لمن خلفهم ، وهكذا كانت الحرب الضروس التى جاوزت ثمانية أعوام ٠ واليـــوم نرى بوضوح أن العرض يدخل الساحة من جديد والمصلحة تقتضى أن يتنازل من أشعل الحرب عما أشعل الحرب من أجله ويحاول أن يجمد التعارض الذاتى فالى متى يدوم هذا ، العلم عند الله ٠

وهكذا نرى أن تباين الثقافات وتعارض المعتقدات كيف كانت ولا تزال الأسباب الذاتية فى صراعات الشعوب وحروبها وبالنتيجة أسباب شقائها وتعاســتها ٠

وهذا هو الداء فما هو الدواء ؟ !

منذ أكثر من ثلاثين سنة وأنا مولع بمعرفة أسباب التخلف والتأخر فى شعوب العالم وخاصة شعوب العالم الثالث وأنا منها أشعر بدقة وعن كثب بحرمانها ومصائبها وقد جبت العالم من شرقه الى غربه ومن شماله الى جنوبه بحثا عن أسباب التخلف والتقدم ٠ وكنت أتصور بادىء ذى بدء كما يتصور الكثيرون أن أسباب التخلف والتقدم هى العلوم الحديثة والتقنية المتطورة فأسست فى بداية الثمانينات (المركز العالمى للابحاث الفنية) لغرض استقطاب التقنية الحديثة ونقلها الى الدول النامية وحقا أننى لاقيت تجاوبا كبيرا من العلماء الفنيين الغربيين فكان معنا فى مدة وجيزة ما ينيف عن ألف مستشار من مستوى حملة جوائز نوبل وبروفسور متقاعد الى أعضاء مراكز أبحاث عالمية من الأقطار المختلفة ٠ وكانت احدى السبل التى سلكناها لتحقيق هذا الهدف ، هو عقد المؤتمرات الدولية للتنمية ، وكانت أولها فى (جاكارتا) عاصمة أندونيسيا سنة ١٩٨٥ ، والتى أعطينا فيها حلولا لتأمين الغـــذاء للبشرية واثبتنا فى الكتاب الذى كتب لهذا الغرض كيف أن أندونيسيا لوحدها قادرة على تأمين غذاء أربعة مليارد من نفوس البشر فى الحال الحاضر

والمنطقة الاستوائية قادرة على تأمين غذاء لعشرين مليار من نفوس البشر ٠ وكانت الثانية فى لندن سنة ١٩٨٧ بالاشتراك مع اليونسكو وهيئات المنظمتين العالميتين للثقافة والاسكان وكان موضوعه تأمين السكن فى الدول النامية وأثبتنا فى الدليل الذى قدمناه الى المؤتمر كيف يمكن تأمين السكن لكل ذى دخل مهما ضؤل دخله ، وهى دراســة مســتوفية لجميــع الجــوانب الفنية والاقتصادية والاجتماعية والسياسية ٠ وبعد حل مشكلة التغذية والاسكان لسكان العالم وحل مشكلة التعليم التقنى العالى بتأسيس الجامعة التكنولوجية العالمية مع منظمة اليونسكو عرفت أن مشكلة التخلف والحرمان لم تكن المشكلة التقنية أو الفنية ، انما المشكلة الأساسية هى مشكلة الأنظمة والقوانين ، المدنية منها أو الدينية ٠ وتعود جميع جذورها الى المعتقدات والثقافات ويشترك فى هذا الحرمان الغرب المتقدم كما يشترك فيه الشرق النامى ، بل مشكلة الغــرب أمر وأدهى ولنا فى ذلك حديث طويل ٠

والحل باعتقادى يتلخص فى تجنيد الطاقات الفكرية وجميع أصحــاب الرأى والتحقيق من علماء الدين والفلاسفة والمفكرين ورجال القانون والعلماء التجريبيين تحت مظلة واحدة وتأسيس مـــــركز عالمى لأسس المعـــرفة أو Think Tank يتنافس فيه أصحاب الآراء المتفاوتة ويبتدؤون فى نقاشهم من نقطة الوفاق ويستمرون بمنطق سليم مقبول مرحلة بمرحلة فاما أن يقنعوا أو يقتنعوا ، وفى النتيجة سوف يصلون بصورة حتمية الى نتيجة واحدة وتعاليم موحـــــــدة وهى الغاية للثقافة البشرية ولكن بشرطها وشروطها وفى مقدمتها الاخلاص ، وصدق النوايا ، وترك التعصب ، وتناسى الخلفيات والرواسب ٠

سادتى الكرام ، ارشاد الأمم والشعوب أمانة فى أعناقكم ، أنتم رجال الفكر وأصحاب الرأى ، ها هنا وفى كل مكان ، والمثقفون من الناس يحسبون لأقوالكم وارائكم ألف حساب وينتظرون منكم التصــــدى للزيف والباطل والخلاف ، وان كان (مع مزيد الاسف والاسى) عامة الناس كما عرفهم الامام على (ع) (همج رعاع يتبعون كل ناعق) ينساقون وراء العواطف والاحاسيس ولكن هذا لا يقلل من مسؤلياتكم فللعالم دور وللسياسى دور ٠ ولنتضامن ولنتعاضد ولنبك ولا نتباكى ٠

فكــــل يدعى وصــــلا بليـــلى	وليــــلى لا تقـــر لهـــم بذاكـــا
اذا جرت الدمــــوع على الخدود	تتبـــين من بكى ممـــن تبـــاكا

وفى الختام اتمنى وأطلب من شبكات الاعلام والصحافة فى كل مكان أن يتعاونوا مع رجال الفكر واعلام الرأى كما يتعاونون مع رجال السياسة والاقتصاد فللأمة حق عليهم والناس يسمعون ويقرأون ويأخذون منهم القسط الاوفى من الثقافة والمعلومات وعن طريقهم يمكن الوصول الى قلوب الناس وادمغتهــــم ٠

RELIGION AND THE DIALOGUE OF CULTURES

Yehia Houweidi (Egypt)

1. Special and General Culture :

Culture is broadly divided into special and general culture : scientific-technological culture on one hand, humanities and a moral-religious study of values on the other. It is obvious that specialism is the means of advancement in our mobile social structure; it gives the student a specialized career, whether as a chemist, or an engineer or a doctor, or a specialist in some form of business or of manual or technical work. On the contrary, general culture whether somewhat vague and colourless, is used to indicate that part of culture which does not give the student competence in some occupation or vocation, but looks first of all to his life, as a responsible human being and citizen We do not mean, however, by general culture some airy knowledge in general, nor does it mean education for all in the sense of universal culture. It simply means a sort of culture aiming to produce a person with a full understanding of himself and of his place in society and in the cosmos. This general culture has somewhat the meaning of liberal education, which first appeared in slave-owning societies, like that of Athens, in which the community was divided into free-men and slaves, rulers and subjects. While the slaves carried on the specialized occupations of menial work, the free-men were primarily concerned with the rights and duties of citizenship aiming not exclusively to rule, but also to spend leisure time, to form a leisure class of free-men specially trained in the reflective pursuit of good life.

Needless to say that the existence of these two classes in Athenian society reflected and odious regard to labor. Nowadays in our modern societies this regard is over. On the contrary, our democratic societies regard leisure with suspicion and expect men

and women to engage in work. Moreover, if leisure in the past entailed aristocratic ideals and instruction only to the minority, our democratic societies have but one goal : to extend instruction to all. Democracy is the view that not only the few but all are free, in that everyone governs his own life and shares in the responsibility for the management of the community.

In other words we could say that the task of modern democracy is to preserve the ancient ideal of liberal culture and to extend it as far as possible to all the members of community. In short, to believe in the equality of human beings is to believe that the good life and culture which train the citizen for good life are equally the privilege of all. A free-man is no longer a man who is owning his liberty to any ethnic reason from his birthday on, nor in so far as he has slaves, nor is he the man essentially concerned with the rights and duties of citizenship, but he is the human being able to judge and plan for himself so that he can truly govern himself. In so doing, a free man is the one who is apt for self-determination, the one who has a firm hold on his initiatives and activities. It goes without saying that to do this a freeman must be a mind capable of self-criticism.

In brief, a free man or a liberated man in our modern democratic society should possess inner freedom as well as social freedom.

So, it would be irrelevant that what we have mentioned concerning Athenian society could be misinterpreted. The scientist nowadays might wronlgy understand that his vocation in a certain specialization could be a hinder to his liberty; might interpret the distinction between humanities and science in terms of liberal and illiberal. Jumping to this conclusion, the scientist would be completely erronous. In our modern society, we can never turn away from specialism and experts. Nowadays one should have some vocation or art. It is worthnoting also that in this epoch almost

all of us must be experts in some field in order to make a living. And since no one can become expert in all fields everyone is compelled to trust the judgment of other people pretty thoroughly in most areas of activity. I must trust the free judgment of my doctor, the advice of my plumber, the view of my lawyer and so on.

A free society thus depends on both kinds of culture : the general and the specialized, both of them being the expression and the action of a free man.

2. Where is science taking us ?

The aim of modern culture should be to prepare an individual to become an expert both in some vocation and in general art of free life. The two kinds of culture must be given to all individuals.

Nevertheless, it is time for each of us to endeavor some evaluation of the role which science or scientific culture played and is playing in his life. Each of us has the right to ask : Where is science taking us ?

Needless to say that without science we would still be living in caves. By science we have changed the face of the world, and it is science that changed the way man lives ; science being responsible for our progress ,for improving the health and comfort of the population.

But when the question comes to the personal contact with science, the image is different; it alters.

In nature, the scope is unlimited. Man finds himself dealing with living and human beings, with real plants and animals not with the bones and unanimate knowledge as presented in the laboratory. Living things give an opportunity for wonder and humility.

In society, scientists however patronized by society, yet they are not in society. The ideas they have, the work they are doing stop short with the limits of their profession. They are not part of the intellectual and cultural life of the times. The distance between science and the public is going more and more far and wide. Scientists bear a heavy responsibility in widespreading totalitarianism, because politicians have reduced scientists to yes-men. In doing so, scientists have become the weaponeers of hostile nations.

No wonder then that Bertrand Russell said that science can enhance among men two great evils : war and tyranny. It possesses the greatest force in liberating the mind, but also in enslaving man and destroying him. Science scarcely measures values. Science reveals truths, but perhaps never the whole truth. It provides increased control over the forces of nature and so gives us the means of realizing our aims in practice. But it cannot have a solution to our bitter social and political problems. The kind of unity which science provides to humanity due to its universality is far from being the living unity which mankind needs.

3. The rise of machine and the fall of man :

Though men have taken great interest in the practical results of science, yet this interest helped them to forget that science is mere knowledge, and its practical results are not more than its by-products. Then the balance between scientific method and objective outlook which are the true and democratic results of learning science, and those by-products of science was destroyed to the advantage of the latter. As a consequence, metaphysics, ethics and religion had to be ignored or eliminated in culture. In this perspective, philosophy, being the kind of culture that trains the individual to a self-examined life which according to Socrates is alone worthy of a free man, was neglected and reduced only to a philosophy of science. This is the perilious posi-

tion in which Western culture, in general, has now found itself. By reducing philosophy to pure science man has not only abdicated his right to judge nature and to rule it, but he has also turned himself into a particular aspect of nature, subjected, like all the rest, to the necessary laws which regulate its development. A world where accomplished facts are their own justification is ripe for war and for the most reckless social adventures. Its dictators can play havoc with human institutions and human lives and symbols. Fulfilling their personal dreams and wishes always out-weigh the value of human lives. A science that disclaims all interest in human values except the satisfaction of curiosity and the increase of manipulative skill cannot be useful even in its own limited sphere when the dissolution of moral values leads to a contempt for science itself and for a perversion of its results.

Most of our contemporaries are still unaware of the dimensions of the present catastrophe to which our civilization is facing and that can be resumed in few words : the rise of machine and the fall of man.

4. **Inner change :**

The above hasty approach of culture focused on its division into general and specialized one, leads us to this outcome.

Inner change is the prelude to every significant outer change, and the only way to renew the forces of our life and to achieve a true and real change is to emphasize once again the role of general culture in rebuilding the individuals as well as the society. The only way to reach this goal is to let the ethico-religious principles gain the upper hand in our instruction to the youth so that they might understand that behind the material and exterior shell of the society, and beyond the utilitarian look of life there exists an inner growth. The internal crisis in our civilization has been

these days come more and more visible to most of us. So, unless we reconstruct ourselves from our inner depth all our external triumphs will crumble. Without a real inner change no great betterment will take place in the social order. Once this change begins in our general conception of culture, everything is possible. No doubt about this statement, because we must always keep in mind that culture means — at least for us — the group of values influencing our human existence and guiding our actions and exercises in it.

The preceding presuppositions contribute to put in consideration this question :

How could we reach a renewal to our moral situation ? How a true growth in our inner life could be acquired or achieved ?

I am here adopting the view that no moral renewal to our moral situation, no real change in our whole life could be attained, no radical transformation in our societies is fulfilled unless through religion, because it appears to me as the dominant force in culture.

This answer might be regarded as paving the way to dogmatism, or as reflecting a certain opposition to free thinking, a sort of challenge to the prevailing culture of the scientific-technological revolution on the pretext that seeking cultural identity is taking the form of nationalism, ethnic and religious movements lead us to fundamentalism. My counter argument is defered until clearing out what is meant by religion, because there are many ways to understand religion.

5. Ways of understanding religion :

Religion may mean the theoretical proof given to demonstrate the existence of God or, more precisely to demonstrate the

idea of God. This intellectual aspect of religion concerns only the philosopher and is far beyond the faith of ordinary man who has a profound distrust of metaphysical constructions and proofs. Religion might also be presented as a precious revelated code for ordering and organizing our life. In this perspective religion appears to have but one and essential function : teaching right conduct and promising paradise to peacemakers and doom to wrong doers, in this world as well as in the hereafter. This is the preoccupation of the priests or, in our moslem countries, of jurists in their constant efforts to apply the details of the revelated Law or Shari'a in our life. Religion, thirdly, in the eyes of faithful worshippers represents a corpus of ritual gests and symbols.

It is obvious that religion in its second and third meanings tends towards localism, each religion having its specific way of praying, its distinct flavor and its lot of obligations and commitments. The Christian for instance, when observing the moslem orienting his prayer-rug towards Mecca, when remarking the moslem's over use or even his abuse of water day and night in his ritual ablution before prayer probably thinks that it is of no use to change a common language with him. This may be a superficial way of looking to religion, but reflects anyhow the idea that religion when conceived, as above, tends to divide the spirits of mankind rather than to unify them.

Besides, it was due to these ways of understanding religion that arose conflict between religion and science, through which religion was only considered as a mere collection of granted beliefs, rites and codes of commitments which do not cope with the scientific method. This disagreement between science and religion was not only conceived as a struggle for autonomy and distinguishing one field from another but also it was a struggle for domination from one side over the other. But since everyone in our world of today can plead for the value of science, it was a

natural consequence to note that during the last decades we witnessed a gradual decay of religious influence, and for two centuries by now, religion has only been on the defensive.

This situation however should come to an end. Humanity cannot bear the fall of religion, being one of the two major and overwhelming trends which influence human beings. Civilization will gain nothing in loosing religion nor in setting science and religion one against the other in an everlasting strain and struggle.

6. **A new approach to religion :**

What have been said should incite all of us to find out a new approach to understand religion and to make religion regain its vitality and get back its value to mankind.

But it is noteworthy that this view would not be maintained in the absence of a scientific outlook. Religion does not need at all to attack science in order to regain its vitality and to become relevant to present human affairs. How could we attain this goal and make the irreconcilables meet together so that they could change views with each other ?

We should remind ourselves that there is much distortion that results from viewing science in isolation. Science does not work in void but works within a preexistent institutional state of affairs, moral conditions and socio-religious beliefs. Even those who conceive science as if it were a self-enclosed and isolated entity cannot deny that it does not remain as such in reality. This tends meanwhile to consider morality as a practical socio-cultural fact in respect to matters of right and wrong, good and evil and theories about the ends, standards and principles according to which the actual state of affairs is to be judged.

Time is now ripe to point out that culture has an imaginative aspect as found in folk cultures, in historical traditions and in anthropology. Religion itself is a very important part of this kind of culture. While enjoying material and practical advantages of science, we must not prevent ourselves from reaping its fruits in a typical social field dealing with habits, beliefs, moral and religious attitudes. The impact of science on old institutional habits specially habits in thought and not merely habits in conduct, would give science a room for the values normally reserved for the spiritual.

This impact constitutes what is called "secularization" : a movement which was regarded as a profaning of the sacredness of the spiritual. Indeed the vital and dialectical relation between the profane and the sacred is one of the most interesting relationships provoked by religion.

Science found itself in front of two realms : the realm of the ordinary affairs of life and the realm of habits and beliefs. While science was always at liberty in intruding into the first realm, the supreme authority of the other old realm constituted by those matters of high morals called spiritual had been retained intact and no one felt courageous enough to intrude in it, in spite of its influence on the society.

In this respect, we can point out that the latin word "Cultus" which is at the origin of the word culture was first used to mean worship or pray : "Cultura degli idoli".

Now, the time is ripe to let science enter into this intact field in order to reduce the number of spots of strain in social life. In each society as well as in the whole community philosophers and religious men now have the opportunity and the challenge to perform a useful work in forwarding moral inquiry in this realm of beliefs and habits.

We ought not conceal, in this respect, that the material out of which philosophy emerged at its dawn-spring, was irrelevant to science. It was rather figurative and symbolic. It was the material hope and fear, love and hatred which soon had been consolidated in stories, dramatic legends first concerned the individual but more and more became typical of the emotional life of the tribe; it was in this way that social heritage, moral norms and beliefs; i.e. ethical traditions have arisen.

In addition, this may be the place to mention that the ordinary man left to himself is a creature of desires, habits and beliefs rather than of intellectual inquiries. The early beliefs and traditions of mankind are far from being attempts of a scientific explanation of the world. As a matter of fact, these beliefs and traditions which coined his primitive culture persisted side by side with the growing body of knowledge and culture.

Wherever possible, these two sorts of culture were interlaced. But they were kept apart because they became the possession of separate social classes.

Socrates was interested in the reconciliation of the two sides, yet the fact that he approached his task from the side of factual method, trying to find out definitions to norms and giving primacy to its criteria and canons was enough to bring him to the condemnation of death. The work of philosophy was ever since to justify on rational grounds the spirit, though not the form, of accepted beliefs and traditional morality and customs. Its mission was defined as an intellectual effort of man to extract the essential moral kernel out of the threatened traditional beliefs of the past. Henceforth, philosophy's aim was and should be always defined as to purify moral and social traditions on scientific and rational approaches. If philosophy after that healthy origin is isolated in some marginal and logical entities, this must rot conceal its origin in culture.

* * *

On this occasion we must keep in mind these precious words of Heideggar : "In passing through philosophy, science was born and thought vanished. Thinkers up to then had known neither a "Logic", nor an "Ethics" nor a physics. Yet there thinking is neither illogical nor immoral".

* * *

Probably in that realm of imaginative and emotional culture, in our pursuit after the most interesting diabetic combining together the sacred and the profane perhaps in our scientific efforts aiming at secularizing some aspects of our spiritual, cultural, moral and religious beliefs we are not to despair finding out some common traits linking together the three revelated religions. By purifying these beliefs and these spiritual symbols, through social, anthropological and scientific researches, by throwing out behind our backs their abuses and tending to pull our legs towards a worship other than that of our mighty God and thus blaspheming, falling down once again in idolatry and regressing from true monotheism we could reach a reconciliation not only between science and religion, but also between the three revelated religions, unifying them in one religion or, at least, paving the way for a rich dialogue of religions. In so doing, we could reach a general moral theory about all our social symbols, including undoubtedly our sexual ones.

Thus it is obvious that looking at culture in this new layer gives us the opportunity not only to manage the well known dialogue between general culture and specialized one but also to carry out the dialogue of cultures on a more generalized and universal scale. But we should always remind ourselves that the dialogue of cultures is maintained through religion and relying on the perspective we choose to look at religion.

7. Religion and the dignity of man in the dialogue of cultures :

Where is man in all what have been said ? Which role is he liable to play in the dialogue of cultures ?

At the outset, we must point out that man represents the corner stone in religions, or in religion because there is only one religion although there are many versions of it.

To confine myself with the religion I know better i.e., Islam, I shall try to emphasize the role of man and the portrait given to him in this particular religion. In doing this, I am dealing with a new approach to handle my subject : "Religion and the dialogue of Cultures".

It is commonly said that all religions adopt the view that man was created by God in his own image. The Quran specifies man as the "viceroy" of God on earth.

But it is stil relevant to ask : Why man has been the image of God ? Why was he considered as his "viceroy" on earth ?

St. Augustine answered this question in this way : "because he has got a mind". All greek and the so-called moslem or arab philosophers, would have gladly subscribed to this position. Reason, indeed, is the distinguished character of human being defined as a rational animal. Deprive man from reason and what is left is not man but animal.

From this perspective, this philosophico-religious definition of man is at the same time a scientific one. Science, being the legitimate exercise of reason, defined as the human faculty aiming at finding out the laws of nature imposed by God will be regarded as playing the same part as religion.

Nevertheless, this pacific co-existence between science and religion, however good for both, did not eliminate our social tumors, our troubles and misery, did not succeed in putting our conflicts to an end. All of us are wintnessing the crisis of our age, described by some of us as the decline and collapse of western civilization.

Observing all the conflicts between science and religion, those which come down to man from east and west, north and south, one should be driven to the conclusion that probably there is something wrong or rather insufficient in defining man only as a rational being.

Adopting here the view of Islam, man is primarily a being of eminent dignity. If we find in other animals some traces of this dignity, we must subscribe to the fact that human dignity is higher, more refined, having its roots, according to Islam, in a holy charter or "Testament" taken by God on man to respect always his human aspect both in himself and in other human beings as well. God himself, according to the holy Quran, witnesses the birth of every human being-many verses assert this line of thought — so that he cannot afterwards take back his word given once to God in the Testament to be always faithful-to his human nature, never to make serious degradations or concessions in his dignity, never to accept humiliation from whoever and whatever happens. Accordingly, every human being has got right in this dignity, and so far it is on the basis of all human rights and should take the lead on all of them. Humiliating man is acting against the will of God, and man himself will be regarded by God the same way each time he tends not to preserve his dignity. Without really respecting this dignity, all speeches, writing and meetings on human rights would be untenable and meaningless.

The dignity of man represents the pivot to every debate on culture. All cultures should accept it as its starting point. We can thus aspire to a common world culture. Nevertheless, I am not however unaware of the differences dividing cultures ; I can easily adhere to the fact that moral values could vary from culture to culture, but this is not to say that they are arbitrary. In fact, moral values cannot be belittled to the extent that they could merely be conceived as slogans to exlpain the motivations of our judgments or as the mobiles influencing our human behaviour, and altering from time to time, from place to place and even from an individual to another.

In addition, one could observe that a matter of dignity is a matter of moral decision; it represents a critical point of a man's life in his effort to shape up his self creation and in which he sometimes finds himself running and perhaps rushing the risk to endeavor. This self creation accompanied by that moral decision or resolution belongs to the realm of personal dignity ; but we should never loose from sight the sacred link, the vinculum substantialae, combining or rooting personal dignity with its divine vocation.

In other words, what we are now trying to make clear is that the awareness of self-dignity from my part does not go without indignation, without offensing my dignity from the part of an alien. This implies that indignation is the moral motivation for my legitimate effort to regain my lost dignity and, by so doing, to attain truth and establish justice. This would lead us to the conclusion that without a counter movement from my part to face this indignation I have suffered, i.e. without anger there would be no moral creation. Aristotle in the Nicomachean Ethics enumerates "suitable" anger as one of the virtues.

It is commonly acknowledged that there is no better way to establish a lasting peace than to launch an attack, war or even an invasion. Anger lies only on the doorstep of every war or invasion. All these measures are accused in the name of humanity as immoral. But humanity does not always doom terrorism and invasion if it is used against a bad power, or a cruel policy or as a counter attack to regain one's dignity. We should conclude then that though terrorism and war have no positive function for moral creation, yet they have no assurance to generate a better moral situation. They have at least negative check function against a bad and unjust political authority in regard to morality.

In conclusion, it should have become apparent after venturing some sporadic ideas about the second approach we opted for to handle our subject "Religion and the dialogue of cultures", that th notion of human dignity considered by Islam as the corner stone and the healthy starting point to every religious attitude is liable to offer to humanity a solid ground for a fruitful and constructive debate of cultures. If sometimes the suffering individual or nation from an act of indignation restores or seeks refuge in force, hostility and even terrorism-measures rejected by all of us-humanity however must not conceal the fact that those measures were simply used by the victim as a reaction from his part to draw the attention upon his cause, and thus, humanity should in some way or other show tolerance towards it.

In a world in which Soviet Union seems in love with Capitalism, and all facts indicate the end of one stage and the start of a new one in international relations, in the post cold war world we should never despair of a debate of cultures between different nations and powers based on religion and specially on a consensus about "Human Dignity" as an appropriate religious theme accepted by all members of human community.

....



CHALLENGES OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS TO A UNIFIED CULTURE IN THE GANDHIAN PERSPECTIVE

Ramjee Singh (India)

I

It is not easy to define the new dimensions created by science in the life and culture of modern societies. However, it has been possible to see beyond the multiplicity of disciplines, specialities, tasks, research projects to the emergence of a whole **Universe** from the mists, a focal point of convergence, a principle of unity. There is a growing awareness of the interdependence of knowledge and feeling a link between intrinsic characteristics of natural and artistic forms, between our conception of the constitutive principles of nature and the application of this knowledge to the creation of man-made forms.

To borrow the phrase of Gyorgy Kepes this will "renew the ancient marriage of art and science."(1) Technology, even more than science, has been held responsible for the rupture of modern man with the world. It has deprived men of every picture or vision and prevented them from giving the human response to the world. But if the world evaporates as an image, a new reality covers the earth. Technology is so powerfully real visible, palpable audible obiquitous that true reality has ceased to be natural or supernatural : industry is our landscape, our heaven and our hell. Technology comes between us and the world. Behind its iron, glass and almunium geometry, there remains only the unknown, that

---

1. Quotation : Collective works **Vision + value** by G. Kepes, quoted by P. Bernard, "The Future of Culture", **Diogenes**, Montreal, No. 66 Summer 1969, p. 105.

formless region as yet untransferred by man. Total point of view is far from being appreciated, either by the scientist or by the poet. If the 19th century was above all a sterile age of urbanisation, the 20th century is divided between two loyalties of tradition and modernity, national and global, rural and urban, war and peace and above all between science and spirituality. Hence the 21st century will emerge as an age of unified culture. We have to remember that totality has nothing to do with the idea of stuffing everything in. It enjoys a certain unity which it can only impose on such parts as are chosen according to a common principle, even if at certain moments these sum to be as different from each other as they could possibly be."(2)

Mankind, today is faced with an unprecedented situation of the problem of peace in a thermo-nuclear age as well as the problem of a unified culture. "Our hope for the future of mankind... lies first in the human imagination which can create the forms of things unkown and so create the image of possible futures that have not been previously imagined."(3) The nuclear war and world disarmament are both thought to be unprecedented possibilities.(4) However, there is the development in the direction of convergence of cultural traditions on matters of peace and avoidance of war. Despite the persistent strength of localisms of many kinds, there is a global anxiety to meet the challenges of nuclear war. Shared destiny may initiate but does not in itself constitute convergence. Convergene presupposes difference but also pre-supposes a certain complementariness of the

---

2. Bernard, P., Ibid., p. 108.
3. Baulding, Kenneth, **Conflict and Defence,** p. 336.
4. Waskow, A.I., "Historiography and the Disarmed world : A problem in the study of an unprecedented future", **Diogenes,** No. 48. Winter, 1964, **p. 13.**

converging.[5] This implies that though there are different philosophies and systems, there is a growing convergence of our outlook to avoid war. "History could not avoid the grandiose trend towards synthesis which characterises our epoch."[6] From the 16th century until today, history had carried analysis. The hour of synthesis has arrived. Spengler, Toynbee and others have been pioneers of these grandiose new conceptions upsetting many fixed ideas and stirring up a lively effervescence among thinkers. The time has certainly come when philosophy not merely does have something to say to this nuclear age, but it has to assert like Socrates that cost his life, Spinoza his religious affiliation, and Kant his right to write and publish. "Einstein and Martin Buber have called for a secret meeting of the "wise men" of the nations as a prelude to later conversations among their Statesmen".[7]

II

Unfortunately a national constituency for the arms race has developed in the nuclear weapon states. The armament industries deal with frontier technologies and attract the best talents available in the country. The core doctrine of the nuclear theology is deterence. The fact, however, is that the nuclear arms race was triggered off, not by the need for deterence, but by the attempt to freeze the international hierarchical power structure. The SALT and NPT were designed to maintain dominance to

---

5. Grunebaum, G.E. Von, "The Convergence of Cultural Traditions in the Mediterranean Area", **Diogenes,** No. 71, Fall 1970, p. 10.
6. Dlague, Ignacio, "The Study of Comparative Civilizations", **Diogenes,** No. 35, Fall 1961, p. 9.
7. Schilpp, P.P., "Does Philosophy have anything to say to our (Atomic) Age ?", **Proceedings of the 12th International Congress of Philosophy,** Firanze, 1961, Vol. OTTAVO, p. 245.

licence unlimited proliferation of nuclear weapons by the five nuclear-weapon powers. Hence the NPT has created a category of cyrph-nuclear-weapon nations passing for non-nuclear-weapon nations. The second loophole in the NPT scheme is the clandestine induction of nuclear weapons into Israel, S. Africa, and possibly Pakistan etc. for maintaining international currency of power and dominance. The other difficulty to reinforce the legitimacy of nuclear weapons is the socalled "nuclear free zone". The most blatant exercise is subterfuge indulged in by the nuclear theologians is to present the continuing arms race among the dominant nuclear powers as an arms control or limitation measure.[8]

There are some more significant developments in nuclear weapons culture. Firstly, there is a growing convergence between U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. on the objective of containing the arms build-up the third countries. Secondly, there has been a tremendous increase in the nuclear weapons in the possession of the two super-powers. Thirdly, there has been a large scale growth of military-industrial and nuclear-technological establishments. Fourthly, a great gap is developing between the power of the nuclear countries and that of the rest of the world. All these have contributed to the growth of an altogether new culture. It has been created by the nuclear-weapon countries by virtue of their monopoly but also because they have been trying to legitimize this culture through NPT. This is nuclear culture. The prospect of a nuclear war is horrifying. It brings us face to face not only with death, but destruction of the civilization. It might destroy our species. There is no precedent for the challenge that nuclear weapons present to us. In the words of the American Catholic Bishops, we may be "the first generation since Genesis with the

---

8. See Chapter on Nuclear Arms Race : An Alternative Perspective in **Disarmament, Development and a Just World Order**, New Delhi, 1970.

capacity to destroy God's creation.'[9] A single three-megaton hydrogen bomb equals all the conventional bomb dropped in world war II and today there are more than 50,000 such nuclear weapons in the world. There is threat of a nuclear winter. But apart from moral difficulty we are inescapably involved in the nuclear dilemma. On the one hand we are all targets and victims of the impending holocaust, on the other hand we are also participants in the system of defense by nuclear deterrence. There are arguments put forward by both the **pro-deterrence** and the **anti-nuclear consequentialists.**[10] But nuclear disarmament seems to be a "moral certainty."[11] Douglas Lackery, therefore, advocates a policy of unilateral disarmament.[12] According to the tradition of Christian pacifism, "one obvious meaning of the cross is unilateral disarmament.[13] However, there are many including American Bishops or even Pope John Paul II would allow the right to defend oneself against an unjust aggressor."[14] This is the doctrine of 'just war' or 'just defence'. Behind this ideology of a just atomic war, there was "a belief, a most deadly illusion, that we could retain a monopoly of the facilities and the knowledge for the production of fissionable material."[15] It was a

---

9. U.S. Catholic Conference, "The Challenge of Peace", God's Promise and our Response", **Origins,** National Catholic Documentary Service, 13, May 19, 1983, p. 1.
10. Nye, J.S., **Nuclear Ethics,** London, Macmillan Publishers, 1986, p. 60.
11. Goodin, R.E., "Nuclear Disarmament as a Moral Certainty". Ethics, April, 1985, p. 644.
12. Lackey, D., **Moral Principles and Nuclear Weapons,** Totowa : Rowman & Allanfield, 1934, pp. 26, 154.
13. Archbishop Raymond Hunthansen, quoted in Hollenbach, **Nuclear Ethics,** p. 66.
14. **New York Times,** May, 19, 1985, p. 3.
15. Chester Barnard in Correspondence with Walter Lippman, February, 1950, quoted by Peter Pringle & James Spigalman, The **Nuclear Barons,** London : Michel Joseph, 1982, p. 39.

deception on a grand scale. Russia surprised the world by exploding its first atomic bomb only four years after Hiroshima. Britain followed in 1952, and so did France, China and some other countries. Hence the monopoly power of atomic arsenal is broken and in case of an atomic war there will be no victor or vanquished but total devastation and extinction of all human species. Almost imperceptibly, over the last five decades, every nation and every human being has lost ultimate control over their own life and death. But "nuclear war can be prevented if our voices are joined in a universal demand in defence of our sight to live."([16]) Citizens through-out the world are expressing as never before, their concern for future.([17]) The Mexico Declaration also proclaims Humanity's Right to Peace.([18]) Gorbochev-Regan declaration in 1985 is significant : "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought". The 73rd Inter-Parliamentary Union Conference calls upon the Parliaments and Governments of all countries of the world and urges all nuclear-weapon states to agree to freeze or reduce all nuclear weapons in their possession.([19])

Apart from a deep longing for a universal culture of world peace and disarmament, the nuclear culture has also some vital economic and social consequences. Arms race represents a waste of resources, a diversion of the economy away from its humanitarian purposes, a hindrance to national development and a threat to democratic process.([20]) It also impedes "the efforts towards the

---

16. Text of the **Delhi Declaration** of the Sixth Nation Summit on Nuclear Disarmament, New Delhi, 28-1-1985.
17. Text of the **Joint Appeal** made by the Heads of State of India Argentina, Greece, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania, 2-5-1984.
18. Six Nation Summit on Nuclear Disarmament Mexico, 7-8, 1986.
19. March, 1985, LOME (Togo).
20. **Disarmament** and **Development,** Delhi : Lok Sabha Secretariat, Sept. 1986, p. 1.

cherished goal of establishing a new international economic order based on a more equitable basis".[21] American President Gen. Eisenhower put the relationship between disarmament and development in a proper perspective when he said : "Every gun that is made, every warship launched, every rocket fire signifies, in a final sense, a theft from those who are hungry and are not fed, from those who are cold and are not clothed."[22] So said Mrs. Indira Gandhi, former Prime Minister of India while addressing the 38th Session of the U.N. General Assembly: "Our plea for peace is not out of superior virtue but because peace is indivisible, because humankind now has the choice, the knowledge and the power to prevent the calamity of extinction."[23] It will not be long that the total annual military expenditure of the world will have crossed the 1000 billion dollar mark.[24] The cost of militarization is not only economic but it also involves socio-economic decline, and human losses. The famous Thorsson Report concerning the relationship between disarmament and development comes to the conclusion that "the world can either continue to pursue the arms race with characteristic vigor or more consciously and with deliberate speed toward a more stable and balanced and social and economic development within a more sustainable international economic and political order."[25] The race for nuclear weapons encourage a culture of its own. There is a relationship between strategies and cultures Strategies are culture bound and this is a moral universal phenomenon. Growing process of nuclearisa-

---

21. Palme, Olef, Common Security : A Blueprint for Survival-Report of the Independent Commission on Disarmament and Security Issues, London, 1982, p. 1.
22. **Disarmament and Development,** p. 67.
23. 28-9-1983 Quoted in **Disarmament and Development,** p. 67.
24. Thapar, Romest, "Unilateral Disarmament", **Ghandi Marg,** (Special Issue on Disarmament and Human Survival) Vol. IV, No. 2-3, May-June, 1982, p. 412.
25. **U.N. Document** A/36/356, 5th October 1981, Paragraph 391.

tion of the global environment will lead to an increase in hostile cultural communication between competing groups unless we create an atmosphere of better understanding and goodwill. Disarmament is no fad or fashion. It is inescapable and inevitable. We must have a Disarmament International[26] to persuade the leaders and followers whether it be through a One World Government or banning of all atomic tests thinking that we are all as members of one family of Nations, who are all children of God."[27] Atomic weapons have thus negatively fostered a culture of disarmament, development and world peace. Nuclear war would be a catastrophe. The impact of even a small or limited nuclear attack would be enormous. From an economic point of view, and possibly from a political and social viewpoint as well, conditions after an attack would get worse before they started to get better.[28] These are the compulsions of a new perception of techno-economics, of demography of sources of energy, of availability of material resources, of military and political power, and of cultural configurations and encounters. Third world movement is by and large the result of unprecedented nuclear threat and the New International Economic Order is a consequent of the Third World Movement. Even the doctrine of non-alignment is a reaction against the bipolar system of world politics. Non-alignement seeks to ensure the sovereign equality of all states and against all dominant patterns of international behaviour. It has demanded global political equality and to an end to the existing oligarchy symbo-

---

26. Paige, G.D. "Political Leadership, Followship, and Education for Disarmament", **Gandhi Marg,** Vol. IV, No. 2-3, May-June, 1982, p. 367.
27. Carrippa, K.H., "One-World Government and Disarmament." Ibid., p.369, General K.M. Carrippa is the first Indian Commander in Chief.
28. **The Effect of Nuclear War** Office of Technology Assessment, Congress of the United States of America, London : Allanheld, Osmun & Co. Montelaira, 1980), pp. 3-5.

lised by the Vito system.[20] The increasing military assistance provided by the developed economics and middle powers and the increase in the developing countries have led to the marginalisation of society and militarization of their political process ultimately leading to the creation of a Psyche of acquiesence. This provides a classic climate to the neo-colonialists to beef up their strangleholds.[30]

III

Gandhi's views on atom bomb are of utmost relevance to the nuclear age. He himself asks a question : "There has been cataclysmic changes in the world. Do I still adhere to my faith in truth and non-violence ? Has not the atom bomb exploded that faith."[31] His answer was in the negative. On the other hand he raised a basic question : "Has not the atom bomb proved the futility of violence ?"[32] He explained : "Non violence is the only thing that the atom bomb cannot destroy. I did not move a muscle when I first heard that the atom bomb had wiped out Hiroshima. On the contrary, I said to myself, "Unless now the world adopts non-violence, it will spell certain suicide for mankind"[33] The nucler age has posed a serious dilemma in the world of power-politics : "Either the great nations of the world must

29. "Non-alignement in Nuclear Weapons Culture", **Disarmament Development and a Just World Order,** p. 95.
30. Mishra, K.K., "Arms Race, Poverty and Political Instability," **Gandhian Model of Development and World Peace** (ed.), P.P. Mishra, New Delhi, Concept Publishing Co., 1989, p. 23.
31. **Harijan,** 10, 2, 1946.
32. His Speech at Poona, 3-3, 1946.
33. His Speech at New Delhi, 24-9, 1946.
34. Alexander, H., "Nuclear Explosions and World Peace", **Gandhi : His Relevance For our Times,** New Delhi : Gandhi Peace Foundation, 1967, 2nd ed., p. 261.

honestly agree to renounce the use of the newest type of weapon, or the world will speedily be brought to end."(34) However, renouncing violence simply out of disgust is not the non-violence Gandhi wanted. How can there be love if there is mental violence." Hence Gandhi wrote : "It has been suggested by American friends that the atom bomb will bring in **ahimsa** (non violence) as nothing else can. It will, if it is meant that its destructive power will so disgust the world that it will turn away from violence for the time being... Precisely, in the same manner will the world return to violence with renewed zeal after the effect of the disgust is worn out."(35) The moral to be legitimately drawn from the supreme tragedy of the bomb is that it will not be destroyed by counter-bombs even as violence cannot be by counter- violence. So Gandhi comes to the conclusion that "man has to get out of violence only through non-violence. Hatred can be overcome only by cover. Counter-hatred only increase the surface as well as the depth of hatred."(36)

Gandhi's thinking about atom bomb has emerged out of his holistic view of life and his faith in striving to produce a blend of all cultures which seem today to be in clash with one another. According to him,(37) no culture can live if it attempts to be exclusive." Our remote ancestors blended with one another with the utter freedom and we of the present generation are a result of that blend. Hence he says : "I do not want my house be walled in on all sides and my windows to be stuffed. I want the cultures of all lands to be blown about my house as freely as possible."(38)

---

35. Raju, P.T. "The Gandhian Way and the Nuclear War", **Gandhi : His Relevance for our Times**, p. 279.
35. **Harijan**, 7-7, 1946.
36. Ibid.
37. **Harijan**, 9-5, 1936.
38. **Young India**, 1-6-21.

In short he believed in cultural "synthesis."[39] True, culture is ethically ambivalent, a mixture of good and evil but the relative proportion would differ at different times, in different places, and different classes. Nuclearism has ushered a culture of supreme violence. The root cause of all violence and therefore, of all arms, conventional or nuclear is the disorder and disharmony that man has, in self-ignorance, created in life. The human society has fragically laid under and over emphasis on the material and physical aspect of life, so that the mind has not simply become the slave of the body but it also blunts the spiritual urges of man. The ego, which is the basic life urge has become the individual ego, group-ego, nation-ego and so on. But unless we rise above these narrow walls and break these barriers of our own make, and recognise ourselves as the Human self or Universal-self, there is no gurantee to lasting peace and progress. There are people who think that to shake the conscience of man even the two world wars were not enough and perhaps atomic catastrophe is necessary. Politicians, theologians and ecclesiastics are deeply divided even on the issue of the morality of nuclear war. It is a tragedy that even the Church refuses to brand the nuclear warfare as intrinsically immoral. In fact evil lies not in the nuclear arms but in the heart of man. Nuclear weapons are symptoms of the disease and not the cause. The cause of all causes is not understanding the human being. Our undue emphasis and importance to the physical frame and therefore self-defence and security has become our top priority. Hence, we regard peace as more absence of any possible or actual danger to our physical existence. Hence we build up our physical strength. In fact this is due to our fear that we create varieties of deterrents like atom bomb. But atom bomb has neither ended fear in man nor has stopped violence. Hence Kruschev frankly asks : "who can honestly say that the arms race has helped to solve a single

---

39. **Young India**, 17-11-20.

even the simplest international problem on the contrary it only complicates and tangles the solution of all issues in dispute."(40)

Here Gandhi shows the way. According to him, the feeling of otherness creates fear and danger. But this will remain as a mere moral platitude "unless big nations shed their desire of exploitation and the spirit of violence of which war is the natural expression and the atom bomb the inevitable consequence."(41) To fight this fear Gandhi prescribed the twin tools of fearlessness and love. On the day of his martyrdom (30-1-1948) when Gandhi was asked by Margaret Bourke-white as to how he would meet the Atom Bomb, he replied : "I will not go underground, I will not go to a shelter, I will come out in the open and let the pilot see I have not a trace of ill will against him. The pilot will not see our faces from his great height, I know. But the longing in our hearts that he will not come to harm would reach up to him and his eyes would be opened."(42) This may not sound utopian today in face of such demonstration by Bertrand Russel, A.J. Muste and Fuji Guruji.

Humanity needs a new civilization and a new ethos. H.G. Wells had predicted that man is unfit to live in the world as he knows what is good but does not know how to do good. Sir James Alfred Ewing had rightly posed a question : "Is man ethically fit for the bounties of science ?"(43) perhaps we have paid too much of our

---

40. Quoted by Om Prakash Gupta in "Gandhian Approach to Disarmament and Peace". **Gandhian Model of Development** and Peace, p. 38.
41. Ibid., p. 37 (attributed to M.K. Gandhi).
42. Ibid., p. 36.
43. Maharajan, M. "Modern Search for Peace : The Gandhian Way", **Multiple Streams and Peace Movement** (ed.) N. Radhakrishnan, Mittrapuram : G.R. Institute of Non violence, 1986, p. 66.

attention on the science of Matter and too little on the **science of Mass.** Progress in man's moral and spiritual nature has not kept pace with his intellectual progress. He has obtained control over nature's forces without being able to control himself. Since the nuclear situation is very nearly out of control and since there is danger, even without a third world war through nuclear exploitations and consequent poisonous pollution, "the way of world peace lies in cultivating the spirit of non-violence and peace in the hearts of men."(44) Gandhi did not share the diplomatic view of peace.(45) "Peace must be lust.(46) Gandhi said. Hence he laid the following three conditions for international peace : 1. Independence of all nations, 2. Equality of all nations, 3. Disarmament in theory and practice. Hence, on the global level, we need a culture of non-violence and peace. Third world countries, more than any others, need peace and security if they are to develop their rich potentials.(47) The struggle for disarmament is a civilisational struggle. Total nuclear disarmament is far more feasible proposition today when the leaders of the world are actively resigned the total destruction of all civilization, indeed of mankind.

What the world today needs is the renewal of the idea of "transcendental universalism", an idea that provides the intellectual foundations for the diversity of collective ways of life as also for the diversity of a peaceful international order. It envisages the unity of mankind and human cultures and civilisations. It calls unity in diversity of traditions in time and space. It accepts

---

44. Gandhi, M.K. **Young India,** 30-1-1930.
45. Hallett Carr, E., **Conditions of Peace,** London : Macmillan, 1944, p. 23.
46. Tendulkar, D.G., **Mahatma, Delhi :** Publications Divisions, 1962, Vol. VII, p. 2.
47. Baig, Tara Ali, "Some Implications of the Arms Race in Developing Countries", **Gandhi Marg,** Vol. IV, Nos. 38-39, p. 414.

and respects diversity. Gandhi's non-violence is the recognition of acceptance of diversity of opinions and culture. His doctrine of non-alignment in political field and "Equal Respect to all Religions" in the socio-cultural spheres. Follows from his theory of non violence, we have to choose today between Atom and **Ahimsa** (Non-violence). In fact, we have no such choice because it is a choiceless choice.

48. Saran, A.K., "Disarmament and World Peace", Ibid., p. 195.

"MODERNITY AS A CONCEPT AND AS A PROJECT"

OR

'MODERNITY', 'MODERNIZATION', AND BEYOND

Ioanna Kuçuradi (Turkey)

The organizers of this Third Afro-Asian Philosophy Conference, kindly asked me to speak on "Modernity as a Concept and as a Project". Modernity is, in fact, one of the fashionable terms of the eighties, as the term of 'dialogue', on which this Conference wishes to focus, is. They are among the "in" modern terms. I prefer to formulate the title of my paper as 'Modernity', 'Modernization' and Beyond", in order to point at what I shall focus here.

'Modern', initially the relative term of 'ancient', 'traditional', 'classical' etc., denoting the latest way of doing or making something — whatever it be —, mostly a way introduced in a revolutionary manner against the traditional one and generalized at a given place, in other words, a term denoting the new way valid at that given moment; was ascribed, with time, also a special yet ambiguous content, supposing to denote one given way.

In western circles (or in the so-called western culture) the term 'modern' appears to denote a special totality of characteristics reflected in various human activities and their products : the period in which such characteristics are seen while carrying out this or that activity and in its products — and of course diachronically —, is called modern. 'Modern philosophy', for example, according to Bochenski, is the "philosophical thought of the period between 1600-1900"(1), while 'modern art' starts around 1980, etc. What are, in fact, these characteristics ?

Thus the term 'modernity' (in English, **modernité** in French, and **die Moderne** in German), lately a concept debated upon in western circles, seems to denote a historical period in which a given world-view, marked by its rupture with the past, prevails (or else, how could the term 'post-modernity' be coined ?) ; but also a rupture with the past in general, or **"une crise par rapport à la tradition"**(2), i.e. the confrontation of a "new" world-view with a traditional one. What is, in fact, this "given" world-view ? And where do we find such ruptures ?

The debate on modernity, which is now going on in the West, betrays a reaction against the positive value judgement concerning "modernity" as a world-view, though it is not clear against which world-view.

Yet the debate going on in many non-western countries is not on modernity, but on modernization. This is an old debate, which has started in a category of non-western countries in the beginning of our Century, in some of them even before, and which is still going on. 'Modern' as a constituent part of the word 'modernization', denoted until recently the state of affairs in the West ; and as an epithet the way of doing things "as they were done" in the West ; or, where an individual is concerned, his "possessing western mentality" — in fact, different mentalities, all shaped in the history of the geographical West, including the USA.

Here we see that, what was considered in western circles to be modern, was something — whatever it was — historically new, while in non-western circles, something — whatever it was — new for them only.

Thus modernization, equated with westernization, has been a permanent item on the agenda of a category of non-western countries — of those, which had themselves opted for modernization

during the Century ; and though we see many discrepant answers concerning what has to be "taken" from the West, westernization was always considered to be something "good" and necessary for the survival of these societies. The debates going on in many such countries during the past decade or so, betray a reaction against equating modernization with westernization, and the attempt to separate them.

Here I shall try to trace the broad lines of global developments, which a) have caused the change in the conception of modernization, and in the prevailing positive value judgement concerning "westernization" in the relevant non-western circles, and which, b) have also brought "the question of modernity" to the fore in the West, in view to point at only a few of their consequences and to evaluate these developments.

* * *

Those of you, who had participated in the First Afro-Asian Philosophy Conference, will probably remember some of the observations and the analysis of the global situation I made twelve years ago. Allow me, please, to refer, nevertheless, during this talk, to some points I made at that Conference, so that I can better connect to them the intellectual developments, which, together with the political events at the global level, have caused remarkable changes in the approaches concerning our topic, during the past ten or fifteen years — i.e. to show how, in the debates in the Third World, modernization was divorced from westernization; and how, in the West, questioning modernity has emerged from the spread of the positivistic world-view; as well as, to show the connection between these two changes.

Modernity, considered historically as a rupture with the world-view and conception (or image) of man prevailing in the Middle-Ages, is often equated with enlightenment, but not rarely

with 'rationality' — understood as a way, any way, of explaining and justifying things non-metaphysically — and recently equated with what is called "western rationality", from which is understood a special approach in explaining and justifying things.

Let us first lend an ear to Kant's answer, given in 1784, — that is 206 years ago — to the question 'what is Enlightenment?" : "Enlightenment is man's leaving his self-caused immaturity. Immaturity is the incapacity to use one's intelligence without the guidance of another. Such immaturity is self-caused if it is not caused by lack of intelligence, but by lack of determination and courage to use one's own intelligence without being guided by another ! Sapere aude ! Have the courage to use your own intelligence is therefore the motto of the enlightenment" and "primarily in matters of religion". "Through laziness and cowardice a large part of mankind, even after nature has freed them from alien guidance, gladly remain immature. It is because of laziness and cowardice that it is easy for others to usurp the role of guardians. It is comfortable to be a minor ! If I have a book which provides meaning for me, a pastor who has conscience for me, a doctor who will judge my diet for me and so on, then I do not need to exert myself. I do not have any need to think if I can pay, others will take over this tedious job for me. The guardians who have kindly undertaken the supervision will see to it that by far the largest part of mankind, including the entire 'beautiful sex', should consider the step into maturity, not only as difficult but as very dangerous".(3)

Fifty years after these words were written by Kant, Schopenhauer will way : "To judge by one's own means is the priviledge of the few : authority and example lead the others. They see with foreign eyes and hear with foreign ears"(4). Here 'enlightenment' is understood as the capacity "to use one's own intelligence without the guidance of another", or "to judge by one's own means", on anything, including questions of value and values. Se-

cularism is one of the ideas of enlightenment; and it is noteworthy that 'secular', etimologically, means 'proper to the **saeculum'**, 'proper to the age'.

This Kantian conception of enlightenment seems to be not very closely connected with what is called now "rationality" or "western rationality", which appears to be rather marked by the Hegelian conception of reason, as well as by Comte's positivism, according to which human thought reaches its maturity in its third stage of development, in which man explains natural phenomena not "theologically" or "metaphysically", but through observation and experiment or by "positive science".

Modernity, as a historical period, covers all these conceptions. Yet behind both pragmatism and marxism, the relentlessly fighting ideologies in the aftermath of the second world war, we don't see enlightenment, but plain or western rationality, in the sense I mentioned above. Pragmatism, as an ideology, is characterized by a conception of man and morals, which are the products of two incompatible value imputations to man : the religionist and the positivist conception of man, which both evaluate man's potentialities in an unbalanced way. Among its mottoes we find pluralism and tolerance — the later understood in a way different from that of enlightenment, as William James "corridor" for example. Marxist ideology, on the other hand, was characterized by having cut off Marx's ideas developed more than a hundred years ago, from their sources, i.e. Marx's conception of man and value, and put them, without noticing it, together with positivism's conception of man and its "value-free" science and action. (6)

Thus we see that these two ideologies, which marked the political climate of our Century, though different perhaps in all other aspects, they share a) the same antimetaphysical or positivistic world-view — the "scientific world conception —, b) the same positivistic conception of man — the image of man without

face as I call it —, and c) the same practical meta-principle of action — the everything is permitted principle in action.

Let us here focus a little on this "scientific world-view", since the debate on modernity appears to be closely connected with this view, and let us focus on its latest, still sixty-years-old expression: "the scientific conception of the world" as formulated by the Vienna Circle in 1929. In the "manifesto" of the Vienna Circle, prepared in order to be presented to Moritz Schlick "as token of gratitude and joy at his remaining in Vienna", signed by Hans Hahn, Otto Neurath and Rudolf Carnap, among others, we read: The scientific world conception is characterized "essentially by two features. **First** it is empiricist and positivist: there is knowledge only from experience, which rests on what is immediately given. This sets limits for the content of legitimate science. **Second** the scientific world-conception is marked by application of a certain method, namely logical analysis. The aim of scientific effort is to reach the goal, unified science, by applying logical analysis to the empirical material... If such an analysis were carried through for all concepts, they would thus be ordered into a reductive system, a 'constitutive system'. Investigations towards such a constitutive system, the 'constitutive theory', thus form the framework within which logical analysis is applied by the scientific world-conceptions"... "The representatives of the scientific world-conception resolutely stand on the ground of simple human experience. They confidently approach the task of removing the metaphysical and theological debris of millenia...". "The increase of metaphysical and theologizing learnings which shows itself today in many associations and sects, in books and journals, in talks and university lectures, seems to be based on the fierce social and economic struggles of the present : one group of combatants, holding fast to traditional social forms, cultivates traditional attitudes of metaphysics and theology whose content has long since been superseded; while the other group, especially in central Europe, faces modern times, rejects those views and takes its stand

on the ground of empirical science. This development is connected with that of the modern process of production, which is becoming ever more rigorously mechanised and leaves ever less room for metaphysical ideas. It is also connected with the disappointment of broad masses of people with the attitude of those who preach traditional metaphysical and theological doctrines. So it is that, in many countries, the masses now reject these doctrines much more consciously than ever before, and along with their socialist attitudes tend to lean towards a down-to-earth empiricist view. In previous times, materialism was the expression of this view; meanwhile, however modern(?) empiricism has shed a number of inadequacies and has taken a strong shape in the scientific world-conception. Thus, the scientific world-conception is close to the life of the present... We witness the spirit of the scientific world-conception penetrating in growing measure the forms of personal and public life, in education, upbringing, architecture, and the shaping of economic and social life according to rational(?) principles. The scientific world-conception serves life, and life receives it."[8] These are the last sentences of the neopositivistic "manifesto", in which we find expressed the assumptions and expectations of the so-called scientific conception of the world, and of its "value-free" science. This seems to be the world-view to which "rationality" was equated, and against which the claim was raised that this is "western rationality", i.e. only one rationality, in other words, one world-view among other ones. The criticism exercised upon modernity — or western rationality — seems to have in mind such a world-conception.

Now, if we look at this equivalence of rationality — scientific conception of the world — western rationality, buit in a wrong way; we see that we are in front of a claim, true in itself, a wrong equivalence and at least one wrong conclusion : i.e. we see that the scientific world conception is, indeed, only one world-view among others, but its equation with rationality a wrong one, as is also wrong the conclusion subsequently deduced from this equa-

tion, that there are many "rationalities", though it is true that there are many world-views.

What does, indeed, 'rationality' or 'rational' mean ? 'Rational' means 'being in conformity with reason'. What, then, is 'reason' It is a human capacity to which in the history of Philosophy different functions are ascribed. Philosophers speak of theoretical, practical, technical, dialectical and other reason(s).

Going through these functions carefully — from Plato to Sartre —, we observe that reason appears to be mainly the capacity — or formal activity — of putting in connection given premisses, in accordance with the so-called principles or laws of reason; or : the capacity to make a deduction from given premisses in various ways and come to a conclusion — yet from premisses of different epistemic characteristics and of different epistemic value. For example, justifying **(begrüden)** a claim, is nothing else but stating the premisses wherefrom that claim was deduced; explaining a claim — of somebody else —, finding the premisses wherefrom he or she deduced that claim — i.e. stating or finding the 'why's — the reasons — of that claim. The problems concerning the epistemic specificity of these premisses or the specificity of the given "reasons", which are put forth by quite different activities of knowing, are quite different from those concerning reasoning or justifying and explaining given claims.

The debate about rationality and rationalities, seems to revolve around problems concerning not reason or reasoning, but the epistemic specificity of the premisses of reasoning or the given "reasons". "Non-metaphysical" justifications or explanations of claims are considered to be "rational". Yet what is considered to be "non-metaphysical" shows a great variety.

Now, when we look at propositions used as premisses for rea-

soning or deduction, from the view-point of their epistemic specificity, we see that some of them are propositions of knowledge — i.e. that they possess an object independent from those who put them forth —; or that they are propositions — general, particular, singular propositions — expressing a thought (for example a thought connected with an "ought", a "may" etc.), deduced, in different ways, either from knowledge, or from other kinds of statements. Knowledge has to do not only with nature, or the so-called "external world". Anything, all human products included, — i.e. also ideas, concepts, values, actions, activities etc. — can be objectified, i.e. can become objet of knowledge.

Logical empiricism has reduced all knowledge only to propositions which "rest on the immediately given", which are of course knowledge, but not its only kind, and made out of this reduction an approach to be used in all areas of human endeavour. This approach is mainly what is called "the scientific conception of the world", which was apparently equated first with "rationality" and then with "western rationality", which is now the object of total or partial criticism, under the name of modernity — a criticism which, nevertheless, shares its "value-free" approach.

But what does it mean for "science", or anything else, to be "value-free" ? It seems, so far as I can see, to denote its being "free" — independent — from the prevailing general moral value judgements — the goods and the bads — of a culture.

Lack of philosophical knowledge concerning value and values, and the equation of value with value judgements and of values with norms, on which I shall not dwell here,(9) seems to be another factor which led to questioning rationality.

Thus modernity — the rupture with the medieval tradition, i.e. the prevailing christian world-view, conception of man and conception of morals — equated with the latest widespread world-

view and conception of man in the West — in spite of the fact that as historical period it includes also enlightenment, marked by secularism, the idea of human dignity, human rights and such other ideas —, has led some thinkers in the West (and it is noteworthy to mention that most of them are French thinkers) to criticize and reject "modernity", and some others to a milder criticism, i.e. to point at the need to revise it.

Therefore, science as a world-view and its consequences, the lost of the object of knowledge in epistemology and its consequences,(10) and the lack of philosophical knowledge concerning value and values, coupled with the historical events during and after Second World War and especially with their outcome during the recent decades — some of the so-called global problems : pollution, arms-race etc. — have shaken the belief in rationality in the West, and the belief in "western rationality at global level. The all-increasing presence of the Third World(11) in intellectual and political debates, has also contributed to this change.

* * *

Let me now have a look at the question of modernization, at the change in the conception of modernization — at its divorce from westernization —, which occured during the past ten or fifteen years.

In the countries of the Third World, which were in the "process of modernization" before the Second World War, modernization was usually equated to westernization. The debates going on, were almost only about what was to be "taken" from the West.

At a certain moment, for some reason, people from these countries got in touch with the western world and looking at this world from the "outside", felt overwhelmed by its standards of living — high in comparison with their own. So, in order to make

their countries like the West and catch up the age, they tried mostly to imitate the western way of living : they tried to imitate the morals which were widespread in the West, at the moment of their encounter with "that West", and tried to import its institutions and technology, i.e. they tried to take the products of a culture and social structure quite different from their own, those of the industrial western society. Thus, they hoped, the "existing order of things" would change and as a consequence their countries would catch up with the age.([12])

Such a race was **a priori** in a deadlock. Yet this deadlock has become obvious only after the developmental policies followed in the sixties and seventies in these countries.

After the establishment of the U.N., "development" — i.e. the idea of development — has become, as it is well known, the principal aim of national policies in almost all the countries of the world, yet understood as increase of the **per capita** income, industrialization and import of technology in the "developing" countries, and as unlimited increase of the industrial production in the "developed" ones.([13])

In most "developing" countries, these policies carried out by "foreign aid", i.e. loans at high interest from "developed" countries, have created the political dependency of these countries to what until recently was called First and Second Worlds, but have not affected so much the lives of the majority of the people in these countries. The gap between the rich and the poor was broadened as a result of these developmental policies, i.e. they even produced results opposite to what was expected. Import of western technology — TV mainly — has nevertheless introduced or hastened "social change" — change in value judgements and norms of a part of the population of these countries, and mainly of their "intellectuals", a part of whom was and is not happy at all to see these changes in their traditional cultures, i.e. in the

prevailing world-views, conceptions of man and what was considered to be valuable.

This change, which is a fact, together with certain historical and psychological factors, has led, on the one hand, to the attempts to divorce 'modernization' from 'westernization' and equate it with 'introduction of the latest technology'; and, on the other, to the so-called crisis of identity, we observe in these countries.

This partial change seems to be at the origin of the reaction to "western culture", we see in the above-mentioned category of "developing" countries — those which had previously opted for modernization in the sense of westernization, by their own will. Yet this reaction turned into a reaction to western culture in general, including enlightenment, and not only to the positivistic world-view. Endeavours to revive or resurrect their "traditional cultures", i.e. the conception of man and of what was, once, i.e. before their encounter with the West, considered to be valuable in these countries, started gaining ground, during the past two decades. These endeavours were supported by the West, "troubled conscience" coupled with lack of philosophical value — knowledge, played, and still plays, a considerable part in the divorce I mentioned before. The so-called fundamentalism is perhaps the most striking appearance of this divorce of modernization from westernization, in the countries "on the way to modernization" — still not in most of the decolonized ones.

Thus we see that "development" understood only as economic development, has led to the demand for "cultural development", which, understood in Third World countries, as 'development of one's own "different" world-view and of one's own "different" conception of man and values', caused first a revolt against the positivistic conception of man, and subsequently to western culture in general, as a result of which, modernization was reduced to developing or importing the latest technology.

Also the demand for "cultural development", understood, in the West, as promotion of human activities deemed to cultivate the "human soul",(14) appears to be a revolt against the positivistic world view. The revival of religion we observe during the demarxization in Eastern European countries, seems also to be, among others, a revolt against the positivistic conception of man and the world — religion being considered to be the only place where "value" and "meaning" can be found; which, incidentally, is not the case.

Looking globally at the present situation of our world, we can say that the positivistic image of man — not of the enlightenment —, of "man without face", has led to different, yet related, criticisms. The point where they meet, is their questioning of science as a worldview. On the other hand, problems of value, and anthropology constitute their common background or concern.

What we experience just now, is a global revolt against the positivistic conception of man and the world; yet we mostly deal with its outcome, the so-called global problems; but in doing so, we act, I am afraid, without anthropological knowledge and without value knowledge. This is perhaps the reason why, we juxtapose, not only synchronically but also diachronically, different cultures and wish to promote a dialogue among them.

In this mixture and co-existence of conceptions of man and of what is valuable, in this so-called "plurality of culture", we need philosophical knowledge of man and of values in order to evaluate not only these existing cultures, but also modernity —: this mixture of culture in the West — and its different images of man.

Thus we need perhaps neither to defend nor to reject modernity in whatever sense, neither to defend nor to reject moderniza-

tion, also in whatever sense; we need new philosophical knowledge : an epistemology beyond the positivitic one — one which distinguishes, not between science and metaphysics, but between knowledge and the other products of the human mind —; and ontology, which has overcome the "great reduction" of Being into one of its species — an ontology beyond the dualism of the physical and metaphysical; an anthropology which does not deal with images or conceptions of man, but with his specifities, which include also his possibilities; and an ethics, which is neither normative nor meta-ethics, but which goes beyond these approaches and objectivies the ethical human phenomenon.

We need this knowledge not only in order to tackle in a better way with the global problems we face, but also in order to evaluate what we try to do just now, in order to solve them, i.e. in order to evaluate our anticipated solutions, or the mottoes of our times — pluralism, dialogue, dialogue of cultures etc. Are we, for example, sufficiently aware where we may speak of pluralism and where we may not ? Are we sufficiently aware of the function of dialogue, as a human activity ? I am sure. Platonic dialogue is among the best examples, showing us the function of dialogue, which appears to be : to create — in each case — the conditions of looking at the same object of knowledge. We need dialogue, in order to help each other to become aware of what each of us, in a given case does not know, not concerning each other or our cultures, but concerning the object to which is related the problem we are dealing with. This is a necessary but not sufficient condition for avoiding conflict, which, in turn, is only the first prerequisite in the endeavour to create a more humane world.

Concerning the central question of this Conference (15) : our problem now seems to be more acute than we think. What we face now, is not confrontation or conflict of cultures within the

same country, within the same society, which leads people to unscrupulous murder.

What has remained from positivism, concerning the principles of action, is the "everything is permitted" principle : while what remains from enlightenment is the idea of human dignity, of human rights, of secularism etc. The confrontation from now on, will be, it seems, not between cultures, but mainly between those who — be they scientists, philosophers, politicians or laymen — know and those who don't know what the value or dignity of man is — not matter in which culture they were brought up.

This is the reason why, in facing also global problems, dialogue in view to create, in given cases, the conditions of looking at the same object of knowledge, could be more promising than the so much promoted dialogue of cultures, provided that those involved in that dialogue possess the will to look for and find what ought to be done in the given case for a better world for all.

Allow me, please, to repeat what I have often said during the past fifteen years : What we have to do now, is to try to spread the demand and to persuade those who govern us, at national and international levels, to replace the idea of development, as the principal aim of national and international policies, by the protection of basic human rights.

NOTES :

1. I.M. Bochenski; **Contemporary European Philosophy,** trans. from the German by Donald Nicholl and Karl Aschenbrenner, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1959, p. 1.

2. "La Modernité en Problème", **Autrement,** No. 102-Novembre 1983, p. 17.

3. "What is Enlightenment", trans. by Carl J. Friedrich, in **The Philosophy** of Kant, Modern Library, 1949, p. 132 f. and p. 138 f.

4. **Die beiden Grundprobleme der Etbik",** Saemtliche Werke 4, 1950, Vorrede zur ersten Auflage XXVI.

5. For the special meaning of this term, see my "From Revolt to Philosophy", in **Philosophers on Their Own Work 11,** p. 109.

6. See also my "Tradition and Revolution or Philosophy and World Politics", in Proc. First Afro-Asian Philosophy Conference, Cairo, 1978, p. 185-196.

7. Emphasis added.

8. "The Scientific Conception of the World. The Vienna Circle", Dordrecht, 1973, p. 11 and 19-20.

9. For these distinctions see my **Etik** [Ethics], Ankara 1988 ; or my paper on "A Different Approach to Ethics", International Philosophical Congress on Traditional Cultures, Philosophy and the Future, Jakarta, 3rd-9th January 1990.

10. See also Hannah Arendt's "The Concept of History : Ancient and Modern", Epilogue, **Between Past and Future,** Penguin Books, 1978.

11. For which we need now to find another word.

12. See also my "Tradition and Revolution", op. cit.

13. See also my "Les droits de l'homme et la décennie du développement culturel", in **Birlesmis Milletler Türk Dernegi 1988 Yilligi,** Ankara, 1990, p. 25-33.

14. See also my "Cultures and World Culture", in **Philosophie et Culture — Actes du XVIIème Congrès Mondial de Philosophie IV,** Montérial, 1988, p. 457-460.

15. The question "Cultures in Conflict or in Dialogue ?"



CULTURAL IDENTITY AND MODERNITY

Ghazala Irfan (Pakistan)

Requires that we deal with a common humanity but diverse cultures. The patterns of human concerns remain in a perennial flux. Our constructs undergo ceaseless transformations. We are confronted with paradoxes of immense magnitude. On the one hand is a commonwealth of human dignity and on the other intricate complexities of ethnicity and folk values. The contemporary world has become interactive being continuously exposed to each other. Yet the local traditions are articulated and verbalised, both implicitly and explicitly. If the world has been reduced to a global village a universal culture must reign supreme, yet small pockets each with a unique characteristic flavour hold its own. Traditional institutions and values persist with an extraordinary resilience. In the quest for modernity lies interspersed the polarities of unity and contradiction.

Inter-societal communication heralds the process of social change. Modernization is the current term for this age long process described as 'similarities of aspiration regardless of other considerations and an accelerated adaptive capacity — a rapid physical, social and psychological mobility.

Social scientists do not agree on any single comprehensive formulation for a criterion of modernity. There has however been a steady convergence among theoreticians on certain key points regarding validity and scope. Let me identify these :

A degree of self-sustaining growth in economy is the single most important factor. Development including production and consumption at a steadily increasing level is a pre-requisite and a necessity for social change. Economic development variables

such as industrialization, commercialization, urbanization, national income and per capita income need to spread. Let us not be unmindful of the dangers. Purely economic processes overlook the factor of human resources for sustained real growth must incorporate and be geared to the skills and values of the people who make it work. So although the economic factor is a significant aspect of modernity it is meaningless unless the human equation is also a high priority objective.

It has historically been the Philosopher's task to delineate and resolve — that which remains untouched by change while undergoing change — that something which remains unchanged and unaffected by the transformation that it undergoes. The problem of identity and diversity, the antinomies of change and permanence have been dealth with by two main streams of philosophic thought. In Greek antiquity we have the classic case of Heraclitus maintaining that nothing remains untouched by or immune to change. On the other hand Zeno and Parmenides hold that there must be something that remains exempt from change. There have been conflicting claims as to what constitutes reality and what the illusion.

Closer to one own time these problems have culminated in two broad issues — the conception of identity interpreted as meaning permanence (amid change) or as unity (amid diversity). In philosophy the former gave rise to the problem of substance, the relation between what seems so and what is so (appearance and reality) and the problem of personal identity. The latter splintered into the problem of Universals i.e. the problem of individuation and the problem of abstract ideas. This dilemma has no ready solutions. Anthropology focuses on three axioms — the psychic unity of humankind, the unity of human history and the unity of culture. If these Universals be the postulates of an all-explanatory map to what may be relegated the simple functio-

nal units of thinking, feeling and acting transmitted from person to person ?

Therefore if modernity encompasses economic growth alone the picture is myopic and limited. If modernity refers to a capacity and capability towards achievement or participatory continuum rather than a static orientation it is to be emulated. One must guard against an exaggerated emphasis or learning towards modernity. We must not forget that modernism does necessarily go in one direction ; it is not irreversible ; it does have breakdowns ? negative developments or even decay. The tendency towards a three tier approach i.e. traditional — transitional — modern, is also open to criticism. It converys a false model as if the traditional stage is at the lowest ring of the ladder and the modern is optimum growth. The thesis of a two polar opposites i.e. agrarian vs industrial and traditional vs modern puts the traditional scheme at a disadvantage too by characterizing it as 'ascriptive, particularistic and diffuse' while the modern is ascribed the characteristic 'achievement-oriented, universalistic and specific'.

Ideally tradition should be harnessed to modernization, neutralized if it is an obstruction but encouraged if it is supportive provided creative capacities and adaptive capabilities are adept at dealing with traumas and crises, handling and surmounting them. Modernity is future oriented; it should suggest probabilities but only with retrospective analysis. Rational policy planning for social change should be the mark distinguishing modernity but no growth is in a vacuum and no evolution without roots. Paradoxically therefore a continual reappraisal of values, norms, standards, institutions and individual behaviour can be the only model of modernization.

Modernity involves an increased measure of public participa-

tion in the polity — this means more democratic representation — which is not only a strong bias but enjoys an acute intensity of fervour. The irony is that citizens — patriotic or otherwise — are often ignorant of their past and voters are often ambivalent about their future. Homo modernus shows a conspicuous absence of a sense of direction. In any case experimental studies indicate that rapid institutional changes are rare and societies can only incorporate ideas they can assimilate and conventionalize. Alternatively intrusions can only be destructive. In a modern participant society enough people must contribute continuously to make these institutions viable. These in turn can only be durable if it is reciprocally rewarding. Thus one society cannot transfer or export models to another; the recipient society must transform itself if it seeks to or wishes to modernize for 'adopted lifeways may only be adopted'.

Or on individual level one must not overlook the effectiveness of interpersonal influence. Cultural identity is retained, diffused or transmitted by intimate contact. These are potent in bringing about radical changes of opinion, attitudes or even action. Processes of acceptance have been divided into various stages beginning with the stage of "awareness, evaluation, trial and eventually acceptance" whether these stages are sequential in time and pre-requisite to each other or whether they are different dimensions only need not concern us here. What we need to emphasize is that interpersonal relations may legitimate social change. For taking innovative risks one needs support of some one who cares — to modernize one needs social support of some influential persons who matter.

This leads us to the salient feature of modernity i.e. an increment of mobility whether it be personal or social focussing or a'preferred picture of a future'. Thus culture is not just the investigation or observation of behaviour but consists also of those norms or ideologies which purport to justify or rationalize

the options, the choices (conscious and unconscious) or the selec ted ways of behaviour. Culture thus becomes the 'intervening variable between human organism and environment'.

But there is more than one kind of model or picture which can accurately or adequately depict the variegated, complex, intricate, rich human condition of culture or modernity.

One major supposition of modernity is a diffusion of secular-rational norms in the culture. In the nineteenth century philosophical currents like positivism and evolutionism, rationalism and empiricism culminated in attempts to reconcile science with religion and historical criticism with belief There was a general rejection of the supernatural. The orbit moved from the transcendental to the immanent. Everything was to submit to reason and reflection. Could religion and reason accomodate one another? Were they inherently opposed to each other or were they just alien ? More specifically these were questions about fundamental religious beliefs pertaining to God, this relationship to nature and man and the life hereafter. All these assumed new proportions in the light of scientific enquiry. It was much later that the distinction between the irrational and the non-rational came to the fore. In the world of Islam Mohd. Abduh argued that faith and scientific reason work at different levels. He went to the extent of affirming that Islam is 'not only not incompatible with reason but is the only religion which religiously calls upon man to use his own reason and investigate nature.

(Fazlur Rahman, 1966, p. 217). To prove his thesis he cited verses of the Quran calling upon the faithful to observe nature — God's creation as the signs of God. Thus what was advocated was not conflict but positive co-operation between reason and faith although the two were supposed to operate in different spheres.

The first genuine Muslim modernist was Jamal al-Din Afgha-

ni who enjoined upon the Muslims to cultivate philosophic and scientific enquiries by introducing the two disciplines in educational institutions. Afghani deprecated the western allegation that Islam and Reason did not blend. He also gave to the world a humanism — concern for the weal of man qua man' (ibid, p. 216) i.e. a better moral order in this world rather than the next.

In the Indian sub continent Sayyid Ahmad Khan took upon himself to prove that modern science is in conformity with Islam. He laid down what he termed the criterion of 'Conformity to Nature'. Thus rationalism and naturalism were both incorporated especially when Sayyid Ahmad Khan rejected the doctrine of Miracles-suspension of natural processes) which Muslims have held to prove the omnipotence of God. In a later phase he and Charagh Ali rejected the Hadith altogether. In an earlier phase Sayyid Ahmed Khan had proposed that Muslims distinguish between authentic and inauthentic Hadith.

In the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent again an eminent jurist Sayyid Amir Ali propounded and elaborated the thesis that Islam encourages the march of reason. The Spirit of Islam was in conformity with a historical and cultural drift towards modernity.

This train of thought was developed by Mohd. Iqbal in his Reconstruction of Religious thought in Islam who argued that modern western thought was in fact a legacy of the Muslims. They had spurred the west and shaken it of its complacency by imbuing it with the spirit of rationalism and humanism. Thus Muslims would not be importing ideas but only owning and rehabilitating once again their initial intellectualism.

Iqbal's thrust towards modernity took a philosophic turn when he used the finality of Prophethood as an indication that human beings had reached a stage of maturity. They themselves were their own navigators and legislators. No ready made solutions were present to be used as crutches. No answers were for

all times. Muslims were the heirs to the rational and scientific impulses which must presume and imbibe constant reconstruction.

The actual incorporation and application of such modernist ideas is fraught with uncertainty. Who can be the torch bearers of such a process. On the one hand are the Ulma restricted by the traditional conservative outlook; on the other hand lay Muslims even with wide liberal education represent no one but themselves. Their credentials were always dubious and doubted. A natural split took place moving out in two diverse directions. One was akin to Westernism and the other moved towards Fundamentalism or Revivalism. The important distinction between Westernism and Modernism became diffuse.

Despite all these modernist cries liberalism has failed to develop in the Muslim world. There is a return to faith rather than an explanation of faith, with a discursive thought element, primarily because Modern Westernism has become akin to Secularism. No matter how radical a Muslim intellectual westernist is, he is not able to disassociate from all emotional appeals to Islam. The initial Modernist impulses in Muslim societies have therefore frittered away and Westernism and Intellectualism have not been able to find fertile ground to disseminate die-hard Secularism. Perhaps only in Turkey where it has been imposed rather than cultivated naturally.

Pan-Islamism — an ideal — could never be translated into reality but it is an idea that lives on in the aspirations of people. Nationalism has made inroads in political and concrete terms but if we are able to define Nationalism as a sentiment for a certain community of mores which give cohesiveness to a group only, it does not become an anti-thesis of pan-Islamism. Thus nationalism e.g. of an Egyptian or a Pakistan does not detract from a strong Islamic brotherhood and is not averse to the wider loyalty to Islam. A state community may continue to seek wider Islamic

objectives. Pakistan for example is a natural heir to all the cultural traditions and achievement of the Muslims of the Indo-Pak sub-continent. Pakistan's birth epitomizes the dream of the Muslims to live according to their own values and traditions. Pakistan's creation was the desire to crystallize the character and contribution of Indian Muslims. Yet the Pakistan state does not conflict with the ideals of Islam or the possibilities of the unity of the Muslim Ummah. One must act locally but think globally.

Pure Secularism could not be synthesized in the Muslim world ; rationalism had had its ebb and decline. But the concept of ijtehad has been defined in no uncertain terms. The Muslim society must necessarily be active and dynamic; it must constantly reorganize and reconstruct. It must continuously resolve its contradictions and more ahead within the spectrum of realizable possibilities — a modernist approach and Modernism can never become obsolete.

To sum up I'd like to refer to a novel definition of cultural identity. People tend to think of Islam as an Arabian Culture. This notion was contested by Hitti and I quote 'Except for the Arabic language through which it was disseminated the Arabians contributed almost nothing'. He goes on to maintain that 'Islam is a compound of ancient Semitic, classic Greece and Medieval Indo-Persian'. I use this as a paradigm case of overlooking the nucleus of a culture, the atmosphere and the ambience. Forward looking perspectives must incorporate within Islam the contribution of non-Arabs so that it retains its vibrancy and vitality — a modernist thrust but the cultural identity of the Arab world is the fulcrum of Islam. If we are able to oevrcome the dichotomies of either — or (the disjunctive propositions of Aristotle) modernity and cultural identity may not need to neutralize or cancel each other; rather they could both be creative, assimilative, synthetic enterprises.

....

UNITY OF CULTURES AND WORLD ENVIRONMENT

Mona Abousenna (Egypt)

It has become a characteristic phenomenon of our contemporary age, particularly post-war era, that every decade or two have their distinct catchwords or catchphrases. In the late fifties and sixties it was "alienation" and "anomy", culminating in the world student movement which raised Marcuse' slogan of the "one-dimensional man." Following that immediately, and perhaps coinciding with it, the catchwords "sacred" and "secular" came to the fore with the revival of Durkheim's theories of the sacred. This coincided with the rise of religious dogmatism and student fundamentalist groups who were setting out to rediscover the sacred and to impose it on a godless world, i.e. a secular world dominated by science and technology and contaminated by modernization and industrialization. (1)

With the growth of world fundamentalist trends, the next emerging catchword, and rightly so, was "identity", or more strictly, "cultural identity," thus trigerring off more worldwide ethnic and sectarian strife and culminating in regional wars.

The worldwide energy crisis in the wake of 1973 October war, and its accompaying oil embargo, resulted in the mushrooming of Gulf petro-dollar wealth which, according to Alvin Toffler, inverted the traditional capitalist principle of development being the basis of wealth by accumulating wealth in the total absence of any development. (2) The catchword accompanying this phenomenon was "environment", which resulted in the establishment of pressure groups, political parties, committees and councils for the protection of the environment and for nature conservation. Alongside with these bodies, magazines, books, conferences dealing with environment suddenly swept the whole world and infil-

trated all circles, intellectual, political as well as military ones. The accompanying phenomenon, this time, was drastically alarming because it overshadowed any previous regional or even universal unrest (i.e. student movement or ethnic and religious wars). It was the threat of nuclear annihilation.

Now the question is :

What is environment ? Or, in more exact terms, how was the catchword of the 1980s defined by its advocates and pioneers ?

In view of the multiplicity and diversity of definitions, the definition adopted here focuses on the cultural i.e. civilizational dimension of the term. Caldwell, one of the figures of environmental studies, in his book **Environment, A Challenge to Modern Society**, writes "The human environment is a matrix of elements derived by evolution through nature and contrived by man through culture. The distinction sometimes drawn between social and physical environment is a false dichotomy. For each individual and for all society, the environment is a complex unity, although the actual environment of no two persons is the same. There is no individual or society without an environment, and no environment exists except as something is environed." (3) Rene Dubos, the French-American biologist and one of the pioneers of environmental studies, distinguishes civilization from culture by using "civilization" in the singular when referring to the values that can be shared, and are increasingly shared, by most people irrespective of origin, race, or religion. In contrast, he uses "cultures" in the plural to designate the body of values, ideas, and beliefs which are characteristic of a particular group. Although Dubos is alarmed by the disquieting conditions under which man lives and which threaten his "humaneness," by which he means the increasing modernization and mechanization resulting in the pollution of the environment, he confirms that "science, the tech-

nologies derived from it, and certain ethical concepts are meaningful to most mankind and might serve as the basis for a universal civilization. Cultural values differ from group to group, change with it, and imply the diversity inherent in mankind."(4) Hence, Dubos, by linking environment to civilization and culture, concludes that unity and diversity are two complementary aspects of man's nature which produce human civilization. However, the criterion determining unity and diversity of cultures is environment, or, man's relationship to nature.

The term "environment" implies another related term, namely, "ecosphere" which combines two concepts "biosphere" and "ecosystem." Jean Lamark, the 19th century French naturalist, first conceived the idea of the biosphere as the collective totality of living creatures on the earth, and the concept has been taken up and developed in recent years by the Russian geochemist. V.I. Vernadsky. The word "ecosystem" means a self-sustaining community of organisms — plants and animals — taken together with the inorganic environment.(5) Hence, the ecosystem is scientifically the most fundamental concept for environmental analysis. Thus, man's relationship with the environment involves an ecological process in which the interplay of the biosphere and the ecosphere are in dialectical relation. The geneticist Theodosius Dobshansky says that "man is part of his own environment, as well as being influenced by it. The organism and environment are really parts of an interacting system."(6)

However, it was none of these theoreticians and scientists who motivated or spread the term of environment and set off with it a whole world trend. It was rather an industrial-scientific institution, the Club of Rome, which was behind the spreading of the term and the trend. The Club of Rome was formed in 1968 by Aurelio Peccei, an Italian economist and director of FIAT, at a meeting held in Academia Nazionale dei Lincei in Rome by a number of European scientists and intellectuals holding different

views and beliefs. Speaking of the aims of the Club, Peccei formulates it as to look for a way out of the situation in which mankind finds itself as a result of the unplanned character of present-day social development and the improvidence of its leaders. The main problems which have to be solved to reach this aim are outlined by the Club of Rome as follows : (1) population and the earth's ability to ensure its further growth ; (2) vital resources; (3) the environment; (4) psychological evolution of human society and its institutions; (5) creation of a new philosophy with the quest of human life.

However, the Club of Rome became more famous and widely known in 1972 with the publication of **The Limits to Growth,** a collective monograph produced by D.H. and D.L. Meadows, J. Randers and W. Behrens of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology on the basis of the Club's fundamental elaborations of Peccei's original conceptions and the method worked out by the well-known American systems-analyst Jay Forrester. In the famous Meadows report, as it came to be known later, the authors used the method to construct a universal "world system" model of the year 2000 which in their view takes due account of the basic trends of modern development.

This new universal hierarchical world model consists of ten blocks, or "regions." The regional divisions are to help build a more improved model which would take into account the socio-economics aspects of the "world system," proceed from the distinctions between planned and free-market economies, and record the specifics of the economic structures of the developing countries. The proposed model was presented and labelled "A Strategy for Survival."

It is quite obvious that this proposed world model for a world system concentrates on the economic structures in the sense of the socio-political dimensions of the economic structures

of the capitalist and socialist systems on the one hand, and those of th underdeveloped countries on the other. The cultural dimension underlying such economic structures is totally overlooked. The strategic objective of the Club of Rome and the Meadows report is social stability and dynamic equilibrium on universal scale. They also consider that the unlimited growth, in view of the earth's finite resources, is a hindrance to the realisation of these objectives. Their world models contain five major world development trends : accelerated rates of industrialisation, rapid population growth, wide expansion of the zone of undernourishment, exhaustion of irreplaceable resources and deterioration of the environment.

By excluding the cultural aspect of environment and reducing it to the ecological factors determined by the biosphere, what they considered as the social was in turn reduced to the technosphere. For the Club of Rome, the vision or the philosophy that seeks to preserve human life comprises only the biosphere and the socio-technosphere. The theoretical assumptions of such view of the world run counter to the very essence of human civilization.

The history of human civilization indicates that it evolved out of man's dialectical relationship with the natural environment which rested at the beginning of civilization on man-nature relation, diverging later into man-man relation with the emergence of societies. At the dawn of civilization man, being one of the organisms of nature, was in perfect harmony and unity with nature. However, such unity was imposed on him in a deterministic manner by the realm of necessity, or in more modern terms, the biosphere or the ecosphere. In his attempt for survival, man emerged triumphantly by controlling and changing nature for his own ends. The results of this qualitative shift were agriculture and animal husbandry along with the arts, primitive science and technology. The major achievements, however, have

been the creation of society which was a manifestation of the unity between man as an organism of nature having extricated himself from it, and other natural organisms such as plants and animals. That is, a unity of the biosphere and the ecosphere through man's unique human resource, namely, reason. However, having the key to the control of nature, man now turned to controlling other men and, hence, society was born.

This divergence, at the dawn of civilization, coincided with the origin of society. Hence, the socio-ecological problematic started. For man started to be alienated from nature and instead of discovering himself through nature, he set out to discover his own entity, the self, through contact with other entities, i.e. other selves, as the Socratic statement "Know thyself" indicates. Man-man relationship, which replaced man-nature relationship, evolved towards the Hobbsian maxim "Homo hominus lupus." With the scientific and technological progress, which originated in Baconian experimental science, the rise of world capitalist system raised the famous slogan, "Knowledge is power", which is based on the logical-ideological deduction of power from knowledge. Hence, the socio-economic-political trinity of man's relationship to nature, which was subordinated to his relationship of domination to other less powerful men, was historically and permanently established, paving thus the way for the second civilization transformation, namely, the industrial revolution based on a capitalist economic system and a colonial political ideology. Science was likewise geared towards specialization, a basic requirement of a commodity oreinted social economy. Hence, man's alienation from nature was socially sanctioned by means of science through fragmentation of knowledge under the slogan of specialization. At the apex of human civilization, and with the tremendous advancement of scientific and technological revolution in a post-industrial world, man is forced to come to terms with nature. In other words, to recapture his lost unity with nature, though on a much scientific-technological level where the stakes

are very high in view of the ideological and religious divisions, which are the price man had to pay for his advancement.

Although the origin of civilization proves that man's relationship with nature was non-adaptive, that it was vertical and not horizontal, it diverged into two levels, one characterized by being vertically and the other horizontally related to the natural world, i.e. environment. Hence, the evolution from the agricultural to the industrial civilization marks a qualitative shift in man's non-adaptive relationship with nature. The so-called advanced, i.e. industrially advanced societies, with the help of the scientific and technological revolution, have been able to harness the biosphere, whereas other societies and cultures which remained within the agricultural level, not being able to surpass it for lack of scientific-industrial capacities, have adapted to the environment.

The paradox of the evolution of human civilization is the evolution from the natural relationship between man and nature with the purpose of humanizing it for man's needs, to the artificial relationship between man and man based on domination and exploitation. The difference is a qualitative one. For, whereas man exploits nature and can reach high stages of aggression which could mount to wars waged against nature, man to man exploitation, if aided by technological aggression, could lead to the destruction of environment with all the organisms on it, including man.

The history of the evolution of civilization registers three major phenomena : (1) man's vertical relationship with nature based on production and reproduction of social life which includes two spheres — production of the means of subsistence and production of social individual. Later on, with the advancement of science, another type of production emerged, namely, the pro-

duction and reproduction of the natural environment itself. (2) The evolutionary process of man-environment relationship was produced and, in turn, produced two fundamental features of modern society : secularization and modernization; the first was brought about by religious reformation and culminated in civil government guided by social contract, while the latter was crystallized in the industrial revolution. (3) Global ecology diverged, accordingly, into diverse cultures characterized by people's mode of relating to environment, or, in other words, producers and consumers of environment. In the industrially advanced urban cultures, production and reproduction of environment is the basis of consumption, whereas in non-industrialized rural ones consumption is not accompanied by production and, hence, results in waste.

The first phenomenon gave rise to the theory of the "noosphere" elaborated by Vernadsky, the founder of geobiochemistry. The theory is a summary of his long study of the biosphere of the earth which is contained in the last but unfinished chapter of his monograph entitled **The Chemical Structure of the Biosphere of the Earth and its Surrounding** (Moscow, 1965). The term "noosphere", from the Greek **nous** meaning mind, was first used in 1927 by the French mathematician and philosopher E. Le Roy, who was a follower of Henri Bergson. Le Roy, together with Teilhard de Chardin, considered the noosphere to be the contemporary planetary stage of the development of the earth's crust. The term was first used by Vernadsky in the 1930s in his article entitled "The Study of the Phenomena of Life and Contemporary Physics." Yet he had explored the idea much earlier in 1920 in his paper "The Authority of Mankind." Unlike Teilhard de Chardin — who reduced the noosphere to some supramaterial basis which is directly connected with the centre of mental concentration or God — Vernadsky approached the problem exclusively from natural scientific position, that is, from the position of a naturalist studying the geological, planetary

processes or, the noosphere, just like the biosphere in its material formation. He writes : "As soon as a living being, endowed with intellect, appears on our planet, the planet enters a new stage of its history. The biosphere turns into the noosphere."(7) Later in 1944 Vernadsky developed his understanding of the noosphere and considered it as a higher stage of the biosphere brought about by man's intellect and work which have the task of consciously and radically changing the biosphere for the benefit of mankind. Hence, according to Vernadsky, when man's geological role begins to dominate in the biosphere, new horizons for his future developments open up. That is, because the ideals of society, by which Vernadsky meant the Soviet scientific socialist society, are in harmony with the laws of nature and the noosphere. Thus, the noosphere, being the result of a planned and conscious transformation of nature, works on two levels : the first is a cosmic one in which the noosphere emerges as a planetary phenomenon extending from planet earth to the total cosmic sphere, as Y. Trusov remarks : "The noosphere is not a planetary but a constantly expanding cosmic sphere : on this planet it has only its beginning."(8) This of course, is a direct reference to space conquest, which is a basic condition for the realization of the cosmic phenomenon, or more strictly speaking, cosmic consciousness.

However, a fundamental question should be raised now : How can the noosphere be realised, or the cosmic consciousness, which necessitates unity of man and nature, or rather man-in-society and natural environment ?

In other words, unity of nature and society is seen as the future of mankind and the way to preserving global environment from pollution and destruction, the crucial question then is : How can man recapture his lost unity with nature in the presence of society which was the price he had to pay to separate himself from nature in order to dominate and control her The question is how to humanize society as a means of humanizing nature.

The first step would be to eliminate divisions of all kinds, all cultural divisions with the purpose of creating a world system within a global environment or, more precisely, within unity of cultures in the context of a world environment.

The second step is to draw up a strategy for world peace based on a cosmic view that unites man and society on one hand, and man and nature on the other.

The present situation of the world provides a negative answer to the first solution, as world divisions of all kinds are growing rapidly as manifested by the ethnic, religious, racial and ideological conflicts. All this provides a negative answer to the second solution, namely by indicating world war instead of world peace.

The two negative phenomena have crystallised in the world fundamentalist movement both in the developed and underdeveloped countries, despite the radical qualitative difference between industrial and technologically advanced societies and agricultural ones. The fundamentalists in the USA, which were politically represented by the moral majority headed by Jerry Falwell, are in favour of a third world war which will bring about the ultimate triumph of Christianity and eliminate communism and atheism. At the other side of the globe, Muslim fundamentalists call for the same, that is, a third world war that will eliminate all systems other than Islam, be they religious or secular. However, while the first group adopt nuclear war, the latter prefer the more authentic and indigenous war methods, that is horses, spears and swords, and reject technology as being the method of paganism. While the first group fights to win territories and power, the latter to achieve martyrdom as the road to paradise. Both absolutes, Christianity and Islam, are in unity and struggle represented by their joint enmity to secular-modern industrial society. However, the most striking phenomenon is that this trend arose in the post-industrial era, or as some critics think, arose as the making feature of the post-industrial era.

One could propose dialogue of cultures as a basic step leading towards unity of cultures. This proposed dialogue of cultures necessitates, as a basis, common cultural issues to be shared equally by the dialoguing cultures, plus tolerance and relativity of outlook. However, the existing cultural levels of civilization indicate two distinctly opposite features : one is predominantly secular and is based on modern urban industrial cultural values, whereas the other is religious and is characterized by a rural traditional value system. Hence, due to the total absence of a minimum common denominator to guide the cultural dialogue, and in view of the rising tide of religious fundamentalism, dialogue of cultures has assumed the same absolutist feature of religious cultures. However, with the emergence of "new world order" within which all kinds of dogmatic systems have to give way paving thus the way for the rise of new creative systems that would express the potential creativity latent in all cultures. This new world order, thus perceived, is the road to a genuine dialogue of cultures that would lead to unity of cultures.

REFERENCES

1. Wahba, Mourad. (edit) Proceedings of International EASRG Seminar on **Youth, Religion and Violence,** Cairo, Anglo Egyptian Bookshop, 1983, pp. 250-52.

2. Toffler, Alvin : **The Third Wave,** Bantam Books, New York, 1981, pp. 348-49.

3. Caldwell, Lynton Keith **Environmental, A Challenge to Modern Society,** New York, The Natural History Press, 1970, p. 79.

4. Dubos, Reul, **So Human, An Animal,** New York, Charles Goribner's Sons, 1968, p. 82.

5. Vernadsky, V.I. **The Chemical Structure of the Biosphere of the Earth and its Surroundings,** Moscow, 1965.

6. Meadows, D.H. et al. **The Limits to Growth.** New York, 1972, p. 95.

7. Vernadsky, Ibid.

8. Trusov, H. "The Ecological Situation today and the Future of Mankind," **Philosophy and World-views of Modern Sciences.** USSR Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 1978, p. 35.

PHILOSOPHY AND CULTURAL DIALOGUE

Yersu Kim (South Korea)

Philosophy and Culture

A way of conceiving philosophy has long been dominant in Western as well as Eastern traditions—the conception of philosophy as **prote philosophia.** Philosophy, according to this conception, is the discipline that defines the precondition for all of man's systematic efforts to understand the world and its place in it. In the classical West philosophy was a study of the ultimate principles governing nature and man, while the long tradition of moral and metaphysical speculation was its match in the East. In more recent times Kant assigned to philosophy the task of clarifying the foundation of the sciences and the morals by defining the limits of what can and cannot be experienced, thus making it the highest court of appeal vis-à-vis the sciences and the culture as a whole. No less adjudicatory of the culture as a philosophy. Philosophy, according to this tradition, is concerned primarily with meaning, setting the bound of meaningful language. Philosophy thus circumscribes the parameters of culture, culture understood as the totality of man's understanding and action.

Today, this conception is under challenge, and this challenge comes from relativism. Relativism today permeates human societies both in the East and West, so much so that it may be said to be the cultural orthodoxy of the day. It permeates not only peoples' thinking and action concerning social and moral issues, but also all areas of knowledge, including the hard-core scientific knowledge. Encouraged by recent developments in psychology, comparative linguistics, the philosophy of science and of language, there is a wide-spread acceptance of the notion that all knowledge, values and truth which form the basis of man's

praxis are relative to cultural background or system. Perception, truth and even reason are viewed as being relative. What we perceive, what we think true, what we deem reasonable are no longer explicated in relation to the objective reality but rather relative to cultural paradigms, conceptual systems or languages. There have of course been various forms of value relativism or knowledge relativism. But what is new today is that truth and reason, which have in the past provided the basis from which to criticize classical relativism, are themselves seen merely as functions of conceptual schemes or languages, and therefore dependent upon the canons of rationality valid for a particular culture and period. It is this denial of normativity and transcendence to philosophy that characterizes the contemporary relativism.

Rorty is emphatic in denying that he is a relativist, but it is he who embraces in a most radical way the consequences of relativism for philosophy. Ever since Descartes, argues Rorty, Western philosophy presumed to provide one single uniquely true picture of the world, that is, to function as the mirror of nature, thus enabling it to assume the privileged role of the judge of the culture as a whole, including the sciences. But this exalted self-understanding of philosophy has been shown to be a grand illusion by the thesis of contemporary relativism. Thus philosophy as a discipline which would rule over the culture as a whole by presuming to provide the unique and absolute truth about nature and man is no longer possible. In the post-philosophical culture, the philosopher-king would be replaced by "informed dilettantes"[1] who would engage in "edifying discourse," a kind of cultural criticism, identifying similarities and differences of different cultures and epochs. Their activity would be far from adjudicatory ; it no longer makes efforts to find Archimedian points that

---

1. Richard Rorty, **Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature,** Princeton, 1977, p. 317.

are separated and distinct from cultural traditions. It would thus be merely one among many other peer activities, one voice among many, such as poetry, psychology, physical science, etc. The culture of the post-philosophical world may not "**center** around anything more than anything else... It may be a culture... whose center is everywhere and circumference no where."(2)

We may indeed ask ourselves the question : What kind of culture would it be that no longer asks whether it is in touch with reality, whether it is in truth. We may even ask the question whether such a culture is even imaginable. We are in fact asking the question : can a culture get along without philosophy ? This is of course the central theme of this paper. Before even attempting to give an answer to this question, some preliminary considerations are in order.

Relativism

Relativism is as old as the history of philosophy itself. Protagoras' thesis of man as the measure of all things, or Gorgias view that justice is the advantage of the strong are expressions of the relativistic view point. These are however expressions of moral relativism. The sole foundation for morals is, for this view, a system of man-made rules. Since there is no objective reality, which alone can provide justification for them, the rules on which morals are based cannot but be different in different epochs and cultures, and no objective standard is available to determine the relative worth of these rules. By showing that neither moral rules nor values exist in the world of facts, moral relativism can be shown to be objectively true. A moral relativist can at the same time be an epistemological or conceptual absolutist.

---

2. Richard Rorty, "Professionalized Philosophy and Transcendentalist Culture," in Rorty, **Consequences of Pragmatism Essays : 1972-80,** University of Minnesota Press, 1982, p. 70.

We must note here how the thesis of moral relativism is based on the dichotomy between fact and value. Although thematized relatively recently by Max Weber, the dichotomy has explicitly at the basis of the Western scientific thinking since early modern times, and implicitly even earlier in Western thought. There may have been no way out of the conclusion that cultural and moral values are relative to culture and epoch, given the conviction that only the knowledge based on the objectively existing facts can be universal and objective. But no fact exists that can establish once and for all the truth of a moral judgment. The relativism operative here is at best a half-way relativism. Relativism may reign in the realm of values, but universalism is still possible in the realm of facts.

The emergence of relativism as a full-fledged philosophical problem coincides with the formulation of conceptual relativism which denies a determinate relationship between the objective reality and the knowledge, or its linguistic expression. According to this view, there exist many equally true but mutually incompatible conceptual schemes that interpret the world. Each of these conceptual schemes has its own standards of truth and justification, and no third, neutral standards in terms of which the claims of each conceptual scheme can be appraised. The question concerning truth and justification reduces simply to which of these conceptual schemes we have in fact chosen. Standards and norms embedded in each of the conceptual schemes are irreducible, and there is no objective rational basis for choice. What is accepted as real in one conceptual scheme can no longer be real in another; that is, the world itself becomes relative to a given conceptual scheme.

Conceptual relativism consists of two interrelated theses. One is the Kantian thesis that all perception and knowledge are products of the constructive activities of the knowing subject. The other is a more recent assertion that there cannot be a single

uniquely valid way in which such construction may proceed. The relativistic consequence of the Kantian thesis had been diluted by the notion of the universal, transcendental structure that constraints all forms of knolwedge acts. Now a series of argumentations in the philosophy of language as well as of science has shown that not only is it impossible to perceive anything without relying upon some conceptual scheme, but also it is impossible to accord any one conceptual scheme the privileged position of representing the world as it is, since the relationship between the world and the language is fundamentally indeterminate.

The grounds for this new philosophical point of view had been prepared by works of Wittgenstein, Sellars and others, which in their different ways questioned the validity of the normative and transcendental conception of philosophy. But it was the notion of ontological relativity expounded by Quine that expresses its relativistic consequences in the most unequivocal terms. The notion consists of two interrelated theses : that of the indeterminacy of radical translation and the inscrutability of reference. Quine begins with the behavioristic thesis that language is a "social art"(3) which is acquired on the evidence of other people's overt behavior. Meanings, in this view, are the property of people's behavior, and not labels for some mental entities, as it has been assumed in traditional semantics. In a situation of "radical translation" in which we translate an expression of a remote, hitherto unknown language into our own, we could not assign meaning to the alien's utterance on the basis of his overt behavior alone, since this would admit or more than one assignment of meaning which would equally well accord with all the observational behavior of the alien. It would be impossible to know which one of these translations was the right one. There is nothing that can adjudicate among these different translations.

---

3 W.V.O. Quine, **Ontological Relatively and Other Essays,** New York, 1969, p. 26.

Further, there is no ground for assuming that the alien will have an apparatus of individuation (such as plural endings, pronouns and numerals) that essentially duplicates ours. His language may individuate, 'cut up" the world in a way fundamentally different from our own. Unless we have prior translation of the alien's individuative apparatus, we would have no way of knowing whether the objects to which the alien refers are the same as those referred to by us. But there can be no right or wrong way to translate this language of individuation. There is therefore a fundamental inscrutability of reference inherent in radical translation.

One may push the thesis a step further, as indeed Quine does. We can introduce referential inscrutability even in our own home language. It would be meaningless to question the reference of our own home language, because we can meaningfully question the reference of terms in a language only against the background of some determinate frame of reference, or coordinate system. By questioning the reference of our home language, we are in fact postulating a background language "still closer to home" than our home language sense. We are in fact launched on an indefinite regress of appealing to one background language after another. We stop this regress only by "acquiescing"(4) in our home languages and taking its terms of reference at face value. Questions of reference are meaningless when put in absolute terms : they are meaningful relative only to some specific arbitrarily chosen linguistic terms of reference. There is no transcendental normative standard that guides us in making that choice. It is simply an act of "acquiescence."

Since reference is relative, so is ontology. It is meaningless to ask, independently of some previously "acquiesced" background

---

4. W.V.O. Quine, **Ontological Relativity and Other Essays,** p. 20.

language, what our words really mean or refer to. On this semantic eliminativism, there are no meanings for the philosopher **ex officio** to be concerned with. The thesis of ontological relativity makes intelligible the idea of any one single description of the world as having the privileged position of being uniquely true of the world, for the ontologies which are being presupposed by these descriptions are relative and arbitrary. From the epistemological point of view there can be no fundamental difference among different descriptions of the world whether mytical, metaphysical or scientific. Only perhaps a difference of degree. Mythical objects or physical objects are both "cultural posits" (5) that form parts of the mutually different descriptive systems about the world. Choosing among these different descriptions is fundamentally an arbitrary process. Of course, cultural tradition and pragmatic considerations operate in such a choice. We tend to accept the description of the world as provided by the natural sciences as being epistemologically superior, because we believe they organize and structure our experience in a way more efficient than other systems of description. According to Quine, "There have been philosophers who thought of philosophy as somehow separate from science as providing a firm basis on which to build science, but this I consider an empty dream... I think of philosophy as continuous with science, as a part of science." (6)

Paradox of Cultural Relativism

What are the consequences, if any, of the thesis of ontological relativity for culture, or more precisely, for cultural dialogue ? A culture can be compared, within limits, with a language. A culture, like a language, is a system of symbolic meanings that serve

---

5. W.V.O. Quine, "Two Dogmas of Empiricism," in Rosenberg and Travis ed.), **Readings in the Philosophy of language**, N.J., 1971, p. 80.
6. Brian Magee, **Men of Ideas**, BBC, 1978, p. 170.

the common needs of its members. It is, again like a language, a living organism that undergoes a process of change within the constraints of a particular time and place. Both develop in time and place. Both develop in time a grammar and vocabulary peculiar to each of them. It is then no accident that cultural anthropology and cultural linguistics are closely related, both in terms of method and technical vocabulary.

Cultural relativism, which we have seen as the cultural orthodoxy of the day in both East and West, is in some sense an act of repentance for the naturalistic theory of the cultural evolution which saw man as going through successive unilinear states of savagery, barbarism and finally civilization. It is a conception of cultural evolution that is modelled on evolution in the material realm, particularly in science and technology, where the measure of progress seemed clear and unambiguous.(7) By assuming further that the progress in the material realm determines the worth of a civilization, the naturalistic theory could postulate a universal cultural evolution according to which cultures and societies are engaged in a single track race, with their relative positions clearly marked at every stage of their progress. Wedded to the idea of Christian mission, the naturalistic conception results in the idea of "civilizing mission" and thus naturally an imperialistic conception.

That such a cultural universalism is merely a totalization of the ethnocentrism of the West with its scientific and technological achievements was clearly seen even during its heyday by such men as Herder, Nietzsche and Boas. In particular, Franz and his followers refused to accept the prevailing ethnocentric assumption

---

7. cf. Michael Adas, **Machine as the Measure of Man : Science, Technology and the Ideological of Western Dominance,** Ithaca, 1989, p. 339.

and denied any hierarchical order among peoples and cultures. They believed that cultural anthropology should enable us to see the validity of every set of the cultural norms specific to a people and culture, and that such an attitude entails in practice tolerance and respect for all cultural values and patterns. All cultures are just as good as our own, according to the cultural relativism of the anthropologists. All forms of cultural imperialism, which attempt to replace the cultures of other peoples with what we perceive to be the superior culture of our own, are thus morally wrong.

It is difficult to tell how much condescension or romanticism is involved in this attitude of tolerance, but it is pertinent that cultural relativism is of Western origin. Cultural relativism, in the form of the concept of cultural identity, is being put forward as an antidote of the universal claims of Western ethnocentrism. It is linked with justificatory grounds for various independence and liberation movements. It provides the ideological basis for opposition to imperialism in international relations as well as for pluralism in national politics. It is claimed to provide the foundation for a conception of development that goes beyond mere quantitative growth. Specific cultural values and aspirations of the people concerned are increasingly seen as essential components in all development efforts.

Can cultural relativism deliver all that is claimed for it ? It has been remarked by a number of writers on the subject that, as in the case of epistemological idealism, a water-tight logical refutation of relativism is beyond pale. But there does seem to be a kind of obfuscation in the relativist's argument against cultural universalism. The self-defeating nature of a consistent relativism has often been observed. A consistent cultural relativist cannot claim that all cultures are just as good as his own without ceasing at that moment to be a relativist. For if all values with which one measures the worth of cultures are rela-

tive to the social norms of a particular culture and people, there can be no intelligible sense in which one culture can be just as good as any other. Nihilism — the thesis that there is no such thing as being just as good — is the only valid conclusion that can be drawn from the non-existence of objective values. Respect and tolerance for all customs, which the relativism of anthropologists and the proponents of cultural identity advocate, would require a value other than relativism itself, which simple relativism is unable to provide. The only legitimate conclusion would be nihilism, anarchism or deconstructivism.

Popper is only one among many contemporary philosophers who expressed a deep concern about relativism by branding it the greatest of modern irrationalism.[8] There does seem to be a sense in which relativism can be said to have replaced the philosophical claims to an exclusive validity of one particular system of knowledge with a de facto claim to its superiority. If there is no objective standard by which to judge the conflicting claims of different systems of knowledge, then we must grant equal validity to all systems of knowledge. It is not difficult to see how such a situation would lead to a kind of intellectual defeatism. If it is true that there is no objective knowledge, that there exist no values worth pursuing, then all intellectual pursuit and striving would be meaningless. Progress in knowledge is possible only if we believe old beliefs to be false and discover the new beliefs to be true. Thus, if a relativist continues to talk of "more effective" knowledge and points to the de facto practical and technological superiority of one system of knowledge and values over others, he is in fact contributing to the freezing of the status quo in the progress of knowledge. Relativism thus helps not only

8. Karl Popper, "The Myth of Framework," in E. Freeman (ed.), **The Abdication of Philosophy : Philosophy and the Public Goal**, 1976, p. 25.

to perpetuate the dominance of the hegemonic culture over others and to put a moratorium on the progress of knowledge. It also strengthens the present relationship of domination in a subtle way by hindering the progress of knowledge. Possibility of knowledge that may be objectively true, to quote Rorty, "is the impulse which... drives the youth to read their way through libraries..."(9) Relativism, when embraced by dominated cultures, encourages particularistic tendencies in knowledge, and tends to encourage an illusory sense of adequacy, thereby giving philosophical endorsement to the abandonment of the arduous intellectual task of integrating all forms of knowledge into the core of objective knowledge that transcends the boundaries of cultures and forms the common intellectual property of man.

There is an even more sinister political aspect — had not McIntyre said that all philosophy, no matter how obtusely technical, is ultimately political philosophy ?(10) — to the contemporary discussion of relativism. The Western culture, since its early days, but particularly with the advent of science and technology, has laid strong claims to possessing a body of universally valid true knowledge and values that are essential knowledge on the one hand, and power on the other (**vide** Francis Bacon), the universal claims of truth and knowledge went hand in hand with Western imperialism. One is tempted to say that it is no accident that the proliferation of relativism in the Western world today has coincided historically with the demise of political colonialism and the emergence of the Third World. But if relativism is true and there are no standards other than the existing cultural tradition that can abjudicate among different claims,

---

9. Richard Rorty, "Pragmatism and Philosophy," in **Consequences of Pragmatism,** 1982, p. xi.
10. Alisdar McIntyre, "Relativism, Power and Philosophy", in K. Baynes, J. Bohman and T. McCarthy (eds.), **After Philosophy : End or Transformation ?** Cambridge, 1987, p. 393.

the relationship of man to man, nation to nation, and culture to culture becomes one of unmediated will and power. A cultural relativist can become a worst kind of cultural imperialist. Thus we are left with a curious twist in the dialectic of ideas and its consequences for relations among nations and cultures. An idea that was put forward as a means to rehabilitate and revitalize discredited cultural tradition and restore respect and tolerance among cultures seems now to have turned against itself, and seems to perpetuate the very cultural situation which ostensibly it was designed to redress.

Refutation ?

There have been many philosophical arguments against the relativisms of different varieties. The argument based on the self-refuting character of relativism has already been mentioned briefly. But despite its logical strength, its high potent argument against conceptual relativism has been advanced by D. Davidson(11), in which philosophical consideration concerning translation and conceptual schemes are intertwined.

The crux of the Davidsonian argument is the charge that no sense can be made of different conceptual schemes on which all forms of relativism depend one way or another. When one speaks of a conceptual scheme, it can be identified with a particular linguistic system which expresses it. If two linguistic systems are mutually translatable into each other, then one must assume they embody the same conceptual scheme. If there exists a scheme of translation between two different languages, the same conceptual scheme is expressed by both of these languages. The

---

11. Donald Davidson, "On the Very Idea of Conceptual Scheme," in D. Davidson, **Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation,** Oxford, 1984, pp. 188-98.

criterion of identity, or difference, of conceptual schemes is intimately linked with the translatability among them. In order for the expression "different conceptual schemes" to be meaningful, there must exist a language that is in principle untranslatable into our language, or any of the languages which are translatable into our own.

But there can be no such language. What in fact makes a cluster of inscriptions or sounds a language? Can there be a criterion of what makes something a language other than that it be translatable into our own language ? If a cluster of inscriptions and sounds are not translatable into our own language, there would be no reason for us to suppose them words and sentences uttered by a language user. There would be no reason to consider him a language user, a thinking being, and, indeed, a man. If translatability among languages provides the only criterion of identity of the conceptual schemes embedded in the language, then a conceptal scheme different from our own cannot exist. If it is in principle meaningless to speak of alternative conceptual schemes different from our own, then conceptual relativism cannot be maintained.

When we accept the theses of indeterminacy of radical translation and ontological relativity at their face value, we are compelled to deny the possibility of all human intellectual activity and consequently the possibility of culture in general. Once we accept these theses, not only does translation from one language to another become impossible, but understanding and comparison of two different epochs of the same cultural tradition also becomes impossible. No real confrontation or interaction among cultures seems possible. For no understanding of those speaking another language is in principle possible. And if we cannot translate the sounds emitted by another living being into our own language, that is, if we cannot understand him as a matter of principle, there can be no reason to regard him a special kind of

being quite different from other living beings, that is, to regard him as a human being. There would be no reason to regard him as a speaking being, and, as a corollary, as a thinking being. Radical relativism is, in Putman's phrase, a mental suicide.(12)

Cultural Synthesis

But facts are incontrovertible that there is a de facto wide range of intercultural agreements, contacts and interactions, that mutual understanding and communication across cultures and epoches is sometimes achieved. It is also a fact that although there are some parts of everyday language which are not translated into another, a large part of it is translatable into every other. In fact, as McIntyre points out, it is the sign of accomplished bilinguality to know precisely what parts of one language are translatable, and what parts not, into another. There have been many examples of interaction among cultures. A culture may lose a sense of direction at a certain stage of its development. It may then be confronted with another culture what is conceptually richer and more resourceful. It would then recognize its inadequacies and may transfer allegiances, either partially or totally. Such a transfer of allegiance need not be an imperialist imposition, but a rational recognition of the need for changes in culture.

Culture in its broad sense is, after all, an internally coherent and cohesive set of values, beliefs, attitude, knowledge and practices by means of which people relate themselves to the world. These ideas, values and practices together constitute some notion of an ordered universe and man's place in it by specifying for man a set of purposes in relation to himself, his fellow men and nature. They enable men to deal with the environment in rela-

---

12. Hilary Putman, "Why Reason Can't Be Naturalized".

tion to that set of purposes. As the world is in constant flux, however, it can be said to be part of the nature of culture is to be in constant flux. Culture is a kind of living organism with an internal dynamism of its own, looking beyond the boundaries set by itself. As the world and our knowledge of it change, culture too must change so as to make itself adequate to its changing and changed circumstances.

Culture in a sense is a milieu of conflict. Cultures of each epoch and region strive to forge an optimal cultural synthesis, and claim for it a rational superiority over all others. The basis for their claim would be that it transcends the limitations of its competitors, avoid their weaknesses while incorporating their strength. The conflict need not be in the nature of unmediated will and power, so long as the synthesis achieved in a culture is couched in a cross-cultural universal, but fallible reconstructions. The optimal cultural synthesis would reflect a reflective equilibrium in the process of interaction and interchange of ideas and values on the one hand, and the recalcitrant but changing environment on the other. Philosophy, with its natural hang forward argumentation and justification, would interpret, and criticize the ideas and values. But above all philosophy, to be worthy of the name, must be able to contribute toward forging an effective and persuasive synthesis of all the ideas, values and attitudes by bringing them into reflective equilibrium. The language of such an equilibrium would be fallibilistic, and its ambition would be universal.

We are encouraged in such an effort by our realization that there are species-specific primitive facts in man's natural history that are common to all men and that the basic constraints that the recalcitrant world places on the lives of men are essentially the same for all cultures and periods. But these universals represent only a minuscule part of the components needed to forge an optimal cultural synthesis. Can optimality be claimed

for all cultures and periods ? If there is a valid insight in the philosophical arguments for cultural relativism, it is that man is finite. If questions concerning what exists are essentially relative to the conceptual scheme adopted, the world **an sich,** even if we could be certain that such existed, is beyond man's capacity to know. Indeed, even if it were somehow known by us, we would not be able to know we had such a knowledge. A cultural synthesis that is valid for all peoples and cultures is **in fact** beyond the purview of man. Whether it is **in principle** unattainable is altogether a different question.

My proposal is to regard the possibility of an optimal cultural synthesis as a regulative idea in the Kantian sense. It guides the efforts of different peoples and periods to forge a system of ideas, values and practices perfectly adequate to the requirements of men and the constraints of the environment. The task would be somewhat akin to that of an archeologist who, on the basis of meager material, attempts the over-all picture of an ancient civilization. As the picture offered must undergo changes, sometimes minor, sometimes radical, whenever some new material is discovered and thus closer to the "true" picture of the civilization, so too is our knowledge of the world and conception of how best to flourish in it undergoes a continual process of disruption, correction and expansion. As our knowledge of the world increases and our horizons expand in the wake of even greater contacts with other peoples and cultures, our notion of the optimal cultural synthesis is bound to undergo a similarly evolutionary process of revision and expansion. But the finitude of man constrains us from believing that this evolutionary process would be linear. A more appropriate imagery, I think, would be that of a spiral, and an irregular one.

ISLAM ET CHRISTIANISME : LA RENCONTRE DE DEUX CULTURES EN OCCIDENT AU MOYEN AGE

Georges C. Anawati (Le Caire)

Dans un livre intitulé "L'avenir de la culture en Egypte" (**Mustaqbal al-thaqafa fi Misr**) [1], un des plus grands écrivains du monde arabe contemporain et qui fut ministre de l'instruction publique, le Dr. Taha Hussein, a soutenu avec ferveur la thèse suivante : L'Europe et les pays musulmans du Proche-Orient appartiennent à la même civilisation méditerranéenne parce qu'ils ont en commun l'héritage de la philosophie grecque, celui du droit romain et le monothéisme de deux grandes religions : le Christianisme d'une part avec la Bible, l'Islam d'autre part avec le Coran; **Aurea dicta.**

Dans mon exposé d'aujourd'hui, je voudrais essayer d'esquisser à grands traits la vérité de cette thèse en l'appuyant sur l'examen de la rencontre culturelle des deux grandes cultures médiévales en Occident. Cet exposé comprendra deux parties d'inégale longueur la première plus courte donnera des flashs brefs et en style quasi télégraphique. Ce sera le fond de tableau qui permettra de comprendre le bilan de cette rencontre sous ses différents aspects ;

A. Le cadre religieux et politique

L'Islam est, en une unité organique sui generis, une religion, une Cité et une civilisation.

Né culturellement dans un "canton retiré de l'univers" (La Mecque), sans contact avec l'héritage gréco-romain, il se rattache, du point de vue religieux, au monothéisme juif et chrétien.

Comme religion, l'Islam a un dogme bien défini : Dieu transcendant, personnel, Créateur, miséricordieux, Juste Juge, qui a parlé à travers les prophètes. L'homme a été créé pour être le vice-gérant de Dieu sur le monde. Il ressuscitera à la fin des temps pour un bonheur ou un malheur éternels. L'Islam nie les mystères de la Trinité, de l'Incarnation et de la Rédemption, Jésus n'est que Prophète et il n'est pas mort sur la Croix.

L'Islam est encore une Cité, un "Ummah". Le Coran, Parole incréée de Dieu assure l'unité des musulmans ainsi que la Loi religieuse (shar'a) et les cinq piliers : Profession de foi, prière rituelle, jeûne, dîme aumônière, pèlerinage.

Enfin, l'Islam est une civilisation. Les peuples musulmans ont établi un pont entre l'héritage antique et l'Occident et ajouté leurs propres découvertes et créations, en particulier dans le domaine philosophique et scientifique.(2)

Le cadre politique et la vague arabe(3). Les conquêtes musulmanes ont eu un caractère de soudaineté foundroyante(4). Cordoue devint au Moyen-Age la plus brillante capitale du monde (à l'exception de Byzance, en Occident). A la cour des califes, la langue officielle était l'arabe mais on ne dédaigne pas de parler le dialecte roman.

La Reconquista poursuivit sa marche lente mais sûre(5). Les Reyes taifas firent appel aux Almoravides(6). Les rencontres des deux cultures eurent lieu en Sicile, en Italie (et surtout en Espagne). En Sicile(7), Frédéric II de Hohenstaufen (1215-1250) subit une influence arabe prononcée(8). Des traductions au latin furent réalisée à Tolède et en Sicile (Michel Scot).

B. **Approches occidentales de l'Islam**(9)

I — Avant le XIIème si'cle, l'Occident n'a connu les Sarra-

zins qu'à travers les vagues réminiscences bibliques. Après la conquête arabe de l'Espagne, la culture arabe devint prépondérante dans les milieux intellectuels des chrétiens; témoignage de l'évêque de Cordoue Alvaro(10). L'Occident nourrissait de nombreux préjugés sur l'Islam et son fondateur.(11)

II — La première tentative pour connaître le Coran fut entreprise par l'Abbé de Cluny, Pierre le Vénérable(12) qui le fit traduire en latin et publia une série de textes arabes traduits. ("Collection de Cluny")

II — La première tentative pour connaître le Coran fut endeuxgrands Ordres mendiants : celui des Franciscains par saint François d'Assie et celui des Dominicains par saint Dominique. Les deux Ordres se distinguent par la différence sur la place des études dans la formation des religieux. Les Dominicains s'attachèrent surtout à l'étude de la philosophie, la théologie et l'Ecriture Sainte et travaillèrent dans le milieux universitaires. La papauté les chargea de la conversion des musulmans.

IV — Des écoles de langues(13) furent fondées pour l'étude de l'arabe et de l'hébreu à Tunis, Barcelone, Murcie Jativa et Miramar; et des chaires pour leur études furent fondées dans les universités de Paris, Toulouse, Oxford et Naples ou en certains ordres ou abbayes.

C. L'Affrontement intellectuel(15)

I — L'impact de la pensée arabe au coeur de la chrétienté.

Peu à peu les oeuvres de la philosophie grecque, à travers leur traduction arabe, arrivèrent en Occident ef turent traduites en latin par des équipes de traducteurs à partir du 12ème siècle à Tolède. Deux philosophes arabes, en particulier, eurent une grosse influence Avicenne et Averrocès et furent utilisés par les théologiens chrétiens pour l'élaboration de leurs doctrines.

II — **Polémique et apologie: vers le dialogue islamo-chrétien.**

Rejetant l'idée de croisade militaire, un certain nombre de théologiens occidentaux préconisèrent l'argumentation intellectuelle, le dialogue. Voici les auteurs les plus représentatifs :

1. **Rogers Bacon** (m. 1294) Il n'a connu les textes des philosophes arabes qu'à travers les traductions latines. Il faut s'efforcer de convertir les musulmans. L'Islam a un rôle à jouer, avant de disparaître. ([16])

2. **Thomas d'Aquin** (m. 1274) O.P. Son Contra Gentes parle de l'Islam dans le ch. VI du Livre 1er.

3. **Raymond Martin** O.P. (m. 1285) Son **Explanatio symboli Apostolorum et son Pugio Fidei,** le meilleur traité de théodicée espagnole du 13ème siècle ([18]).

4. Riccoldo de Monte Croce O.P. (m. 1320). ([19])
   Son voyage en Proche-Orient. Ses deux ouvrages : **Itinerarium** et son **Contra Legem Saracenorum.**

5. **Raymond Lull** (m. 1316). ([20])

6. **Jean de Ségovie** O.F.M. (m. 1458). ([21])
   Affirme que c'est seule l'étude scientifique du texte coranique qui permet de conduire à des résultats décisifs.

7. **Nicolas de Cues** (m. 1464). ([22])
   Son **Cribratio Alcorani.**

BILAN DE LA RENCONTRE DES DEUX CULTURES

Au terme de notre brève introduction, il nous faut maintenant essayer de dresser le bilan de la rencontre des deux cul-

tures : occidentale d'inspiration chrétienne et la culture musulmane et en tirer la leçon pour le temps présent et pour l'avenir.

On demandait un jour à l'un des plus brillants arabisants espagnols contemporains[23] ce qu'il pensait de l'influence de l'Islam sur son pays. "L'Islam, répondit-il en substance, a été pour nous à la foi un aliment et un révulsif".

Sous sa forme abrupte, cette formule pourrait, me semble-t-il, servir d'exergue au bilan que nous voudrions dresser, non seulement en ce qui concerne l'Espagne mais bien de toute l'Europe occidentale, objet de notre étude.

A la vérité, ici comme dans tous les problèmes où on veut éviter des confusions malheureuses, il nous faut faire plusieurs distinctions. Nous en ferons deux fondamentales. D'une part nous distinguerons, du point de vue géographique, trois aires différentes où se fit la rencontre Islam — Christianisme, à savoir la Sicile et l'Italie, puis l'Espagne, enfin le reste de l'Europe occidentale. La seconde distinction portera sur les domaines culturels où les échanges eurent lieu : c'est-à-dire d'une part les emprunts scientifiques et technologiques, d'autre part ceux des arts, de la philosophie, de la religion et des institutions.

Sicile

Utilisant la distinction entre les trois aires géographiques que nous avons faite, commençons par voir l'influence des Arabes dans la Méditerranée centrale, c'est-à-dire surtout en Sicile et en Italie. On sait que les arabes mirent près de soixante-dix ans (827-902) pour conquérir l'île, qu'ils y restèrent maîtres pendant deux siècles et y demeurèrent encore un siècle sous la domination normande avant d'être entièrement rejetés par Frédéric II.

Quels furent les fruits de cette rencontre trois fois séculaire ?

D'après le témoignage du meilleur connaisseur de la Sicile musulmane, Amari, la présence musulmane dans l'île, fut, en définitive positive et bénéfique : un sang nouveau renforça la vitalité de la population siculo-byzantine, les conditions sociales et économiques furent notablement améliorées : le latifundia fut brisé, les petites propriétés multipliées, l'agriculture avec les nouvelles techniques connut un essor remarquable. On peut en trouver l'indice dans le vocabulaire de la vie économique préservé dans le sicilien et qui a passé à travers lui à l'italien : mots concernant l'agriculture, l'irrigation, les travaux des fermes et des champs, les produits du sol[24]. Nous conaissonns le témoignage admiratif de voyageurs comme Ibn Hawqal et Ibn Jubayr. "La période arabe demeure en fait le plus haut point atteint par la grande île méditerranéenne en ce qui concerne l'exploitation de ses ressources et la vie matérielle en connexion avec elle".[25]

Par contre, au point de vue culturel, la période proprement arabe n'a guère laissé de traces dignes d'être mentionnées; elle s'exerça surtout dans le domaine des sciences religieuses et littéraires qui surgissaient partout où une communauté musulmane importante s'installait. La poésie fleurit à la cour des Kalbites à Palerme.

Mais c'est surtout sous le règne des rois normands que les contacts culturels s'établirent entre les gens de la cour et le cercle des savants et de lettrés qui gravitaient autour d'elle sans que cela donnât lieu à une symbiose originale : la preuve en est que lorsque la main passa à la dynastie germanique, l'arabisme sicilien disparut rapidement.

Là où les effects de la présence arabe se manifesta avec le plus d'éclat, c'est dans le domaine des arts figuratifs. De la période islamique, il subsiste seulement les bains à demi-ruinés de Cefalà, près de Palerme, et quelques monnaies et inscriptions. Mais les monuments arabo-normands suscitent jusqu'aujourd'hui

notre émerveillement: la chapelle Palatine avec son plafond entièrement décoré par des artistes musulmans venus peut-être d'Egypte, le palais de Zina et de Cuba, l'architecture Palerme et ailleurs.

"Une analyse sans passion, écrit le professeur F. Gabrieli, des habitudes et de la psychologie individuelle et collective du peuple sicilien d'aujourd'hui peut nous conduire en arrière jusqu'à l'héritage arabe, même sous certains aspects moins positifs. Mais la balance de 'l'histoire économique, sociale et culturelle de la période musulmane est largement à son crédit" ([26])

Italie

En Italie es choses se passèrent autrement. Là les Arabes n'y firent que des apparitions sporadiques et sauf les courts émirats de l'Apulie et de Bari([27]), ils ne parvinrent pas à s'y établir. Ils se contentèrent de raids rapides sur la côte italienne par exemple le sac des églises de Saint Pierre et de Saint Paul de Rome en 846 et la bataille d'Ostie en 849. En fait, pendant les deux siècles de leur domination en Sicile, les musulmans furent considérés par le sud de l'Itaie comme des fauteurs de troubles, qui, jouant sur les dissensions qui existaient entre les Longobards, les Byzantins, et les républiques maritimes, essayèrent de tirer le plus de profit matériel possible. L'apport scientifique et culturel de ce côté fut nul pour l'Italie.

Par contre, l'influence s'exerça selon d'autres voies, pacifiques celles-là : celles du commerce, des voyageurs, des savants, et, plus tard, de la grande transmigration culturelle de l'Espagne musulmane. (p. 79) On peut citer comme éléments arabes dans l'art de l'Italie du Sud les monuments de Salerne, d'Amalfi, de Canossa di Puglia et la présence de nombreux objets d'arts mineurs dans les trésors des églises, non seulement dans le sud de l'Italie mais aussi dans le centre (Lazio, les Marches, la Toscane).

Enfin le travail des traducteurs, en particulier de Constantin l'Africain commença à révéler au monde latin les richesses de la science moitié du 11ème siècle, c'est-à-dire avant que le flot de la science musulmane n'arriva en Europe par l'intermédiaire de l'Espagne. C'est par cette route que l'influence arabe s'exerça en Italie, après l'an 1000, et non directement à partir de l'Orient arabe.

Un bon critère de l'influence arabe sur la civilisation italienne est celui de la langue : on y relève de nombreux vocables d'origine arabe concernant les échanges commerciaux, les sciences (astronomie, astrologi, médecine), la philosophie, la technique.

Espagne

En passant en Espagne, le problème des échanges islamo-chrétiens prend des proportions beaucoup plus importantes. Il s'agit cette fois de toute la péninsule ibérique et d'une période de temps s'étendant à sept siècles; et surtout il s'agit d'une région où les Arabes fondèrent un véritable empire, une civilisation brillante.

A part des moments de persécution provoqués avant tout par des chrétiens exaltés cherchant à tout prix le martyre, on peut dire que les communautées chrétiennes continuàrent à mener leur vie chrétienne avec leurs églises, leurs couvents, leurs chefs responsables (**defensor** ou **protector**), leurs percepteurs spéciaux, leurs magistrats qui appliquaient le vieux code gothique du **Liber Judicum.** Les émirs homologuaient généralement le choix des dignitaires ecclésiastiques désignés par le métropolitain de Tolède et l'évêque de Cordoue le témoignage d'Alvaro de Cordoue sur l'extension de l'arabe au milieu de la population chrétienne est significatif; si la langue romane, issue de l'idiome latino-ibérique, était la langue du peupe dans les villes et dans les villages et fournit à l'arabe dialectal un vocabulaire concret, il reste cepen-

dant qu'il y eut chez un certain nombre de chrétiens un engouement pour la langue et la littérature arabe classique. Beaucoup se laissèrent fasciner par les attraits de la brillante civilisation des nouveaux venus abandonnant leurs propres traditions et leur langue. On connaît les lamentations que cette situation arrachait à l'un des plus actifs champions de la réaction anti-musulmane, le cordouan Alvarez :

"Mes coreliogionaires, écrit-il, aiment à lire les poèmes et les romans des Arabes; ils étudient les écrits des théologiens et les philosophes musulmans, non pour les réfuter, mais pour se former une diction arabe correcte et élégante. Où trouver aujourd'hui un laïc qui lise les commentaires latins sur les saintes Ecritures ? Qui d'entre eux étudie les Evangiles, les prophètes, les apôtres ? Hélas ! tous les jeunes chrétiens qui se font remarquer par leurs talents, ne connaissent que la langue et la littérature arabe; ils lisent et étudient avec la plus grande ardeur les livres arabes; ils s'en forment à grands frais d'immenses bibliothèques, et proclament partout que cette littérature est admirable. Parlez-leur, au contraire, des livres chrétiens : ils vous répondront avec mépris que ces livres-là sont indignes de leur attention : Quelle douleur ! Les chrétiens ont oublié jusqu'à leur langue, sur mille d'entre nous, vous en trouverez à peine un seul qui sache écrire convenablement une lettre latine à un ami. Mais, s'il s'agit d'écrire en arabe, vous trouverez une foule de personne qui s'expriment dans cette langue avec la plus grande élégance, et vous verrez qu'elles composent des poèmes préférables, sous le point de vue de l'arabe, à ceux des Arabes eux-mêmes." [28]

Il y eut donc une vie commune quotidienne, dans les échanges commerciaux, intellectuels, dans les fonctions publiques et dans la vie de tous les jours. Il y eut même, au niveau des familles royales, des alliances matrimoniales. Et les ambassades venues soit des royaumes du Nord, soit de Constantinople, soit d'Allemagne (l'ambassadeur Jean de Gorz envoyé en 956 par Otton 1er),

reçues avec un cérémonial de cour imposant rappelaient aux chrétiens qu'ils avaient des frères dans la foi au-delà des frontières. [29]

Les arts

Au point de vue artistique, les Arabes importèrent en Espagne d'abord les traditions syriennes puis les innovations des Abbassides. Ils furent peu influencés par la civilisation wisigothique antérieure dont les seuls héritiers furent les mozarabes.

Toujours sur le plan artistique, l'influence de l'Islam espagnol sur l'art roman a été démontrée par des études entreprises de chaque côté des Pyrénées et surtout par les travaux d'Emile Mâle. "Il ressort de ces enquêtes que l'art roman du haut Moyen Age est, soit directement, soit indirectement, redevable à l'art de l'Islam espagnol d'avant le XIIème siècle de toute une série d'emprunts qui affectent moins l'ordonnance architecturale proprement dite que les thèmes décoratifs des intérieurs et des extérieurs des monuments". [30]

Il y eut des arts intermédiaires : art mozarabe et art mudejar. Le premier s'est manifesté à partir du 9ème siècle en Espagne chrétienne et supplanta totalement l'art asturien précédent, influencé par l'art wisigothique. Les églises mozarabes qui s'élevèrent en Castille, en Léon et en Galice se distinguèrent par l'emploi constant de voûtes soutenues par des arcs en fer de cheval. C'est à travers cet art mozarabe ou directement à travers l'art califien que s'exerça l'influence de l'art musulman sur l'art roman.

L'influence de l'art musulman s'exerça aussi sur l'architecture non religieuse : monuments civils, ouvrages militaires, ponts et aqueducs et sur le développement des arts mineurs : travail de l'ivoire orfèvres, céramique, tapisserie, manufacture d'armes de Tolède et l'industrie de cuir de Cordoue [31]. "Calices, croix et

couronnes royales de Castille, vêtements ecclésiastiques d'apparat, que beaucoup de sacrities espagnols conservaient naguère encore, portent assez souvent une ornementation directement apparentée à l'art hispano-moresque, parfois même des arabesques où l'on découvre, à l'examen, des versets coraniques déformés par une succession de copistes". [32]

Les sciences

De même sur le plan scientifique, les musulmans, épris d'observations concrètes, dépassèrent aussi leurs maîtres. Les arts techniques se répandirent rapidement en Mésopotamie et en Egypte : travaux d'irrigation, construction des routes, dl forteresses, arts de la guerre, etc. En arithmétique, ils apprient l'usage des chiffres "ils firent de l'algèbre une science exacte en la développant considérablement et jetèrent les bases de la géométrie analytique. Ils furent indiscutablement les fondateurs de latrigonométrie plane et sphérique qui n'existaient pas, à proprement parler, chez les Grecs." En astronomie, ils perfectionnèrent les instruments d'observation, en construisirent d'autres de nouveau, firent de nombreuses observations. En optique, ils brillèrent d'un vif éclat : Alhazen et Kamal al-Din surpassent Euclide et Ptolémée. En médecine et pharmacologie, ils ajoutèrent aux Anciens leurs nombreuses observations faites dans les hôpitaux qu'ils fondèrent. Le **Continens** de **Razes, le Canon** d'Avicenne renferment la somme de toutes les connaissances médicales de l'Antiquité accrues de l'expérience déjà longue des practiciens arabes. Razès écrivit le premier traité qui décrive avec précision la variole. Un grand nombre de drogues enrichirent l'arsenal de la thérapeutique. Voyageurs infatigables, les musulmans parcoururent l'immense territoire de l'empire musulman qui s'étendait des bords de l'Indus jusqu'à l'Atlantique et décrivirent soigneusement les itinéraires et les particularités des pays qu'ils traversèrent. L'ouvrage sur l'Inde de Biruni, l'une des plus illustres figures de la science musulmane, est encore aujourd'hui une mine de ren-

seignements précis sur les us et coutumes des populations médiévales de l'Inde.

Plan philosophique et religieux

Sur le plan plus proprement intellectuel, la civilisation musulmane a été essentiellement un pont, un intermédiaire exceptionnel entre l'Antiquté classique et l'Europe chrétienne.

Les Musulmans ont reçu avec avidité, avec amour, avec un respect infini les grandes oeuvres de la Grèce et, sous l'impulsion de puissants mécènes, des équipes de traducteurs chrétiens à Baghdad, firent passer en langue arabe Platon et Aristote, Hippocrate et Galien, Ptolémée, Euclide et Archimède, Apollonius et Théon, Ménélas et Aristarque, Héron d'Alexandrie et Philon de Byzance et beaucoup d'autres. L'admirable souplesse de la langue arabe leur permit de forger un vocabulaire philosophique et scientifique précis capable de rendre les mots scientifiques et techniques.

En Occident, il y eut le phénomène inverse. Dès le 12ème siècle à Tolède des équipes de traducteurs occidentaux sous l'énergique impulsion de l'évêque Raymond travailla à faire passer en latin les grandes oeuvres philosophiques et scientifiques des Arabes. Et de l'Espagne et de la Sicile, elles passèrent en Europe.

Dans l'Orient musulman, les disciples arabes devinrent bientôt eux-mêmes des maîtres car ils ne se contentèrent pas de copier servilement les Anciens mais essayèrent de les assimiler et, grâce à leurs principes, de repenser leurs propres problèmes. Platon et Aristote revêtirent bientôt le caftan et portèrent le turban. Avec les Kindi, les Farabi, les Avicenne, les Ibn Tofayl, les Averroès, la pensée antique aborda les problèmes que posent certaines vérités dogmatiques transmises par la Révélation : existence de Dieu, sa nature, problème de la création, de la prière, de la Pro-

vidence, l'immortalité de l'âme, le bonheur éternel, la résurrection des corps, etc...

Au point de vue de la mystique, il faudrait signaler les similitures relevées par Asin Palacios entre un soufi musulman andalou Ibn Abbad de Ronda (m. en 1390) et saint Jean de la Croix.

A mesure que la **Reconquista** se poursuivait, l'héritage arabe devenait plus accessible. Loin de le renier, les souverains chrétiens entendirent le faire servir à l'intelligentzia chrétienne. Alphonse le Sage entreprit un travail de traduction et d'adaptation de ce legs. Il fonda en 1254 à Séville un Institut d'études latines et arabes où une équipe de traducteurs, chrétiens musulmans et surtout juifs fit passer en castillan un grand nombre d'ouvrages scientifiques et littéraires, en particulier **Kalila wa Dimma,** le **Sindibad.** On rédigea la **Chronique générale.** [34]

Pour les échanges littéraires et proprement culturels, je voudraits les illustrer par l'étude de trois thèmes qui depuis les débuts de notre siècle ont été particulièrement étudiés, à savoir l'origine de l'amour courtois, celle de la poésie lyrique des troubadours enfin les rapports de Dante avec l'Islam. Commençons par voir l'influence des Arabes :

1. LA POESIE LYRIQUE DES TROUBADOURS [35]

La question de l'origine de la poésie lyrique des troubadours a été très débattue. A l'époque où les romanistes ignoraient tout de la poésie hispano-mauresque populaire au Moyen-Age, ils refusaient avec déduin toute influence de celle-ci sur la poésie provençale. En 1899, l'un des plus célèbres d'euntre eux, Alfred Janroy exprimait son opinion en ces termes : la littérature provençale "nous apparaît d'abord, dès son origine, comme soustraite à toute influence étrangère; elle éclôt brusquement, pareille à une fleur qui sortirait de terre sans racine et sans tige" et il déclarait

tout uniment que l'influence arabe qu'on voulait mettre à la base de cette poésie était une légende.

Mais en 1912, des arabisants espagnols, en particulier Julian Ribera réagirent contre l'absolu de cette affirmation. En s'appuyent sur le recueil des chansons populaires d'Ibn Guzman — **(El-Cancionero d'Aben Guzman)** — qui fut un moment ministre à Cordoue au 12ème siècle et dont le recueil de **zajal** en arabe populaire andalou avait été publié quelques années auparavant — Ribeira essaya de montrer que le parallélisme des trophes de ces zajal et des chansons des troubadours n'était pas une simple coïncidence. Pour lui, les formes métriques andalouses ont suivi le même chemin que les autres disciplines classiques, c'est-à-dire qu'originaires de Grèce, elles ont fait le circuit Rome, Perse, Bagdad, puis Espagne arabe pour, de là, revenir en Europe.

Au fond, les rapports entre la poésie des troubadours et la poésie arabe n'est qu'un des aspects de la pénétration de la culture hispano-mauresque en Occident. Si l'ont doit accorder aux romanistes que la poésie des troubadours est due en grande partie au développement de la poésie populaire, il semble bien que les nouvelles recherches, basées sur les sources arabes, amènent à considérer — et Robert Briffault, qui a consacré un livre documentation sur **Les troubadours et le sentiment romantique** (1945), "que cette évolution n'eut pas lieu en Gascogne ou en Provence, mais en Espagne, sous l'influence dominante de la poésie andalouse. Ayant déjà été savamment perfectionnée, c'est sous cette forme et dans un style populaire qu'elle se répandit en Provence. Le modèle une fois donné, les troubadours provençaux brodèrent dessus à plaisir, et le varièrent à l'avenant des conditions et des traditions de leur entourage. A eux revient le mérite d'avoir fait de cette poésie lyrique, dont l'inspiration et les moyens techniques leur avaient été fournis par le chant hispano-mauresques d'Andalousie et d'Aragon, le modèle qui devait se perpétuer dans la littérature lyrique de l'Europe". (pp. 47-48)

Je sais d'ailleurs que le débat reste ouvert.

2. L'AMOUR COURTOIS[36]

Le deuxième sujet où un résultat concluant a été obtenu grâce aux sources arabes est celui de l'**amour courtois.** Le P. Denomy, professeur à l'Institut d'Etude médiévales de Toronto, a consacré un certain nombre d'articles à démêler ce problème. Il a montré, un particulier, par une étude minutieuse des manifestations de l'amour courtois chez des troubadours comme Guillaume d'Aquitaine, Marcabru, Bernard Marti, Jaufré Rudel et Bernard de Ventadour qu'ils avaient subi l'influence, — d'un traité d'Avicenne **sur l'amour.** Ce qui a permis au P. Denomy d'entreprendre cette recherche, c'est la traduction faite par un de ses collègues arabisants de ce traité et qu'il a publié en même temps que ses articles. A cette occasion d'ailleurs, le P. Denomy a fait une large enquête dans les documents arabes concernant les auteurs mystiques musulmans et où il est parlé en détail de l'amour platonique, **al-hubb al-Udhri.** En particulier, un auteur andalou du Moyen-Age, Ibn Hazm, a consacré un ouvrage spécial, **Le Collier de la colombe èTawq al-hamana)** à la description des sentiments que suscite l'amour courtois. Ce dernier ouvrage est accessible actuellement en anglais, en français, en espagnol et en italien.

3. DANTE ET L'ISLAM[37]

Le troisième sujet intéressant l'héritage culturel arabe du point de vue littéraire est celui des rapports de Dante et de l'Islam. Dans un livre fort documenté, l'illustre arabisant espagnol, Don Asin Palacios, prêtre catholique d'ailleurs et qu'on ne peut pas soupçonner de vouloir diminuer le grand chef-d'oeuvre de l'Occident chrétien, a entrepris de montrer que l'on pouvait trouver dans la littérature arabe médiévale des oeuvres comme celles d'Ibn Arabi qui contiennent, en y utilisant des traditions musulmanes, en particulier le voyage du Prophète de l'Islam au ciel, des thèmes, des images très proches de celles de la Divine Comédie.

Bien entendu, au moment où l'ouvrage d'Asin parut, il souleva un vif émoi dans les rangs des dantologues. Il leur semblait qu'on avait porté une main sacrilège sur la quintessence de l'épopée religieuse chrétienne. Mais peu à peu les discussions permirent de mettre les choses au point. Sans rien ôter au génie créateur de Dante, on peut admettre qu'il ait emprunté tel ou tel détail de son imagerie ou même telle ou telle conception des tourments de l'enfer ou des délices du paradis. Ce qui donna à la thèse d'Asin plus de force, c'est la publication ultérieure par un érudit italien Enrico Cerulli et un savant espagnol Sendino du **Libro della Scala**, ouvrage qui reproduit des textes latins médiévaux décrivant l'ascension nocturne de Mahomet au ciel. Sans donnr la preuve définitive de l'emprunt fait par Dante l'ouvrage apporte cependant à l'appui de cet emprunt de fortes présomptions.

Enfin, il faudrait citer tout un groupe de légendes ou de fables qui ont traversé la Méditerranée pendant le Moyen-Age, probablement par l'intermédiaire des voyageurs occidentaux se rendant en Orient. On trouve ces légendes dans le folklore espagnol, français et anglais.

Nous avons vu jusque là ce qui a été un "aliment" pour l'Occident. Il nous rete à voir comment l'Islam a été aussi un "révulsif" pour lui.

Ce que nous connaissons de la structure de la société musulmane et de son dogme nous permet de comprendre pourquoi au Moyen-Age l'attitude des deux sociétés religieuses, musulmane et chrétienne, ne pouvait être qu'une attitude de confrontation implacable, — avec des périodes de répit, des intermèdes de paix, provisoire.

Le Christianisme, depuis sept siècles, vivait dans une foi absolu dans la vérité de son message. Il avait pendant trois siècles vécu en quelque sorte dans les catacombes, subissant parfois de

sanglantes persécutions jusqu'au moment où il put vivre au grand jour. Le triomphe de Constantin signifiait pour lui l'organisation d'une société chrétienne où la foi et les moeurs inspirées de l'Evangile s'affirmaient à la face du monde. Mais bientôt, les Vandales furent au coeur de la chrétienté. Un moment on aurait pensé que l'Eglise serait serait entraînée dans le naufrage de l'empire romain, mais elle tint tête à la bourrasque et on baptisa les Barbares. L'Europe, au moment où parut l'Islam était, malgré ses dissensions et ses luttes, ou chrétienne ou en voie de le devenir : son dogme était défini, sa morale précise et claire, l'autorité spirituelle du pape reconnue, le droit canon et le droit romain régissant la société chrétienne.

Bien que le spirituel et le temporel fussent en principe distin, la place de l'Eglise était première dans une société féodale hiérarchisée où les évêques étaient à la foi défenseurs de la foi foi et de la cité.è C'était la papauté qui, en fait, était l'âme de l'Europe en croissance et qui en orientait les destinées. "Hors de l'Eglise, point de salut". Ceux qui étaient au-dehors, c'était les "infidèles" qu'il fallait convertir ou du moins qu'il fallait empêcher de venir, comme des loups ravisseurs, ravager la bergerie.

Or l'Islam s'était présenté dès le début comme une force militaire mise au service d'une foi nouvelle ardente, désireuse de s'étendre aux confins du monde. Il entendait apporter aux peuples la lumière et la loi du Coran. Il ne s'agissait plus d'une simple hérésie chrétienne, portant sur tel ou tel point du dogme, mais bien plus d'une autre religion, d'une autre conception des rapports de Dieu avec ses créatures, d'une style de vie entièrement différent. Ce que nous avons dit plus haut au sujet de l'Islam comme Cité le montre d'une façon très claire. Dès lors, l'Europe chrétienne devant l'avance des troupes musulmanes n'avait le choix qu'entre l'une des trois solutions suivantes :

1. Ou bien recevoir les musulmans comme des sauveurs, em-

brasser leur religion, donc renoncer à sa foi chrétienne, s'islamiser et s'arabiser.

2. Ou bien rester chrétiens mais accepter de vivre en **dhimmis,** en citoyens de seconde zone, en protégés.

3. Ou enfin résister, ne point courber la tête, ne pas céder à la force, lutter pour sa liberté à la fois religieuse et nationale, on dirait aujourd'hui "garder son identité". La première solution fut choisie par une partie de la population wisigothe, en Espagne: elle devint musulmane avec les musulmans. D'autres chrétiens furent fermes dans leur foi, et, en terre occupée par les Arabes, acceptèrent de vivre en "protégés", nourrissant toujours l'espoir de retrouver un jour entière liberté. Enfin, en terre non musulmane, dans le nord de l'Espagne et dans toute l'Europe, le désir de "délivrer" les terres chrétiennes resta vif : d'où le mouvement de la **Reconquista** en Espagne et celui des Croisades en Europe.

Que ce dernier, motivé religieusement au début, soit devenu par la suite une aventure militaire à fins politiques et matérielles, ne change rien à la position du problème : il s'agissait de deux communautés "totalitaires" qui s'affrontaient et qui n'admettaient pas le partage.

La **Reconquista** finit par réaliser son rêve : et, pour employer une expression d'Americo Castro, "elle forgea le style de vie espagnol" elle fit de l'Espagne un pays catholique d'une parfaite homogénéité. Les Croisades, par contre, finirent par un lamentable échec. Et bientôt l'Islam à son tour devenu plus fort passa de nouveau à lattaque : il s'empara de Constantinople et un moment menaça les portes de Vienne.

Sur le plan intellectuel, la "révulsion" se manifesta par toute cette série d'oeuvres polémiques que nous avons analysées et qui se signalent toutes, même celles qui veulent être bienveillantes, par leur inflexible agressivité.

Ainsi si le bilan de la renontre de l'Islam avec le Christianisme a été, du point de vue culturel, véritablement enrichissant, sur le plan proprement religieux et social, l'échec a été total.

Mais alors, qu'en est-il du présent et de l'avenir ? Heureusement que depuis le Moyen-Age et la Renaissance, beaucoup de choses ont changé. Le fait capital, qu'on le déplore ou qu'on s'en réjouisse, est que l'Europe n'est plus une chrétienté. La laïcisation a fait son chemin, l'Etat s'est libéré de l'Eglise et celle-ci, devenue plus libre à son tour de ses implications temporelles, se donne plus entièrement à sa tâche spirituelle. Son attitude à l'égard des religions non chrétiennes s'est faite plus compréhensive et, à l'égard de l'Islam, le Concile de Vatican II, a fait une Déclaration qui marque une date dans les rapports des Musulmans et de l'Eglise. Après avoir rendu témoignage à la foi musulmane, elle termine sa Déclaration par la voie à suivre dorénavant entre les tenants des deux religions : "Si au cours des siècles, dit-elle, de nombreuses dissensions et inimitiés se sont manifestées entre les chrétiens et les musulmans, le Concile les exhorte à oublier le passé et à s'efforcer sincèrement à la compréhension mutuelle, ainsi qu'à protéger et à promouvoir ensemble, pour tous les hommes, la justice sociale, les valeurs morales, la paix et la liberté".

En ce qui concerne le présent et l'avenir, les perspectives d'échanges culturels entre le Christianisme et l'Islam sont pleines de promesses. Le Vatican entretient des relations diplomatiques cordiales avec de nombreux pays mususlmans. Depuis la fin du siècle dernier, les deux grandes universités chrétiennes de Beyrouth, celle des Protestants américains et celle des Pères jésuites, les nombreuses écoles chrétiennes de garçons et de filles dans les pays à majorité musulmane fréquentées à la fois par les chrétiens et les musulmans ocntribuent à la formation de cadres qualifiés pour les carrières diplomatiques, les finances, le commerce, les oeuvres sociales, les professions libérales; elles préparent une

élite d'éléments ouverts aux deux cultures, puisées à leurs sources mêmes.

De plus, au plan même des hautes instances du Vatican, deux grands discastères du Vatican ont pour charge spécifique de nouer et d'entretenir res échanges culturelles étroits entre le Christianisme et l'Islam : ce sont le Secrétariat pour les croyants non-chrétiens et notre Conseil de la Culture. Pour ne donner que quelques exemples, au moment du millénaire d'Avicenne, le Cardinal Tisserant a invité un grand savant musulman, le Dr Mahmoud El-Khodeiri, qui était à ce moment secrétaire du cheikh al-Azhar, Mostafa Abd El-Ràaziq, à se rendre à la Bibliothèque du Vatican pour y examiner les manuscrits des traductions latines d'Avicenne. Le P. de Beaurecueil, dominicain, spécialiste de la mystique musulmane, a été invité par l'Université de Kaboul pour y donner un certain nombre de cours sur sa spécialité. Le P. Tom Michel jésuite, à son tour, a répondu à l'appel de plusieurs instituts religieux de la Turquie pour y donner des cours sur la religion chrétienne. Nous-mêmes, avec le regretté professeur Louis Gardet, avons publié une Introduction à la théologie musulmane, vrai traité de théologie comparée, qui fut traduit en arabe par le P. Jabre et le cheikh azharien Sobhi El-Saleh qui y ajouta des notes et des remarques du point de vue musulman, ouvrage qui a été reçu avec faveur par les chercheurs musulmans savants.

Les exemples pourraient être multipliés : au Maroc, à Tunis, au Caire, à notre Institut, au Bangladesh, en Indonésie, en Inde, au Pakistan il y a partout des foyers de rencontres ferventes où les échanges cultures sont surtout centrés sur les aspects spirituesl de la culture [33]

Chrétiens et musulmans doivent poursuivre avec ardeur, en-

semble, ces échanges culturels. Leurs croyances respectives, loin de les éloigner les uns des autres, doivent, au contraire, les inciter à dépasser leurs conflits éventuels, dans une même recherche du service de Dieu et des hommes. Rien n'est plus nécessaire aujourd'hui que ces échanges pour assurer aux hommes leur dignité, dans un climat de paix et d'amour.

NOTES

Nous ne donnons ici, faute de place, que le minimum de références renvoyant pour une abondante bibliographie, à notre article sur le même sujet paru dans le revue **ESTUDIOS LULIANOS**, No. 81, vol. XXIX, Fasc. 2 Ano XXIX : 1989. Nous renvoyons dans les brèves notes suivantes à cet article en le désignant par Anawati, **Estudios**...

1. cf. une analyse de ce livre du P. Abd El-Jalil, **Aspects intérieurs de l'Islam**, Paris, le Seuil 1949 ch. IV intitulé : "L'Egypte de demain", pp. 81-116.

2. Pour l'étude des Sciences dans le monde de l'Islam, cf. la bibliographie dans Anawati, **Estudios**..., note 3.

3. Sur l'histoire de l'Espagne musulmane cf. **ibid.** note 4.

4. Au sujet de l'expansion de l'Islam cf. **Ibid.** note 5. L'ouvrage d'Arnold, **Preaching of Islam** a été traduit en arabe au Caire.

5. Sur la Reconquista et les rapports entre souverains chrétiens et émirs musulmans cf. Anawati, **Estudios**... note 8.

6. Sur les Almohades et Almoravides cf. Ibid. notes 10 et 11.

7. Sur la Sicile musulmane cf. **Ibid.** note 12.

8. Sur Frédéric II cf. **ibid.** note 15.

9. Sur la connaissance de l'Islam au Moyen-Age cf. **ibid.** note 17.

10. Sur ce texte cf. **ibid.** notes 18 et 19.

11. Les légendes sur Mahomet sont nombreuses et variées au Moyen-Age cf. **ibid.** note 21.

12. Sur Pierre le Vénérable cf. **Ibid** note 22.

13. La meilleure étude et la plus complète est celle du P. Cortabarria cf. **ibid** note 25.

14. En ce qui concerne l'origine et le développement des universités espagnoles au Moyen-Age. Voir Rashdall et Powick, **The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages,** London 1936 et réimpression en 1942 vol. 2, pp. 63-108.

16. Sur Roger Bacon cf. Anawati, **Estudios**... note 39.

17. Sur Saint Thomas d'Aquin, cf. **Ibid.** notes 38, 40 et 41.
18. Sur Raymond Martin, cf. **Ibid.** notes 25, 42, 43 et 44.

19. Sur Riccoldo, cf. **ibid.** note 46.

20. Sur Ramon LULL, la littérature est immense, cf. **Ibid.** note **46**.

21. Sur Jean de Ségovie, cf. **Ibid.** note 48.

22. Sur Nicolas de Cues, cf. **ibid.** note 50. L'édition critique du **Cribratio** a été faite par Hagemann.

23. "... hay que reconocer que, como dicé E. Garcia Gomez, Islam y Oriente han sido a la vez para Espana un alimento y un revulsion", cité par Juan Vernet, Los musulmanes espagnoles, Barcelona, **1961**.

24. Sur la langue arabe et son influence sur le vocabulaire des langues occidentales cf. Anawati, Estudios, note 56.

25. cf. une liste choisie de mots choisis dans l'article de Fr. Gabrieli dans **Legacy et Islam** 2ème édition : Islam in the Mediterranean World", pp. 87-88.

26. **Ibid.,** p. 78.

27. in Rizzitano, **Gli Arabi in Italia, Settimane**... **in Spoleto,** pp. 93-114; G. Musa, **L'emirato di Bari,** Bari 1964.

28. Sur l'évêque Alvaro cf. Anawati, **Estudios,** notes 18 et 19.

29. cf. **ibid.** notes 60 et 61.

30. Levi-Provençal. **La civilisation arabe en Espagne. Vue générale, IFAO** 1938, p. 134.

31. appelé "cordoan" d'où provient en français le mot "cordonnier".

32. Sur le plan scientifique cf. Anawati, Estudios, note 3.

34. **Ibid.** note 67.

35. Sur la poésie lyrique occidentale et ses rapports avec les sources arabes cf. **Ibid.** Note 52.

36. Sur les sources arabes de l'amour courtois cf. **ibid.** note 53.

37. Sur Dante et l'Islam cf. **ibid.** note 54. Ajouter : Vincent Cantarino, **Dante and Islam : History and Analysis of a controversy in A. Dante Symposium,** series in the Romanic languages and literatures. Chapel Hill, North Carolina 1965 ; **Dante and Islam Theory of light in the Paradiso,** Kentucky Romance Quarterly 1968 (?)

38. La littérature sur la polémique et le dialogue islamo-chrétien est abondance cf. Anawati, Estudios... note 68.

....

CULTURES, CONFLICT OR DIALOGUE ?

ALTERNATIVE MODELS

Hassan Hanafi (Egypt)

I. Introduction

Cultures are living entities, carried by living human beings and subject to the same laws of life, birth and death, struggle or concord, conflict or dialogue. The two alternative models exist. By-passing conflict and preaching dialogue is mere rhetoric. History of cultures would show when the two models existed and under which circumstances.

Every culture has two aspects : a particularist and a universalist. The particularist aspect is the vehicle of self-identity, self-affirmation and autonomy. The universalist aspect is the common share between the self and the other, "solvitur in Ecselsis", the common goal for all humanity. The relation between particularism and universalism is like that between change and permanence.

Since culture is the expression of a people's struggle for survival, culture becomes a power, a tool for survival. Cultures provide the worldview, the image of the self and of the other, the value-system to adopt, the norms of behaviour, the legitimizing devices. It creates its own history and revitalizes, by its own will, choices from memory. Therefore, culture is power. There is no such innocent culture calling for love of the neighbour and kingdom of God, except in preaching and not in social science. Wishful thought is something and reality is something else.

Cultural-interaction likewise is the expression of the balance of power between cultures. Dialogue is not only mutual talk but

dialectics between the two partners. The power of Greek Logos was behind the inter-cultural dialogue between Greek philosophy and nascent Islam. The power of the transcendence was behind the inter-cultural relation between Islamic sciences and philosophy on one side and medieval scholasticism on the other side. The power of convergence was behind the Andalusian symbiosis between Islamic, Jewish and Christian cultures in Spain. The power of domination was, and may be is, behind the cultural interaction between the European culture in its modern times and cultures of Asia, Africa and Latin America since the "Geografic Discoveries", from the capital C to the small cs, from the center to the periphery. Examples from the two alternative models, conflict and dialogue, are numerous. The challenge is : When does every model occur and under which circumstances ? And if the model of conflict exists nowadays what are the ways and means to change it to the model of dialogue ?

II. **The Conflict Model**

The conflict model occurs when one culture makes itself the culture with capital C and all other cultures are cultures with small cs. The relation between the two is a metaphysical one, the relation between one and many, an ontological one, God and creatures and even an ethical relation, the **Ought** to the **is.** One culture, for quest to power, transcends all other cultures and surpasses them like Zeus on the Olymp. The order of cultures is a value order, the capital C, is superior to the small cs. One in the center, others in the periphery.

Hence, the process of acculturation begins. In the mind of the capital C, acculturation means **dropping** the indigenous and **adding** the exogenous, a necessary passage from underdevelopment to development, from backwardness to progress, from primitivism to modernism, from death to life. In the mind of small cs, acculturation means the destruction of national cultures of

small cs to implement the Imperial Culture of Capital C. Since culture is the expression of national identity, the destruction of national cultures is a destruction of national entities, communities and nations.

That was the case of Western culture vis-à-vis non-Western cultures in Africa, Asia and Latin America, the supremacy of the white man's culture on the cultures of black, red and yellow peoples. Europe is in the centre and the three continents in the periphery. The movement began since the so called "Geographic discoveries" the beginning of Western colonialism to the ancient world followed by missionaries. The largest pillage in the world history began during the European "modern times", the flow of wealth, gold and slaves from the periphery to the center, the destruction of the periphery for the construction of the center. The universal culture became the outlet where all particular cultures poured.

Since Western culture is a compound culture from several sub-cultures; British, French, German, Italian, Spanish, Dutch, Purtugese, Russian ... etc. every sub-culture played the role of the Mother-culture. The French destroyed Arab and Islamic cultures in north, central and west Africa, specially in Algeria. The British did the same in India, the Dutch in Indonesia; the Portugese and the Spanish in Latin America, the Italians in Ethiopia and Somalia, the Russians in Islamic Republics, of Central Asia. All of them in the name of the West destroyed indigenous cultures, the red Indians in North America. Indigenous people are either exterminated or forced to live in Reservations. This is unforgotten history specially after the Decolonization era, the decaying culture in the centre and the rebirthing of cultures in the periphery.

This acculturation process, the destruction of small cs for the hegemony of the big C, occurs on different levels. Language

comes first. Since language is the way to learn and to communicate, indigenous language is prohibited by the destruction of schools and a new language of the new comers is planted. Gradually new generations are uprooted from their own cultures and anchored in the alien one. Education comes second. The local history is erazed and Mother-France or Mother-Russia came as substitute. Knowledge about the self is minimalized, knowledge about the other is maximalized. Local customs and manners are considered Folklore to be observed by the other or fossilized in museums. Traditional law of the self yielded to the civil code of the other. The centers of learning are in the centre attracting the novices from the periphery, a one way learning, from the eternal master to the eternal disciple. The center produces and the periphery consumes. The capital C creates and the small cs imitate. The transfer of knowledge is a normal process from those who have to those who have not. "Orientalism" took the lead and put the big C as an observer and small cs as observed. Stereotyped images forged by the center about the periphery multiplied and became substitute realities. The historical past of small cs forgotten by the power of the mass-media of the centre, the present is doomed. The story of mankind has been written for the big C and by it, is the culmination of all cultures. Eurocentrism became law and order.

III. **The Dialogue Model**

The dialogue model occurs when all cultures are equal, capital C or small cs, since all cultures are the product of history, the creation of peoples and a man-made self-image. And since all peoples are equal in value irrespective of colour, cultures as national products are also alike.

In case of historical movements, the birth and fall of Empires, cultures are also alike if the rising nation, expanding on the decaying ones, presents a more universal code of ethics in

front of which all human beings, as individuals, are equal irrespective of their nations rising or falling. In the model of conflict historical movements between nations are invasions while in the model of dialogue their movements are liberation movements, from inequality, between nations or between rulers and ruled, to equality.

In this case, the particularities of the liberated nations are not destroyed, as it is the case in the conflict model, but affirmed and defended. Customs and manners which are not contrary to the universal code of ethics are maintained. Those which are contrary to it disappear. This newly perfected particularism is equal to individual and national identity. The universal code of ethics does not uproot peoples from their cultures, but on the contrary it anchores them more and more. That was the case of the expansion of Islam in Malaysia and Africa. Islamisation means Malayisation and Africanisation.

In the dialogue model, the relations between cultures is not a unilateral one, from capital C to small cs as it is the case in the conflict model, but multilateral, give and take. Learning is a double process between two masters or two disciples, mutual enrichment and collective creativity. The Arabèsque comes from central Asia. It existed before Islam and expressed the infinity in art after Islam. The Roman arch after Islam became the Arab arch, an expression of Palm-trees.

The model of dialogue appears clearly in history in the relation between Islamic philosophy on one side and Greek, Christian and Jewish philosophy on the other side. Islamic philosophy borrowed from Greek philosophy its language : Intellect, form, matter, cause, movement, substance, accident... etc. and used it to express new content. Greek logic was translated, commented and restructured within Islamic theory of knowledge. Greek ethics was also reaffirmed and completed. Islamic philosophy took the

old language and gave it new meaning, new wine in old bottles. Arab translators were the medium, Christians in faith and Arabs in culture.

Afterwards, Jews and Christian philosophers took the new meanings from Islamic philosophy and expressed them in their own proper languages. Moses communicated with the Intellect Agent like Mohammed. Jewish Torah had been restructured according to the Shari'a. Islamic mysticism appeared in "Zohar". Islamic Kalam was borrowed by Jewish thinkers, Saadia Gaon, Maimonides ... etc, to prove the veracity of Jewish religion. Christian philosophers in late scholasticism did alike. Islamic transcendence, unity and justice, the universal code of ethics, the virtuous city, the immortality of the soul were behind christian rationalism since Anselm, Abelard, Thomas of Acquinas. Islamic experimental sciences were taken as models by Duns Scot, William Ockham and Roger Bacon. Dialogue even became a literary genre in the Khuzari of Jehuda Halevi. The Muslim became the philosopher per excellence in "Dialogue between a jew, a christian and a philosopher" of Abelard.

In the dialogue model, all equal cultures can participate in the common goals and share the same universal code, based on reason and the right to know nature and the use of its laws, rights of man and peoples in freedom, social justice and welfare. All peoples and cultures strived for the ideals of Enlightenment appeared in the Andlusian symbiosis. In the model of conflict, these ideals are only for the self, not for the other who should stay in ignorance, magic, fear, oppression, exploitation and poverty. The ideals of European enlightenment were broken at the borders of Europe and even at the borders of every European nation generating a model of conflict, while the ideals of Islamic Enlightenment went beyond peoples and nations, generating a model of dialogue.

IV. Conclusion

If the model of dialogue existed in the past and the model of conflict is more prevailing in the present, it is possible by certain means to recuperate the model of dialogue as follows :

1. Continuous efforts to put an end to the polarity between capital C in the center and small cs in the periphery. A dialogue between cultures is only possible when they are equal. As far as the dialogue continues with the complex of superiority from the culture in the center and the complex of inferiority from the cultures in the periphery, the model of conflict prevails. The multiplication of the centers of cultures equal in value, permits double way relation between them, give and take, a process of mutual learning and mutual enrichment. Every culture learns what it ignores.

2. This also requires an equal share in historiography. As far as Europe is the center of history, in which all cultures culminate, the model of conflict prevails. Cultures of the periphery have to find an equal share in writing history. This history of the world did not begin in modern times. Seven thousand years of human culture cannot be reduced to one chapter prior to modern times and even not their source, since the European culture is a new creation without precedents. In re-writing history the European culture has to be reduced to its proper size, to return back to its natural geographic borders. Cultures in the periphery can then breathe and expound from within without external pressure from without.

3. Putting an end to the stereotyped images, every culture, in the model of conflict is making for the other. It was normal from the central culture to distort the images of peripheral cultures as a means for colonization, such as : ignorance backward-

ness, underdevelopment, inflation, debts, corruption, dictatorship, torture, violation of human rights, tribalism, civil wars, terrorism, poverty, overspending, the ugly Arab in London, Harem, polygamy, patriarchal society, unemployment, dependency, in short, the slave. It was also normal, in the prcess of decolonization as self-defense to draw another streotyped image from the colonized to the colonizer : colonialism, imperialism, zionism, capitalism, exploitation, monopoly, militarism, racialism, Eurocentrism, arrogance, genocide, materialism in short, the master. Since decolonization occured some images became irrelevant. Once cultures become equal the glory of each culture appears, science and art in China, mathematics and ethics in India, politics and administration in Persia, science and philosophy in the Muslim World... etc. The role of the mass-media is decisive. New orientalism and new cultural anthropology are needed.

Humanity had enough from the model of conflict. The model of dialogue is not that far.

PANCASILA
A PHILOSOPHY TO PROMOTE CULTURAL DIALOGUE
(A CASE IN INDONESIA)

Iman Sudibjo Reksosusilo (Indonesia)

Foreword.

This paper has the intention to show a case where a philosophy of a certain people can help that people to have an inbuilt mechanism to deal with the problem of cultural interactions.

Due to the limited scope of time, and the wide scope of material involved this presentation cannot give full details of historical facts.

This paper will dedicate itself more to explaining the basic ideas. For easier reading, all notes and bibliography will be put at the end of the paper.

This presentation will follow these steps :

1. Cultural dialogue and cultural conflicts.
2. Indonesian cultural heritage.
3. The PANCASILA : a) Its Imergence.
   b) Its cultural roots.
   c) Its basic meaning as philosophy of life.
4. PANCASILA : A Philosophy to promote cultural dialogue.

1. Cultural dialogue and cultural conflicts.

Speaking about culture there seems to be two big tendencies: The first tendency is to regard culture as more concerned with the

spiritual side of man : Culture becomes : Religion, philosophy of life, fine arts. Culture is distinguished from **Civilization** which is more concerned with the material side of man. Civilization becomes : Economic, Technology, Entertainments.(1)

This tendency will regard "traditional" dance as Culture, while POP Music is regarded as Civilization.

The second tendency is to regard culture as THE WHOLE of human activities of a certain people. In this sense economics and technology are included in the culture of the people.(2)

If we follow the first tendency cultural conflicts will consist of resistance of a certain people toward ideas of other people coming from outside, and of resistance to new technology and expression of a new art/music insofar as art and music are regarded as vehicle of expressing ideas and way of life.

While cultural dialogue means the process by which foreign ideas and expressions are absorbed into the existing pattern of culture.

On the other hand if we regard culture as the total whole of human activities of a certain people, then cultural conflicts mean the rejection of other people because they have a different culture. Cultural dialogue then means all effort to change a different culture into assuming another culture. There is an effort to dominate another culture.

2. Indonesian cultural heritage.(3)

The present cultural pattern of the Indonesian people is the result of influences from many different cultures which in the past were brought into Indonesia (or a certain island of the present (Indonesia) by travellers and traders from different coun-

tries like India and China. We will trace in great outline the cultural layers of Indonesian present culture, by giving also the most important contribution of the different cultures.

The basic indigenous culture of Indonesia can be said as the culture of gatherers and of farmers.

There is everywhere sign of animism, and acknowledgement of the existence of ghosts and spirits, superhuman power of nature which can be helpful or harmful to men.

Among the gatherers there is more individual pride, while among the tribes with settled agriculture there lives a sense of interbelonging with NATURE and the UNIVERSE, and a close interdependency in social life.

The Hindu culture came from India already early in 5th Century in West Java, while Buddhism flourished in the Sumatra in the 6th century under the **Sriwijawa kingdom** which spread its influence over the present Malaysia, Tahiland, and Borneo (Kalimantan).

In Java Buddhism is represented by the famous temple Borobudur. The peak of Hinduism was reached in the 14th Century under the **kingdom of Majapahit.** At that time the influence of Majapahit has spread over practically all the important islands of the present Indonesia.

The important traits of Hindu-culture which remain from this period until present time is the idea of the one-ness of man's inner realm with the highest realm of the Universe, the one-ness of Atman and Brahman.

This idea finds expression in the social set-up of the notion of Divine power as manifested in the Kingly power. The notion of the KING-GOD. (Dewa-raja).

From the cultural point of view a unique phenomenon occured during the Hindu kingdom in Java. Javanese poets and artisans managed to absorb Hindu arts into javanese art, which is called Hindu-Javanese arts.(4) And during the reign of Majapahit kingdom Buddhism and Hinduism have been united into one religion called Ciwa-Buddha.

Hinduism and Buddhism in Indonesia gave rise to the tendency of mystical contemplation, and the quest for inner perfection.

Islam arrived in Indonesia around the end of the 14th century. This religion was brought into Indonesia by way of merchants from Gujarat, India. They build up trading-centre in coastal towns of Malaya, Sumatra, and north Java.

Little by little those trading-centres became fortified cities, centres of kingdoms, governed by a Sultan. Through the expansion of those kingdoms Islam expanded throughout Indonesia.

However, the real penetration of Islam has been brought about through centres of learning, by way of mystical teachings of Sufism.

So many people in Indonesia became Moslems, because their Kings have accepted Islam, and also because they had already the tendency of mystical contemplation which they perceived also in the teaching of Islamic Sufism.

In this way also Islam was easily absorbed into local customs and traditions. At that time Islam in Indonesia was not very orthodox. Only later, in the 19th and 20th centuries, when Arab world became more accessible to Indonesians, then arose more orthodox Islamic groupings.

So, also the coming of Islam did not cause warfare and upheavals among the Indonesians.

Christianity entered Indonesia also by way of traders. (Spaniards, Portuguese, Dutchmen, and Englishmen). Where the Portuguese had the overhand in this trade competition, they built up a trade centre and established their power, and also spread the Roman Catholic Religion. Where the Dutch had the overhand, then the Christian Protestant religion had more opportunity to spread.

However in the beginning there was much resistance towards Christianity, as Christianity was regarded as also on the side of the foreign power which has imposed its superiority by military power.

But through the good works of the missionaries, little by litle the people also accepted Christianity.

The significance of Christianity for the Indonesian people is the opening of Western education to the Indonesian people.

These layers of cultural influences have moulded the Indonesian people into a unique personality : A people who is proud of its tradition, who is religious-minded, who has close-knit social relation with his fellowmen, who by its experience of foreign-rule and by its acceptance of the Western idea of freedom has forged a nationalism based on the motto : One nation, one country, one language : Indonesia. This unity of Indonesian people forms the basic cultural factor for the struggle for independence.

3. PANCASILA

a) Its emergence. [5]

The word PANCASILA was already found in an old Ja-

vanese poem of the 14th century. However that word means the Five buddhist training precepts of : Abstinence for destroying life, abstinence from taking what is not given, abstinence from sexually immoral conduct, abstinence from false speech, and abstinence from slander.
The PANCASILA of which we are now speaking emerged during the meeting of members of the Committee of Indonesian Independence May 29 - 1945 until 1 of June 1945.

In the first meeting the members were looking for the basic principles on which to build the new nation Indonesia. Mr. Muh Yamin in his speech mentioned that the new Nation should be grounded on the principles Of :

1) Religious belief and attitude in one God.
2) Nationalistic unity of Indonesia.
3) Deep sense of just and noble humanity.
4) Sense of oneness with the people through wise leadership by way of delegation and peaceful togetherness and deliberation.
5) Social justice for the whole Indonesian people.

While Mr. Sukarno, who later became the first president of Indonesia, also put forward the same idea.

He said that the Philosophical base is the first to be founded, the "Welt-Anschauung", on which to build the new nation. Sukarno put forward these principles :

1) Basic sense of nationhood.
2) Internationalism or sense of humanity.
3) Leadership by delegation and peaceful deliberation to achieve consensus.
4) Welfare for the people.
5) Sense of religious belief in God, according to one's religion.

Both speakers agreed that these principles were taken from the cultural root of the Indonesian people.

Later these five principles were taken up into the preamble of the Indonesian Constitution of 1945.(6)

Mr. Sukarno called these principles the PANCASILA. However he regarded these five principles not merely as moral/ethical norms, but as the five basic philosophical grounds, way of thinking, way of life for the Indonesian people, and philosophical grounds for the Indonesian State.

4. **PANCASILA : b) Its cultural roots.**

The cultural roots of PANCASILA is to be found in the believing attitude of the Indonesian people in superhuman creatures who control the destiny of mankind.(7) As the religions which later came into Indonesia basically hold the same belief (with different names for those super human power) the Indonesian people readily accept these religions. This is the cultural root for the first SILA Belief in one Divinity.

Until the present time Indonesian people are basically an agricultural people. In every tribe in Indonesia there has been the custom of doing the farming and the agriculture together. Social cohesion and consideration for other's need are very strong.(8)

This agricultural trait of Indonesian people forms the cultural root for the second SILA : Humanity.

In all known tribal community in Indonesia the decision for the villages' welfare is taken through talk and deliberation of the village elders, in order to come to the consensus concerning the best solution to any problem.

This pattern is followed into the royal court, where deliberation takes place in certain times to discuss the problem confronting the kingdom. In these royal meetings heads of lower territorial municipalities should appear before the Royal court, also the elders and representatives of the religious groups. (2)

This is the cultural roots for the Third SILA : Deliberation to come to a consensus through meeting of representatives.

In actual history of the Indonesian Islands, no island and tribe have lived in complete isolation. Influence from one place was always felt in another place. Very often one kingdom has managed to spead its reign and influence over many regions. (10)

In this way many tribes have known each other, and they grew into a sense of belonging together.

When the foreign power, the Dutch, has managed to reign over the islands which comprise the present Indonesia, there was already a sense of unity among the different tribes.

That is the cultural root of the fourth SILA ; National unity.

In the ancient literature of Indonesia there are many passages depicting how benevolent kings and ministers helped the poor and gave welfare to their people. (11)

Despite the wars during the course of history of the Indonesian people, there have been times of prosperity during the peak period of the different Indonesian kingdom.

There have been kings who had their people's welfare in their hearts. That forms the cultural root for the fifth SILA : Social welfare for the whole people.

4) PANCASILA : c) **Its basic meaning as philosophy of life.**

In this section I intend to show the basic philosophical pattern of **Pancasila.**

1. The metaphysical-ontological basic pattern.
In the PANCASILA I discern the interweaving of two ontological patterns. There is the pattern of ORDO ENTIUM where BEING is regarded in different order. There is the Uitimate Being, the Perfect Being and there are subordinate beings, dependent on the Ultimate Being.
There is the acknowledgement that the ultimate being is transcendent, ineffable, ONE and perfect.
There is also the pattern of the ONENESS of BEING. in this pattern all the different beings are only manifestations of the ONE BEING.

Within this pattern it is easy for the Indonesian mind to accomodate the different ideas concerning the Godhead of the different religions which came over to Indonesia. Ancient literature and folklore in Indonesia abound with the names of Godhead derived from all kinds of Religion. It is within this metaphysical pattern that we can understand the SILA; Belief in one God, which accomodates Islam, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Christianity without giving occasion for conflicts.

2. **Indonesian philosophical anthropology.**

The Anthropology of Indonesian people is based on the animistic and pantheistic-monistic pattern of thinking Man is regarded as manifestation of the ONE BEING,

and should return to the ONE BEING, and as human being he is one with NATURE, while living among different ghosts and spirits who have power over NATURE.

Man is an interdependent being and part of the ONE BEING, of the ONE NATURE. Man's duty is not to conquer NATURE but to be one, in harmony with NATURE and the UNIVERSE.

Applied to social and ethical life the above pattern gives rise to the pattern of social cohesion. The indonesian individual feels himself part of the community. Community is more important than the individual. In ethics man has to live in harmony with his fellow men, curb the outer lower and rough human nature, cultivate serene, patient, tolerant conduct in order to be united with the ONE BEING.

The above pattern forms the base for the sense of unity, and the tendency to discuss problems in communical deliberation to achieve consensus.

3. **Indonesian political philosophy.**

Indonesian political philosophy concerns the philosophy of POWER.

Power is a manifestation of THE GODHEAD, everything in NATURE contains part of that POWER, takes part in the POWER. In more eminent way that power can reside in the "wise" man, and in the King. (12)

This pattern of thinking makes it possible that the people feel obedient to the King, because being obedient to the King will make the people participate in THE POWER residing in the King.

On the other hand this kind of POWER will not allow the King become a despot misusing his Power, oppressing his people. When the King does not take care of the welfare of his people THE POWER will leave him, and come down into another person who is going to overturn the kingdom.

This political philosophy forms the basic philosophy underlying the way of life for social welfare, for humanism under the rule of the one elected as head of the State.

4. **Indonesian Epistemology.**

Already in ancient times Indonesians equate knowledge with WISDOM, meaning to PENETRATE into the deepest essence of things, seeing the inner one meaning and connection of the many phenomena of the world. (13)
Knowledge in that sense does not come from active experiments and logical analysis, but comes from contemplation and mastery of the senses.
This type of knowledge tends to emphasize what will unite the different aspects, tends to minimize differences, tends to focus on the ONE more than on the MANY, tends to give encompassing definitions more than to give sharp exclusive distinctions.

This epistemological pattern makes Indonesian mind synthetize even conflicting ideas, makes the tendency to look for peaceful solution by compromising the content of dispute, rather than to delineate sharp exclusive limitations which generate disunity, even if it seems to defend the truth.

With that epistemological pattern, it is easy for the Indonesian mind to accept knowledge from all kinds of sources, to accomodate all different informations, to mould them into one

pattern which will fit into a pattern of UNITY IN DIVERSITY, "BHINEKA TUNGGAL IKA".(14)

4. **PANCASILA, a philosophy to promote cultural dialogue.** In this section I would like firstly to show the present philosophical and religious pattern which forms a challenge to Pancasila.

   Secondly I will show that present philosophical and religious pattern does not facilitate cultural dialogue.

   Thirdly, and lastly, I will show that PANCASILA philosophy is more apt to promote cultural dialogue.

   1) The metaphysical base of Pancasila is challenged by the dualistic pattern of BEING. A separation of the transcendent Supreme Being, and the subordinated manifold beings.

      This pattern of thinking prevent the conception of the immanence of the supreme Being in the subordinated beings.

      The anthropological philosophical base of Pancasila is challenged by the present emergence of the philosophy of man as individual, living on his own right, unique and existential, by which the value of the individual is put above the community.

      The political philosophy underlying Indonesian unity is challenged by the idea of scientific knowledge through observation, empirical experiments and statistical analysis.

      Also the analytical philosophy of language which looks

for sharp delineated definitions and meaning of words forms a challenge to the unifying mind of the Indonesians.

2) The above mentioned philosophical pattern of thought has formed this present world into a world of many religions, many enterprises, many researches which all claim to be for the good of human communities, for the good of mankind.

However realities of today's world have clearly shown how rligious fanaticism has splintered many nations into opposing groups who claim to fight for right and freedom.

Excessive stress on individuality makes the present world a place where each individual tries to get as much as possible from life, for his own individual need, without caring for his fellow men.

Epistemology which leads to empiricism makes people become materialistic in their attitude, which makes them silence the call for insight and wisdom. Sharp delineated definitions tend to sharpen differences and splinter mankind into different opposing factions.

All these traits mentioned above do not promote cultural dialogue, be cause dialogue within the above mentioned philosophical pattern will result in a monologue to convert the other party of the dialogue into the conviction of the cultural pattern of the other party of the dialogue. Each one tries to defend itself and tries to overcome the other. The result is war and strife. (15)

3) PANCASILA : A philosophy to promote cultural dialogue.

A real cultural dialogue can only happen peacefully if there is a spirit of equalness among both parties and if there is no trace of coercion and any trace of superiority from one of the parties, or from both parties.

But how can a spirit of equalness happens between two cultures which are different. That can only happen if they both accept that the differences are encompassed within ONE BEING.

THERE IS ONLY ONE SUPREME BEING, ONE GOD not many "one Gods".

This ONE BEING can accomodate the one God of Islam, the Trinity (one God) of the christians the ONE of the Hindu (Brahman, Tat Ekam), and the supreme ONE (adibuddha) of the Buddhist.

A true cultural dialogue can only happen if the persons of the dialogue accept the other persons fully despite the differences, but this can only happen if they both accept that actually they are part of the community of MANKIND. In this way governments are not regarded as limiting elements but as the other part of the total WHOLE of the community, of MANKIND.

A true cultural dialogue can not happen if the two minds in dialogue are not able to see the underlying unity of all things; if the two minds equate the difference in appearances with differences in its complete REALITY. Only minds who admit ONE CORE OF REALITY behind many "cores" of appearances, will easily admit that many differences are only "incidental" which can be ignored, to find the really "essential" which unifies.

As we have shown above, all the traits of metaphysical, anthropologic-epistemological pattern of philosophy which can lead to dialogue are found in the philosophy of **Pancasila**

EPILOGUE

The basic tenets of Pancasila is ONENESS/UNITY in DIVERSITY. The basic idea is HARMONY in COMMUNITY. Diversity and individuality are not ignored but ELEVATED into more perfect state within the ONE, within the Community. In practice Indonesian people nowadays face the challenges of this present world of religious fanaticism, technological materialism, the excessive demand for freedom, and the analytic scientific mind which lead more and more to specific differences, which splinter mankind into different professions and status of life.

The Indonesian people themselves must be careful so that they do not themselves betray their basic philosophy in exchange of those alien philosophies, but also they must be careful not to oppress the many for the sake of the ONE, not to oppress the individuals for the sake of the Community, but remain in their tenets : Unity in diversity, harmony in community, elevating the many within the One.

The Indonesian Pancasila might contribute to world's cultural dialogue and the world's cultural dialogue will strengthen the Indonesians in conserving the Pancasila which has proved sofar to unite the Indonesians into one country, one nation, one language.

NOTES

1. See : P.J. Zoetmulder : **Culture Oost en West,** Amsterdam, 1951; pp. 15-26.

2. See : **"Kebudayaan"** in **Ensiklopedi Nasional Indonesia** Vol.: 8, Jakarta. 1990 ; p. 256.

3. See : J.J. Fox (Ed.) : **Indonesia : Australian Perspective.** Canberra, 1980; pp. 151-172.

   also : **"Indonesia"** in **Ensiklopedi Nasional Indonesia** Vol.: 7, Jakarta, 1990 ; pp. 106-110.

4. See : W.F. Wertheim : **Indonesian society in transition** The Hague, 1964; pp. 281-284.

5. See : A.M.W. Pranarka : **Sejarah pemikiran tentang Panca-sila,** Jakarta, 1985 : pp. 15-45.

6. In the preamble of the Indonesian Constitution of 1945 is written : "... a Republic of Indonesia which is based on the souvereignty of the people and the pillars of the one Deity, just and civilized humanity, Indonesian Unity, and People's rule guided wisely through consultation and representation, in order to achieve social justice for the whole Indonesian People"

   (See : Herbert Feith (Ed.) : **Indonesian political thinking 1945-1965** New York, 1970, p. 50.

7. See : Dr. Th. Fischer : **Pengantar Anthropologi Kebudayaan Indonesia.** Jakarta, 1957, pp. 142-166.

8. See : Dr. Th. Fischer : op. cit., pp. 64-65.

9. As an example of meeting and members of a royal court : See : Dr. Th. Pigeaud : **Java in the Fourteenth Century** Vol. III, the Hague, 1960; pp. 9-16; 99-101.

10. The regions under the influence of the Kingdom of Majapahit, are listed in the "Nagara Krtagama", Canto 13-16.
    See : Dr. Th. Pigeaud : Op. cit., pp. 16-19.

11. Standard version in Javanese literature to describe a King : "A great King, upholding law with justice, full of mercy, lavish in giving, great of heart".

12. See : Dr. Th. Pigeaud : Op. cit., p. 4.

13. The Indonesian word for "Wisdom" is **Bijaksana** which certainly has connection with the Javanese word **Wicaksana** meaning "wise" which in Sanskrit has the connotation of **Caksus** = eye, seeing, insight.

14. This Phrase (Bhineka tunggal ika) was already found in a fourteenth century Javanese text the "Sutasoma".

    See : I.B.C. Agastia : **Sastra Jawa kuno dan kita** Denpasar, 1982, p. 29.

15. The above observations are found in President Suharto's speeches on Pancasila.

    See : CSIS : **Pandangan Presiden Suharto tentang Pancasila** Jakarta, 1976.

THE PLACE AND ROLE OF SAGE PHILOSOPHY IN OUR TIMES

Odera Oruka (Kenya)

My anthology on **Sage Philosophy** (indigenous Thinkers and Modern Debate on African Philosophy) has just come out (about two months ago) published by E.J. Brill, Leiden, Netherlands, 1990. The Nairobi version will soon be coming out published by African centre for Technology.

The book is in three parts : part one consists of papers which I have written and published over the years introducing and discussing the nature and methodology of **Sage Philosophy** in Africa. Part two consists of the verbatim interviews conducted by myself or by a number of my student assistants in the project. It consists of two broad divisions; the division of the folk sages and that of the philosophic sages. The distinction between the two lies in the fact that the former are knowledgeable yet uncritical adherents to the common-mass beliefs and wisdom of the community. The latter are critical/ratiocinative assessors of the common wisdom with/or a flair for personal creativity.

The third part consists of the papers by the critics and commentators on the project. Among them are P. Bodunrin (Nigeria), L. Keita (Sierra Leone). D.N. Kaphagawani (Malawi), Lucius Outlaw (U.S.A.) and C.M. Neugebauer (Austria).

This book is an addition to a body of texts which in the last three decades have emerged expressing or criticizing what can generally be classified as Sage Philosophy.(1)

---

1. **Among the texts are,**
 1) Marcel Griule's **conversation with Ogotermmeli** (1965) ;

There is, therefore, no doubt now that **Sage Philosophy** whatever it means is developing as one of the important trends in the current debate about the nature of African Thought. The important question is : what is the significance of this trend of thought and what role can it play in promoting cultures in dialogue ?

The question can best be answered after a brief discussion of the crigin and meaning of Sage Philosophy.

Origin and Meaning

Until recently it was taken for granted in academic circles that the best that can be received from the non-literate societies are the findings of the anthropologists and missionaries bent on unearthing the communal uncritical folk beliefs of the peoples of such societies.

Neither science nor philosophy was ever expected to be a possible product of a non-literate society. In Africa, however, the anthropologists and missionaries for reasons which are now well known[2] invented a philosophy and crowned it on the people ;

=

Claude Sumner, **Ethiopian Philosophy,** vol. 1, **The Book of the Wise,** philosophers (Adds, 1974). H.O. Oruka ; 'Four Trends in current African Philosophy' (1978, 1981), John, O. Sodipo and Barry Hallen, **Knowledge, Belief and Witchcraft** (London, 1986) Anthony Oseghare, **Sagacious Reasoning in African Philosophy** (Ph.D. Nairobi, 1985) ; G.R. Hoffman : **Faktoren und Gegenwartige Tenderzen der Entwicklung Nicht Marxistischer philosophie in Africa,** (Leipzig, Phil. Diss., 1984) ; Kwame Gyekye, **An Essay on African Philosophical Thought** (1987).

2. Some of them wanted a localized theory to base their work

=

that philosophy became no more philosophy that a system of taboos, unexamined beliefs and practices typical of a people. In other words, they coined "African Philosophy" from the uncritical aspects of the traditions, while philosophy proper is oftern a part of the critical elements of a tradition.

To get to philosophy one must help to precipitate the critical elements from a given tradition or culture.

The term "critical" here is not used in the conventional intellectual sense where it is often simply associated with the inclination to be non-conformist with reasons rejecting the given. I use the term critical here in a much broader sense : To be critical in this sense is to possess the potential and adopt the attitude which inspires objective thinking and judgement. A critic in this sense can be non-conformist or conformist of the object of his judgement.

Sage-Philosophy in Africa starts from the work of all those scholars who strive to look for the critical elements in the traditionalism.And it turns out that a given number of individuals (men or women) in the traditions stands out as the embodiments of the critical elements.

However, when criticality is pushed too far we then find a

=

of civilizing the natives. And it was tempting and attractive to call such a theory "philosophy". Others wanted to convince the white world that the Africans too had a philosophy but being of different race and mentality, their philosophy must be incongruent with/passes in the West/what as philosophy. Others were simply immature in the field of philosophy even if they might have been great anthropologists. And so they used the term **philosophy** without being able to know or care about its contents.

distinction in the Sage-Philosophy between **folk sagacity** and **Philosophic sagacity.** The former is conformist and non-conformist but only on the basis of a rationality that defies any given cultural system.

Internal Differences

Within the texts which appear to merit the label of **Sage Philosophy** there are important differences.

The position for example of the texts represented by Griule's **Conversation with Ogotomelli** belongs only to **folk sagacity.** I have demonstrated this in chpater 3 of **Sage Philosophy**(3), on the other hand, the position taken by the texts of Barry Hallen and John O. Sodipo and Kwame Gyekye belongs to hermeneutical philosophy developed out of a confusion between folk sagacity and philosophic sagacity — a confusion which is an indication that the authors have been unable to get out of the **anthropological fog.**(4)

Lastly, we have a position represented by my former student, Dr. Anthony Oseghare, a position which seeks the attempt to **reconstruct** the thought of a sage into a new order without loosing touch with the original(5). This reconstruction should not be everstressed for it is likely to attempt us to **philosophicate** i.e. produce a philosophy out of the given which may not be really a philosophy.

---

3. Op. cit. see note No. 1.
4. I have explained this in details in The introduction to **Sage Philosophy.**
5. This is more explicit in his Ph.D. thesis than in the contribution he has made to my anthology Sage-Philosophy.

The Critics

I have answered the critics in the introduction to **Sage Philosophy** as well as in my contributed chapters to/book. But for the purpose of this/the paper, two/three of the critics deserve a mention : /to

Dr. G.R. Hoffman

Dr. Hoffman, a German who wrote his Ph.D. at the University of Leipzig 1984,/from the stand point of Orthodox Marxism, claims my Sage Philosophy/writing project is a borgeous reflection which isolates philosophy from ideology. Hence to the extent that **Sage Philosophy** claims to be rooted in a classless peasant Africa, it cannot be a philosophy but some kind of "peasant story telling." To him philosophy begins with classes and ancient Greece was already a class society.

Class or no class has not been an issue in **Sage Philosophy**. I have already explained in the book how absurd it is to classify Greek Sage such as Thales or Heraclitus as philosophers and deny the label to African Sages such Mbuya and Kithanje(6) when it is known (or should be known) many of the ancient Greek sages are in record to have uttered one or two saying(s). And such sayings have been commented upon by numerous subsequent thinkers and scholars giving their utterers the label of "philosophers."(7)

D.N. Kaphagawani

One very significant commentory comes from Dr. D.N. Ka-

---

6. See introduction and chapter 7 of **Sage Philosophy**.
7. Thales is known mostly by one saying, that 'everything is made of water' and Heraclitus that 'struggle is the truth of all life'. Some of our sage-informants such/Mbuya and Kithanje have numerous sayings/as which are no less worthy or philosophic.

phagawani (see chapter 9 of Sage Philosophy). He reasonably argues that **Philosophic Sagacity** is second order to **Ethno-Philosophy** and would not exist without it. This could be true only in the trivial historic sense that Ethno-philosophers provoked critics such/myself to resort to researches which/as ended up in **philosophic sagacity.** But it is not true in the important scientific and historical sense which would imply that **philosophic sagacity** never existed until after the production of ethno-philosophy. Ethno-philosophy is not **culture philosophy,** and philosophic sagacity may only be second order to the later.

Cultural Dialogues And The Future

Sage philosophy would play a crucial role in promoting cross-cultural communications. I have dedicated one of the chapters in **Sage Philosophy** to the Role of Sagacity in Development (chapter 4). In Kenya we have many different ethnic-communities, each with its own cultural heritage. Yet in the administration of the country, the Government often (rightly) posts District Officers and Commissioners (DOs and DCs) to districts with which they are culturally unfamiliar.

Yet, it is very important that the DOs and DCs get to communicate with their subjects and sell and implement the Government policies. One of the best ways of going about their work is to be familiar with the sagacity of the district in question. In practice this would mean knowing and befriending the acknowledged wise men and women of the district, for very often the wise are opinion leaders. (8)

---

8. On many occasions I have been invited to lecture to DOs on **sagacity** and **wisdom** and used occasions to carry out a dialogue with them on the nature of their works — it turned out that they (where they are democratic) generally make use of sages to facilitate their work.

Even across nations and races sage-philosophy would still play a role that it plays in Kenya to facilitate communication and understanding between people of a different culture and people from other cultures.

Let us briefly consider some sayings of the following sages.

(A) **St. Mkindia Kithanje on Wisdom**

All people are born wise, but many fail to be so because of hangers and fears : There are three major hangers :

(i) **disease** (which can impair one for serious thought)

(ii) **hangers of ears and eyes** (which sways one from truth to the world of hearsays and appearances)

(iii) **the hunger of the stomach** (which comes from poverty or greed and ejects chance for wisdom)

The fears sound something like this :

(i) Fear of persecution in case what you say is unpopular

(ii) Fear that no one will listen to you.

(iii) Fear of the material consequences/abandoning your routine or/of profession in pursuit of wisdom.

Kithanje explains that the real wise should be able to overcome both the three type/hungers and the three type of fears. But he cautions/of that this is in reality very difficult. So it is no wonder only a few do become wise.

(B) **Okemba Simiyu Chaungo on Poverty and Riches**

Q : What is riches and what is poverty ?

A : Poverty (Bumanani) and riches (Buyinda) are chosen

by a person. If you work hard and eat little you get wealth. If you work little and eat with greed (Muliungu) you attain poverty. So poverty is a child of greed and laziness.

Q : What about if you pick millions and become rich in a day — or if you get rich through **Magendo** (corruption) — is that hard work.

A : Well, many pick a fortune and waste it. A few will use it skilfully and be rich by sunset. As for **Magendo** it is immoral — but even magendo requires a lot of rough and hard work plus risk-taking.

Comments

I have given the sayings above to show that their topic as well as the manner of discussion makes them subjects that can be discussed without cultural inhibitions.

The subjects are subjects of discussion in any culture. And the two sages above do not necessarily base their judgement on the premises or taboos of their given communal cultures. They freely employ their critical thinking in making their judgements. And then the judgements if true or correct are so across cultures and across-nations.

The two sages are however aware of what their own respective communities treat as wisdom or as the causes of wealth and poverty. But on this occasion they did not put forward the communal view points. They thought critically and answered objectively. And it is no wonder they are classified as **philosophic sages.**

TABLEAU SYNOPTIQUE DE LA PENSÉE ISLAMIQUE

Abdelmajid El-Ghannouchi (Tunisie)

La révélation coranique (610-623 J.C.) se présente à la fois comme un phénomène linguistique, juridique, religieux et culturel d'une importance considérable. Elle fit d'une poussière d'individus perdus dans le désert d'Arabie et plongés dans "les ténébres de l'ignorance" une communauté de fidèles sociologiquement et spirituellement solidaires. C'était donc à partir du Coran que la pensée et l'histoire prirent leur essor en Islam. En effet, la pensée religieuse, tout en servant de moteur à l'histoire profane, n'a pas manqué, au cours de son développement dialectique, de subir par contre-coup les fléchissements, les deboires, voire les scleroses dont celle-ci fut marquée. Tant il est vrai qu'en Islam, pensée religieuse dont celle-ci fut marquée. Tant il est vrai qu'en Islam, pensée religieuse et histoire profane étaient si imbriquées qu'on ne pouvait toucher à l'une sans provoquer des incidences sur l'autre. Et c'est précisement ce que tous les réformateurs avaient si bien compris lorsqu'ils avaient voulu toujours agir sur le sacré pour promouvoir le profane.

L'histoire de l'Islam commença par conséquent avec la révélation du Coran. Mais ce n'était pas sans résistance ni réticences que celui-ci finit par s'imposer dès le premier siècle de l'hégire (7ème siècle J.C.) aux arabes d'abord et à tous les peuples islamisés. Car ceux-ci, bien qu'acquis finalement à l'Islam, ne s'étaient pas aisément départis de leurs croyances anciennes. Aussi s'étaient-ils employés, en discutant les dogmes de la nouvelle religion, à susciter des controverses et des disputes théologiques où se laissaient entrevoir des survivances de Mazdéisme, de Christianisme et de Manichéisme. C'était là évidemment une des causes fondamentales qui présidèrent à la formation de cette nouvelle science du KALAM ou théologie scolastique musulmane. C'est

pourquoi, tant que la communauté musulmane primitive demeurait homogène et indifférenciée, une simple explicitation des textes scripturaires et des traditions prophétiques suffiraient pour orienter les fidèles et dissiper ainsi leurs légères inquiétudes aussi bien théologiques que juridiques. Mais avec l'impact des autres cultures et la complexité des conjonctures politiques et historiques, on en vint, en matière juridique, au RAY (avis personnel) et à l'analogie (QUIYAS). C'était d'autant plus compréhensible que ni le texte coranique ni la tradition prophétique ne pouvaient présenter une réponse exhaustive à toutes les situations particulières et à toutes les contingences historiques dans lesquelles évoluait la communauté musulmane. D'où cette diversité d'écoles juridiques orthodoxes qui, suivant le tempérament de leurs représentants, privilégiaient, par rapport à l'opinion et à l'interprétation, (RAY et IJTIHAD) tantôt la Tradition, tantôt le Texte Sacré, et parfois les deux références à la fois, comme ce fut le cas du Malékisme.

Mais ce traditionnalisme conservateur — que seul le Hanbalisme dépassait sur ce plan — ne tarda pas, avec l'impact de la pensée grecque, à céder le pas devant l'herméneutique que l'Organon d'Aristote fournissait à la pensée islamique. Et le QUIYAS, le RAY, l'analogie, l'avis personnel, le syllogisme, l'induction, en un mot tous les procédés généraux de la pensée logique furent largement utilisés aussi bien en théologie qu'en jurisprudence. Des centres de traduction se formèrent en outre autour d'illustres traducteurs pour la plupart chrétiens qui maîtrisaient l'arabe, le grec et le syriaque. Par ailleurs, la fondation de Beït Al-Hikma à Bagdad en 830 J.C. par le calife AL MA'MOUN, qui en confia la direction à l'excellent HUNEIN IBN ISHAK, le "cheikh des traducteurs", fut à la fois décisive pour la sélection des ouvrages grecs et la fidèle et méthodique traduction de ceux-ci. C'est précisément ce travail préliminaire et fondamental lui-même qui présida à la formation et au développement non seule-

ment de la pensée théologique de l'Islam, mais aussi à sa pensée philosophique.

En effet, celle-ci subit une double influence héllénique et héllénistique à la suite de la traduction intégrale du CORPUS ARISTOTELICU ainsi que de quelques traités de Plotin (constituant la fameuse pseudo-théologie d'Aristote) et de Proclus. Aussi, pouvait-elle se prévaloir à juste titre de ses sources péripatéticiennes et néoplatoniciennes. En revanche, la scolastique théologique musulmane ou Kalam, tout en profitant largement de l'outillage logique que lui offrait l'héritage grec, ne manquait surtout pas de manifester, dans ses disputes et controverses, ses visées politiques. Témoin la pensée mutazilite, et son antipode réactionnaire représenté par l'Asharisme. Les falacifas, non plus, n'étaient pas exclus de ces controverses et de ces considérations politiques. S'il leur arrivait d'être un peu "dans la lune" avec le problème de l'Intellect qu'ils dénommaient Intellect Agent ou Dator Formarum en le considérant comme une charnière entre le monde supra-lunaire et le monde sublunaire, ils n'en étaient pas pour autant moins enracinés dans la cité médiévale musulmane dont ils étaient censés être les gardiens. Faisant dériver la connaissance prophétique et plus généralement la connaissance humaine de cet Intellect Agent, ils le tenaient pour la cause fondamentale et informatrice des êtres existants. Aussi, pourraient-ils, une fois ce rôle gnoséologique et ontologique de l'Intellect Agent mis en relief, procéder à l'examen de ce fameux problème dont la falsafa de l'orient médiéval arabe était manifestement marquée. Nous voulions parler du syncrétisme théologico-philosophique. Et l'on ne devrait pas s'étonner de voir nos trois falacifas : AL KINDI, AL FARABI, AVICENNE, y souscrire, mais différemment.

Pour AL KINDI, par exemple, le problème de l'accord de la religion et de la philosophie s'était posé pour plusieurs raisons. La formation kalamique d'AL KINDI, qui l'apparentait au Mu-

tazilisme, en était déjà une. La connaissance presque exhaustive qu'il avait de l'aristotélisme (dont les grandes lignes allaient à l'encontre des dogmes islamiques) l'invitait à opérer cet accord. Par ailleurs, il devait démontrer, en bon musulman et en tant que pionnier de la falsafa, que la connaissance religieuse et la connaissance philosophique, procédant d'une même source, c'est-à-dire de l'Intellect Agent, ne sauraient être en désaccord. Tentative rebutante, il est vrai, parce qu'elle tordait le cou à la philosophie d'Aristote pour la réduire à la religion.

Avec AL FARABI et AVICENNE, ce même problème ne s'était pas posé de la même façon qu'avec AL KINDI. Tout en présentant ce problème comme un paravent, nos deux philosophes enseignaient l'éternité du monde, et l'inaptitude de Dieu à connaître les choses particulières. Ce qui d'ailleurs justifierait plus tard la grande attaque de GAZALI contre les falacifas. Mais ce qui est évident c'est qu'avec AL FARABI, nous assistions à une tentative de réforme sociologico-politique (mais utopique) d'une grande envergure. Conscient de l'état d'éclatement et de chaos où pâtissait la communauté musulmane au Xème siècle J.C., (La IIème époque Abbasside) il voulut, avec la notion d'ordre, de structure cosmique, de hiérarchie céleste, et d'organicisme, restructurer la cité médiévale musulmane, rétablir le pouvoir effrité, le centraliser, en prônant le chiisme ismaélien.

AVICENNE, par contre, n'était pas étranger, dans sa philosophie à des considérations de classe, et même à des préoccupations chauvinistes. La parabole de "l'Homme Volant", qui est une pièce maîtresse de sa philosophie, mettait déjà l'accent sur le MOI, L'EGOITE, et signifait incontestablement chez lui, avant même que DESCARTES n'effectuât sa grande découverte du COGITO(la perception immédiate de la subjectivité et l'affirmation des propriétés essentielles dont celle-ci est constituée. N'aurions-nous pas là un écho du chauvinisme de MIHYAR AL

DAYLAMI, son contemporain et son concitoyen : "UJIBAT BI" (Elle se fut éprise de moi).

L'avènement de GAZALI, quant à lui, se plaçait sous le signe de la foi en danger. La première croisade faisait déjà son apparition en Orient, et la religion musulmane orthodoxe, à force de ratiocinations kalamiques et des disputes philosophiques, risquait de se perdre par les méfaits de ses propres tenants. GAZALI préconisait d'abord la foi puis l'intelligence : CREDO UT INTELLIGAM : disait SAINT AUGUSTIN, GAZALI, sans en connaître l'auteur, mettait ce principe sur le compte de sa propre pensée théologico-philosophique et s'adonnait à revivifier les sciences religieuses. Entreprise dont se réclameraient plus tard IBN TAYMYYA, IBN QUAYYIM AL JAWZIA ainsi que MOHAMED IQBAL.

Par contre, tel ne serait pas le dessein des trois falacifas andalous : AVENPACE, IBN TUFAYL, AVERROES. Plus imprégnés d'aristotélisme que leurs prédécesseurs, les falacifas d'Orient, et faisant plus de réserves qu'eux sur la théorie émanatiste et plus généralement sur la philosophie néoplatonicienne, ils s'étaient orientés vers un rationalisme dans leurs doctrines philosophiques ainsi que dans leurs méthodes d'investigation. Ne cédant pas au syncrétisme théologico-philosophique des orientaux, ils avaient distingué les genres de connaissance, les niveaux d'intellection et les aspects de la loi religieuse. AVERROES, par exemple, tout en définissant la connaissance religieuse telle qu'elle devait être, la distinguait de la connaissance philosophique et de la méthode démonstrative de celle-ci. Il établissait ainsi, en dépit même de son "Traité Décisif" sur l'accord de la religion et de la philosophie (épître exotérique, rédigée à l'intention du vulgaire, des Fukaha et du Pouvoir) la spécificité de chacune de ces deux connaissances, de leurs domaines irréductibles et de leurs méthodes respectives. N'avait-il pas dit, à l'instar de Socrate, "qu'il est homme et qu'il ne connaît que d'une science humaine" O

HOMINES NON DICO QUOD VESTRA ISTA SCIENTIA DIVINA SIT FALSA, SED DICO EGO HOMO SCIENS SCIENTIAM HUMANAM" DE SOMNIIS, F: 34, K-L-Contre la dogmatique scripturaire, il démontra de façon rigoureuse, l'éternité du monde et l'immortalité générique de l'espèce humaine exclusive de toute immortalité individuelle. Il soutient, par ailleurs contre GAZALI, un déterminisme sans faille, tout en mettant l'accent sur une liberté humaine en situation, bien que baignant dans une connexion de déterminismes, comme le proclamerait, plus tard, SPINOZA. Malheureusement, ce rationalisme dont AVERROES porta le flambeau, sans partage et sans réserve, dans l'histoire de la pensée islamique, s'éteignit presque instantanément, sans laisser de traces, comme un feu d'artifice, au sein même de la civilisation islamique qui l'avait engendré. Et comme si AVERROES lui-même en avait eu le pressentiment en proclamant un jour que la falsafa mourrait avec lui.

Indubitablement, la falsafa s'éteignit en 1198 J.C. avec AVERROES. Et en l'espace d'un demi siècle, l'on assista, avec l'invasion des Mongols et la chute de Bagdad (1258 J.C.), à une véritable débacle du monde islamique. C'était alors le triomphe de l'irrationnel, de l'imaginaire, du surnaturel. Et une pléthore de marabouts et de confréries religieuses telles que Al Quadiria, Al Chadlia, Al Badaonia, ne tarda pas à combler les emplacements déjà désertés par les sciences et la philosophie. Et combien même certains personnages comme 'IBN KHALDUN (m. 1406), LISAN EDDIN 'IBN KHATIB (m. 13743 et 'IBN TAYMIYYA (m. 1327), derniers soubresauts de la pensée islamique agonisante, feraient leur apparition pour replâter un vieil édifice délabré, leurs efforts resteraient inutiles et le monde islamique s'engouffrait dans l'obscurantisme par sa propre force d'inertie. Et il fallait attendre le début du 19ème siècle pour voir se dessiner avec RIFA'AT ATTAHTAWI (mort 1873) tous les thèmes essentiels de la Nahdha qui se proposait de restorer l'Islam dans sa vigeur originelle pour l'adopter aux exigences de notre

temps ! Un vaste programme de réformes avait été établi dans ce sens par JAMAL EDDIN 'AL AFGHANI (m. 1897) et son disciple MOHAMED ABU (m. 1905), les deux véritables pionniers et piliers de la SALAFIYYA. Quelques unes de leurs idées avaient été consignées et développées dans "AL RADD ALA DAYRIYYIN" (Réfutation des matérialistes) et dans "RISAA-LAT 'AL TAWHID" (Epître sur l'unicité divine). RACHID RIDHA (m. 1935), allant dans le sens de son maître, MOHAMED ABDU, en explicitait le message dans la revue AL MANNAR, avec autant d'ouverture d'esprit que de rigorisme.

Or, ces tentatives de "récupération de Soi" et de "son Identité", toujours recommencées parce qu'elles sont entreprises et soutenues par une conscience fausse et inadéquate de l'histoire et de l'historicité, avortent sans cessé ! Elles s'offrent réellement, à l'insu de leurs promoteurs, mais sous l'oeil vigile des chefs politiques des Etats Islamiques, comme des systèmes bien achalandés de mythologies entraînantes pour les masses. Car, avec des slogans tels que Nationalisme, Authenticité. Islamisme, Arabisme, Renouveau, Renaissance, Identité Culturelle, on aurait, non seulement manqué la réalité concrète avec ses compléxités et ses impératifs pratiques irrésistibles, mais surtout contribué amplement à la mystification des consciences populaires, friandes d'imaginaire, pour les précipiter dans un paralogisme et un onirisme délirant.

BIBLIOGRAPHIE SOMMAIRE

AVENPAGE : TADBIR 'AL MUTAWAHID. Texte arabe, traduction espagnole, introduction et notes, par M. ASIN PALACIOS. MADRID, GRANADA 1946.

AVERROES : TAHAFUT 'AL TAHAFUT. BEYROUTH, 1930.
———— : TAFSIR MA BA'D 'AL TAB'IA. BEYROUTH, 1967.

———— : COMMENTARIUM MAGNUM IN ARISTOTELIS DE ANIMA LIBROS. MASSACHUSSETS, 1953.

———— : COMMENTARIUM MAGNUM IN ARISTOTELS DE ANIMA LIBROS. MASSACHUSSETS, 1953.

———— : "LES MANAHIDJ" : La découverte des méthodes probantes des dogmes religieux et l'exposé des ambiguités déviatrices et des innovations déroutantes résultant de leur interprétation. Texte arabe, traduction française, notes et introduction par A. EL GHANNOUCHI (archives de la Sorbonne, Paris, 1966), en instance de publication.

———— : FASL 'AL MAQAL : "Traité décisif, sur l'accord de la religion et de la philosophie. Texte arabe, traduction française avec notes et introduction par L. GAUTHIER, ALGER, 1948.

ABDOU (M) : Oeuvres complètes. BEYROUTH, 1972.

AFGHANI (J) : OEUVRES complètes. LE CAIRE, 1968.

AL SHAHRASTANI : Livre des religions et des sectes. Vol. I, "Islam et autres religions scripturaires; introd. trad. et notes par D. GIMARET et G. MONNOT, LEUVEN, PEETERS/UNESCO, 1986.

CAHEN (CL) : L'Islam des origines au début de l'Empire Ottoman. BORDAS, 1970.

CORBIN (H) : Histoire de la philosophie Islamique. Folio, Gallimard, 1986.

DE BOER (T.J.) : The history of philosophy in Islam. Transl. by E.J. JONES, London, 1961.

FARABY (A): 'AL MADINA 'AL FADILA. BEYROUTH, 1968.

GARDET (L) et ANAWATI (G.C.) : Introduction à la théologie musulmane. VRIN, PARIS, 1948.

GHANNOUCHI (A) : La problématique de l'haecceïté et de l'altérité chez AVICENNE et AVERROES, in Multiple Avérroès : Les Belles Lettres, 1978.

———— : La falsafa face au pouvoir religieux et politique de l'époque classique, in Défi de la Philosophie. CERES, TUNIS, 1989.

———— : Les fondements cosmogoniques et organicistes de la philosophie socio-politique d'AL FARABI, in AL FIKR, TUNIS 1976, et in Revue de la Société de philosophie du MAROC, CASABLANCA, 1976.

———— ; L'échec de la communication dans le récit de HAY 'IBN YAQZAN D'IBN TUFAYL in Etudes Orientales No. 5/6, Hiver/Printemps 1990. Paris.


GHAZALI (A.H.) : TAHAFUT 'AL FALASIFA, BEYROUTH, 1027.

———— : 'IHYA 'ULUM IDDIN. LE CAIRE, 1348 H.

HERNANDEZ (M.C.) : Historia del pensamiento en el mundo islàmico T1, T2, MADRID 1981.

'IBN TUFAYL (A) : Le Récit de Hay 'Ibn Yaqzan, Texte arabe, Trad. Française avec introduction et notes par L. GAUTHIER, BEYROUTH 1936, ALGER 1969.

'IBN SINA (A) : 'AL NAJAT : 2ème édition. LE CAIRE, 1938.



'IQBAL (M) : The reconstruction of religious thought in Islam LONDON, 1934.

JOLIVER (J) : L'Intellect selon KINDI. LEIDEN. BRILL, 1971.

KINDI (A) : RASAIL FALSAFIYYA. LE CAIRE, 1950.

LAOUST (H) : Les schismes dans l'Islam, Payot, Paris, 1970.

———— : La Politique de GHAZALI PARIS, GEUTHNER, 1970.

QUADRI (G) : La Philosophie Arabe dans l'Europe Médiévale. PAYOT, 1960.

TAHTAWI (R.R.) : Oeuvres complètes BEYROUTH, 1973.

WATT (M) : Historia de la España Islamica, MADRID, 1970.

———— : Mohamed à la Mecque. PARIS. PAYOT, 1977.

———— : Mohamed à Médine. PARIS, PAYOT, 1978.

CONFERENCE DIALOGUE

Mona Abousenna

First Paper : **Mourad Wahba**

Ramjee Singh

According to your distinction between civilization and culture, could we say that culture is what we are ? But if we accept that culture is what we are, then your thesis that culture is the objectivization of an ideology has to be revised.

Mourad Wahba :

The difference between civilization and culture, according to my own opinion, is that I use civilization in the singular and cultures in the plural. We have many cultures but one civilization which evolves from mythos to logos. Within this perspective cultures emerged. If we adopt an ethnic concept of culture, this would be a hindrance to the realization of one civilization. Concerning culture, it was once a pro quo, a futuristic vision, then when it was realized it became a culture. I would like to add that I'm not presenting a Hegelian point of view because, according to Hegel, the Absolute Spirit is going to objectivize itself so that by the end of history it attains self-consciousness. According to my own point of view, I'm not concerned with the Absolute Spirit. I'm concerned with the origin of cultures, and if you are convinced that your culture, the Indian culture, was one day a pro quo, or a futuristic vision realized in reality, then you try to change your culture and would refuse to absolutize it. That is why I could say that cultures are in conflict when they are absolutized. And if you accept my definition then you accept my idea that history moves from the future and not from the past. And in the future we have an ideology and not a culture.

Ramjee Singh :

I'm amazed to hear a new definition of history, that history does not relate to the past, and that culture was, once, future. Culture is neither future nor past; it is an amalgam of past, present and future. The culture of any race or any country is a continuity from past to present to future.

Mourad Wahba :

Let me ask you : how did the Gandhian culture emerge ? From where did Gandhi get his ideas ? And let me tell you that Gandhi predicted that his own ideas, his own ideology, his future vision, could be a means of saving humanity, and you in India tried to realize and incarnate his ideology. And now, if you insist on living according to the Gandhian perspective and life-style as he envisaged it, you would be betraying Gandhi's perspective, because you would be stagnating his future perspective by turning it into a culture and refusing to transcend it by formulating another futuristic vision, or another ideology.

Evandro Agazzi :

I'm a little unhappy with the beginning of this discussion because we are beginning with discussions about the definition of words. One must be conscious that this is practically impossible. The concept of culture had the usual meaning according to which we say a certain people is cultivated which has to do with some kind of spiritual inheritence. So, I believe that discussing the terminology of culture is a loss of time. We simply have to make a choice. I am convinced that we are using, more or less, the sociological concept of culture, that is to say a set of ideas and production of a way of living which characterizes a certain human community.

Mourad Wahba :

I think that definition of words is a philosophical task, and in view of what is currently happening in the international arena, we witness the conflict of cultures. And, at the same time, it is said that we want to save human civilization. One does not say we want to save cultures. So, cultures are a means, and not an end, of realizing one human civilization. But this does not mean that I discard either of them. I simply deal with the function of culture with the purpose of involving cultures in dialogue and not in conflict. If cultures are conscious of their function that is being a means of realizing a global perspective, or a universal perspective, then the unity of civilization could be realized. And that is why I have to differentiate between civilization and culture.

Yehia Houweidi :

You seem to accept only one kind of dialectic, and that is the dialectic between reason and reality. This is one-dimensional aspect of dialectic, but there are other aspects of dialectic. Let me quote T.S. Eliot's words that the culture of which we are completely conscious is not culture at all. In culture there is imagination, there is subconscious, etc. But from your definition entails your futuristic view which is based on this definition, and your understanding of changing reality is based also on this definition. But the future is not the only dimension of culture. What can we do with all our traditions which belong to the past? Shall we omit them ?

Mourad Wahba :

Concerning the concept of the past, the past was once future. And that is why I say that history moves from the future and not from the past. Second, concerning the one-dimensional rela-

tion between reason and reality, reason is used in my paper not separated from other activities for a simple reason : emotions and imagination, for instance, are used for realizing a certain action, and when you realize a certain action you try to rationalise this action. That means you use your reason to tell us that you have reasons for doing this action though you use all your abilities.

Yehia Houweidi :

What about the irrational aspects, shall we accept or reject them in defining culture ?

Mourad Wahba :

I think this is a pragmatic issue. If you want to live on irrational elements it is up to you. But, I think that humanity strives for having a rational system.

Magdi Wahba :

Could I ask Mourad Wahba to give a short definition of the term "rational".

Mourad Wahba :

Rational, in a negative way, is not mythical. And mythical, in a brief way, is against reality because mythos does not change reality, it is reason which changes reality. So, I combine between reason and changing reality, and mythos with preserving reality.

Fr. George Anawati :

I will put two brief questions : firstly, what do you mean by transcendence ? Secondly, is it possible to have a notion of culture without referrring to human nature ? And what is the rela-

tion between culture and humanity ? Are there true values or is it only a question of ideology ?

Mourad Wahba :

Concerning the meaning of transcendence, it is said that the origin of civilization emerged with the creation of the technological apparatus of agriculture. So the hunting age is not considered as the origin of civilization because in the hunting age the relation between man and nature was a horizontal relation, which means that man tried to adapt himself to nature. Then he faced the food crisis because he was satisfied with the horizontal relation with nature. In order to confront and overcome the food crisis, man invented the agricultural technology. This means that man created the concept that in order to survive he cannot be satisfied with adapting himself to the environment, but he has to adapt the environment to his needs. To adapt nature to your needs means that you have to change the environment, and you cannot change the environment unless you transcend it.

Fr. George Anawati :

Transcendence does not have a metaphysical sense.

Mourad Wahba :

It is used in a civilizational sense, which means that man is not yielding to nature but is trying to make nature yield to his needs. In this way civilization emerged. That is why I insist on the concept of transcendence.

Concerning human nature, in relation to culture, within the concept of transcendence human nature itself should change. It cannot be constant. How can man change nature without changing himself ? In this sense, I say that cultures were one day

ideologies for the purpose of changing reality, but the optical illusion was that we thought that cultures were not created in this way but were found as such in the past and we have to preserve them. That is why I am differentiating between the conservative and the progressive cultures, but not in a marxist sense.

Fr. George Anawati :

But perfecting man does it mean that he is no longer man ?

Mourad Wahba :

Now we live in the space age, and man is trying to live in the cosmos. Now he is able to live for one year, and if he can live for more than one year, or for thousands of years, he is going to change drastically both physically and mentally. He might undergo a total process of biological mutation which will change his features altogether.

Ioanna Kucuradi :

I have the impression that when Mourad Wahba connects culture and ideology he means an ideal and not a utopia. An ideal is something that we wish to see realized. If we make this distinction, I think a lot of confusion will be clarified.

Mourad Wahba :

I would like to add that there cannot be a real dialogue between cultures unless we recognize that cultures were one day ideologies, futuristic visions then incarnated. In this sense, we can say that there could be no closed ideologies, but there could be closed cultures, because ideology, as put in the future, is not closed. It becomes closed when it is incarnated in reality, and what I mean by ideology is a kind of ideal, a kind of purpose,

that you want to realize as Ioanna Kucuradi said, and you could struggle for the realization of this ideal. In this sense ideology goes with creativity, but creativity does not go with culture. So, we could have closed cultures, but we can never have a closed idealogy.

Ezzat Orani :

I would like to ask Prof. Wahba to be more explicit and tell us on what basis does he base his assertions ? The first assertion is that dynamism is not found in culture itself. Why not ? If we imagine culture as a living being then we can find dynamism within it. The second assertion is that creativity involves transcendence. In my point of view I don't see any sort of relation between the two terms. On the other hand, I found your conclusion contradictory, for you say culture is an objectivization of an ideology and, at the same time, you say that culture is an interlude between two ideologies. Could you clarify this ? Finally, I found your linking between ideology and culture very interesting, but personally I think that ideology is a product and not the opposite of culture.

Mourad Wahba :

I don't see any contradiction between ideology and creativity on one hand, and my statement that culture is an interlude between ideologies. My intention is to say that a certain kind of culture, and not culture per se, is temporary and not constant. And if culture wants to be dynamic it has to adopt a new ideology in order to evolve and when I say that I have to find out the reason of dynamism not in culture itself but in something else, this means that the cause of dynamism is in ideology and not in culture. In this sense I don't see any contradiction between having ideology as a creative production and stating that culture is an interlude between two ideologies.

Concerning transcendence, it means constructing new relations. That means not being satisfied with the existing relations. So if you are not satisfied with the existing relations and you want to change them, you have to transcend them and construct new ones. This is my meaning of transcendence as I mentioned earlier, it is a civilizational meaning and not a metaphysical one.

Abu-Rida :

I would like to ask a very essential question : we are speaking about culture and about man as the creator of culture, and we are speaking about past, present and future, but we are not addressing the real issue, which is the human race on this unique planet. What is the place of man in this cosmos, with his privileged faculties and his being among other creatures on this planet. Can we speak about culture, or about its meaning or about the importance of all our achievements on earth without asking first of all what is the meaning of the existence and the life of man on this earth ? I think that without coming to an agreement on such points we will not be able to come to a conclusion So we need an answer to all these essential questions in order to be able to continue our discussions and not to be in conflict but to be in dialogue.

Mourad Wahba :

I thank you of criticizing our discussion as being in conflict and not in dialogue. Concerning the point you make, you want to discuss the problem of man before discussing the problem of culture, or in other words, in order to clarify the concept of culture we have to clarify first the concept of man. But as long as cultures are a production of human beings I think, in this sense, when analysing cultures you are at the same time analyzing man himself. And in my paper I have the definition of reason as a creative faculty and man as a creative animal,

while analyzing the concept of culture. So it is not a matter of before and after, or which definition comes first, for both concepts are intermingled and intertwined in one concept. You could define man as a cultural animal and in this sense you would be analysing man and culture at the same time.

Abu-Rida :

But the essential question is about the meaning of our existence on earth so that we can continue our culture or our civilization. This point of view has been neglected. I mean, quite frankly, religion. We have to deal with this great phenomenon in the history of mankind and to put it, not only beside, but perhaps above culture, because it deals with everything concerning man.

Mourad Wahba :

You expressed yourself clearly when you involved the concept of religion. The problem is that your question : what is the aim of the existence of man, and from where did he come and to where is he going, raises a serious issue. If I ask Ramjee Singh this question he will answer me through the Gandhian culture. So cultures are involved in answering the questions raised by you about the existence of man and the aim of his life. But if Yehia Houweidi is confronted by your questions he will say Islam has the answers. Now the question is : Is religion separated from culture ? Is religion not implied in culture ?

Abu-Rida :

I think that man on this earth has arisen on religious basis, and the sociological, spiritual, moral, philosophical aspects are outcome of religion. And, I think, that behind all the differences of religions, and despite all the struggles and conflicts between religions, and between sects in the one religion, there

is a conviction of a unity of mankind, a unity of this universe, and a unity of the Creator of this universe, and on this basis all moral and human values have been established. I think that is the question of the questions.

Mourad Wahba :

If you say that civilization is based on religions, you have to define the concept of religion instead of defining the concept of culture. And, in this perspective, we would have to change the theme of the conference into "Religions in Conflict or in Dialogue ?" instead of "Cultures in Conflict or in Dialogue ?", and in this sense, you will be involved, whether consciously or unconsciously, into tackling religions as cultures.

Abu-Rida :

I don't think that we will come to a conflict of religions than we would when we tackle ideologies with their egoism and fanaticism, and I see now that there is rapprochement between sects and religions and when we meet in conferences we feel that we are more close than when we tackle ideologies with their egoism and fanaticism and all this is on the basis of the unity of mankind. I think that in all religions man has something divine in him because of the image of God in which he was created. So, as an image of God man should create a civilization which makes him worthy of his priviledge among creatures. This does not mean that we cannot speak about our cultural achievements on this earth or the progress of science, technology, art and philosophy. This is a kind of ornament which makes man feel himself in a universe with a meaning to his life and achievements.

Magdi Wahba :

I think that Prof. Abu-Rida is speaking essentially about Semitic religions. But there is, after all, a majority of religions outside the Semitic context which has a completely different view of the place of man in the universe.

Ron Haleber (Amsterdam) :

I would like to ask for a clarification of the concept of ideology. when you say that Islamic fundamentalism is not an ideology, what do you mean by that ? Within the term ideology, there are two main interpretations : one deals with ideology in a positivistic sense as in Logical Positivism, in Spinoza and in the two Islamic philosophers, Ibn Rushd and Ibn-Tufail, in their critique of religion. The second deals with ideology in the sense in which Marx himself used it, that is, as a retrograde system of beliefs. For example, Smith and Ricardo in the second half of the eighteenth century were retrogrades, but in the second half of the nineteenth century their ideas had become an ideology, or a system of ideas and beliefs because the economic realities of the countries were different.

Mourad Wahba :

You raised an important issue, that is, religious fundamentalism which could clarify my idea about ideology. Religious fundamentalisms, whether Christian, Islamic or Jewish or Hindu or Sikh or any other religion, emphasize two main issues : first, return to the golden past; second, the absolute rejection of hermeneutics or refusal of critical thinking concerning the sacred texts, or that the sacred texts should be accepted as they are without using human reason critically. You mentioned Averroes who was persecuted because he was courageous enough to say that man has the freedom to interpret the sacred text with his

reason. So, within this context of fundamentalism, you could be convinced of my definition of ideology as a pro quo that would be incarnated in reality. Fundamentalism discards the pro quo, that means it discards ideology and is satisfied with a crystallised culture of the past. So, creativity is against fundamentalism just as fundamentalism is against creativity. I would like also to clarify that I am using ideology not in the Marxist sense, that is, not in the sense of false consciousness, I'm using ideology in the sense that copes with what is going on nowadays in the sense of having a futuristic vision of the third mellinium. I could interpret the current dialogue between the Soviets and the Americans, between the liberals and the Marxists, as a search for a new synthesis or a new ideology that could change the existing cultures for the sake of solving global problems emerging in a global age.

Ramjee Singh :

I am reminded of Prof. Agazzi's interpretation of culture, that it is a sociological phenomenon, and Prof. Abu-Ridha's interpretation is strongly metaphysically loaded. I would like Prof. Mourad Wahba to clarify whether my understanding of culture is right or wrong and whether he agrees with it. To me, culture has two components : material component, where we can include history, traditions, economics, politics, technology, and so on. The other component of culture call it spiritual or call it ideology, that component includes philosophy of man and philosophy of life. Therefore, let's not confuse the concept of culture by making it either historically loaded or metaphysically loaded. Could I know from Prof. Wahba whether he accepts that culture has these two components, the material and the spiritual.

Mourad Wahba :

I am not for dichotomies, such as material-spiritual, spirit-

body, natural-supernatural, and, therefore, I don't differentiate between what is material and what is spiritual.

Yersu Kim :

I am rather confused by the discussion, and I think that part of my confusion comes from Prof. Wahba's laudable tendency to compress many of the concepts which are very loaded, for instance, transcendence, culture, ideology. I think that what we mean by transcendence is simply overcoming some limitations, and it seems to me you have done something similar to the concept of culture and ideology. Your conclusion that culture is an interlude between two ideologies, if we take what you say literally this would be something very new. If we think in terms of extensions of these two concepts, certainly the concept of culture is much larger than that of ideology, that is in normal historical understanding of these two concepts. And what you are making out of these two concepts is to have a far greater extension than the concept of culture. As you rightly pointed out, the futuristic element in the concept of culture is a very essential part of the definition of culture. What you want to do, seems to me, is to take that futuristic part of the concept of culture and make it into an ideology. You have given a very new definition of this concept without really giving us an idea as to the changes you are making in these concepts. That may be a part of the problem. If what I say is a fairly correct interpretation of what you are trying to say when you state that culture is an interlude between two ideologies you are simply saying that the set of ideas, norms, purposes, aspirations are not permanent.

Mourad Wahba :

I think you are trying to clarify what is going on in our discussions. I have one comment only : you think that I separate

ideology from culture, and that I separate a certain part of culture, which is the future, and name it ideology. You are for dichotomies, but I am not for dichotomies.

Yersu Kim :

No, I'm not for dichotomies.

Mourad Wahba :

But you want to divide, while I don't divide.

Yersu Kim :

You began with a dichotomy between culture and ideology as part of your concept of culture.

Mourad Wahba :

This is not a dichotomy. All I'm saying is that culture was one day an ideology.

Second Paper : **S.M. Shahrestani**

Mona Abousenna :

I would like you to clarify to me what you personally mean by the term culture. You have referred to many definitions of culture and you have used throughout your paper the term of culture in the sense used by Mathew Arnold as the pursuit of human perfection. Is that what you have in mind when you talk about culture, in the sense of the pursuit of sweetness and light, in the sense of the dissemination of all the ideas in the world with the purpose of achieving some kind of unification of cultures based on what all cultures have produced in terms of thought and knowledge ? Or is it something else ? You have, at the same time, emphasized the dimension of religion, although you have also referred to science and technology. But I think

that the direction of your argument emphasizes religion more than the other dimensions of culture, and at the end of your paper you have used a few terms which are vague to me, such as rejection of fanaticism, you did not say tolerance for instance ; you also mention good intentions. So would you please clarify these terms.

Shahrestani :

As I mentioned at the beginning of my paper, there are 161 meanings of culture. Therefore, it is not possible, in such a conference to concentrate on one particular meaning of culture. I have concentrated on the problems of a people, call it culture, call it ideology or any other name. We are gathering here to serve the human being because all of you are eminent thinkers.

Mona Abousenna :

You still haven't answered my question, what do you mean by perfection, or culture being the pursuit of perfection ? Do your last words related to your understanding of perfection ?

Shahrestani :

I prescribed the illnesses and tried to offer the remedy. There are practical problems such as food, housing, education. But we have to eliminate completely the subjective element which makes differences between peoples, whether it is religious or political or economic. How can we come to that ? I suggest a world conference of theologians, philosophers, men of law and economists. Such conference is ideal but not utopic because there were beginnings : the league of nations and the United Nations. But the League of Nations failed, and the United Nations came to almost an impasse and is facing a very difficult situation. We have, in particular, to forget our egoism and our authori-

tative position and our vanity and arrogance, and this is the illness of our century. It was the illness of the totalitarian states but now we are trying to stand very firmly against a situation which endangers the existence of our civilization.

Yehia Houweidi :

I am somewhat confused about the main point in your paper. The title of your paper is "Towards a rapprochment between cultures". It seems to me that you have rather emphasized the conflict in the field of Islamic culture and you have rarely spoken of the rapprochment. You have mentioned only once the word 'constant,' but I am eager to know from you what this constant is.

Shahrestani :

The constant is the ideology or what one believes in and practises, and this is what constitutes culture

Mourad Wahba :

I just want to say that Dr. Shahrestani is the President of the World University for Islamic Studies and at the same time he is the President of an international centre of technology. Therefore, he combines between religion, culture and technology. In this sense he is seeking for solutions to the conflict of cultures.

Dr. Sharestani, you mix up between religion and culture, which means that you mix up between what is absolute and what is relative, and between what is sacred and what is secular. And you are asking about how we could surpass this difficult situation. Could you accept that one of the solutions is to de-sacralise what is sacred so that we would not have a struggle between absolutes. And if we abolish this struggle of absolutes we could

then go deeper into the relativization of what was once an absolute. And if we relativise things, in this case could you see that we could have a real dialogue of cultures that could pave the way for a peaceful world.

Shahrestani :

I accept your proposal and I think that it needs a bit more of thinking.

Ramjee Singh :

In your definition of culture, do you mean by culture belief, faith or religion ? Can there be faith without religion ? I think you understand culture only in the sense of religion, cognition and emotion, and sometimes in a normative sense. In this sense, there are bad cultures and good cultures. So, to have a standard mark of culture from the normative standpoint is not worth. But this is casual. The most important thing, in your paper, is the religious aspects of your approach to the rapprochment between the various human cultures. And I think that this aspect represents some difficulties : every religion has a certain faith. Therefore, if religion is a matter of subjective faith, then there would be difficulty in the rapprochment of cultures.

I would like to mention that there have been three approaches of the rapprochment of cultures from the religious standpoint. The first approach is to treat all religions as equal, in the sense that a true Hindu is a true Moslem. The second one is the concept of personal religion which is outdated. The third approach is to find out the common and essential elements in all religions. Therefore, we should emphasize the fundamental unity between religions in order to have dialogue, because within the inessential elements of religion which involve differences conflict is inevitable, not only between two different religions

but within the different sects and within the same religion. Therefore, if you approach cultural unity from the point of view of religion, I think the only safest thing to do is to treat all religions as equal and to find out the basic unity between all religions.

Shahrestani :

I emphasized the importance of religion as culture, but I never said that it is only culture. Concerning the question of religion, religions are different just as individuals are different, but if everyone follows his own religion of which he is convinced, and lives in one human community like a family and follows the human code of values which is confirmed by humanity, such as justice, love, charity, respect for the differences, if this happens we can have a common culture.

Third Paper : **Yehia Houweidi**

Ramjee Singh :

I would like to make a few remarks : first, although the Afro-Asian countries have had a rich tradition in the past, they are philosophically poor at present. This part of the world, the Middle East, and some parts in Asia, have been the birthplace of all religions of the world, yet they are not as strong as they were in the past. Second, these parts of the world have been places of violent conflicts and regional wars, but this is not due to cultural backwardness as Prof. Mourad Wahba calls it. That is not a happy term, but if it means illiteracy or economic backwardness or backwardness in science and technology I agree. Thirdly, this region has become the seat of religious fundamenlism, from Algiers to Iran to Pakistan and now even India. So all this points to conflict rather than to dialogue of cultures.

Yehia Houweidi :

I subscribe to most of what you said. I would like to add in the same line of thought. To think about philosophy we must use not only our reason but also our consciousness which is something different. To find out what is consciousness, what are its components we must dig under the exterior shell of our consciousness to find out habits, and beliefs which succeed in directing us in our life. Here, in the Afro-Asian countries I think that the major frame of reference in this region is that of values, or strictly the ethico-religious frame. That is not to say that we must not deal with the scientific and technological frame, but all that we can offer in this field I presume would be a kind of repetition of what the West has already offered. So, the only field left to us to show off our creativity, our personality and our originality is the frame of values or the ethico-religious frame.

I think that the best way of tackling this frame of reference is to organize research teams to study these values from the sociological and anthropological points in order to find out what interests the ordinary man and what are his beliefs and his spiritual symbols which dominate his life. This is not only the task of philosophers, but is mainly the task of anthropologists. I think that this is the best way also to understand our religion.

Evandro Agazzi :

If philosophy wants to have a meaning for man it must be concerned with such basic problems as values, beauty, destiny of man, sense of life, meaning of society. And if philosophy is unable to deal with these problems then it becomes some kind of technical exercise of reason. And if philosophy is able to recapture the sense of these problems, this is a way of revitalizing philosohy and of making philoso-

phy in the service of humankind without implying collision with religion and avoiding fundamentalism which is in a way a consequence of having given up reason for treating these very important kind of problems.

It seems to me that you and Prof. Singh are saying that the special privilege of philosophy done in Afro-Asian countries is that this link between philosophy and religion has not been broken. But I would like to stress that reason has to play a role, because if you want to be a philosopher you must stress the critical task of reason. If you say emotions are deeply rooted in the consciousness, this is true, but emotions are not the specific task of philosophy.

Fourth Paper : **Ramjee Singh**

Mourad Wahba :

I think that we have to understand what is behind nuclear war, or the threat of nuclear war, on cultural basis. And I think that a new phenomenon has emerged within the 1970s which is religious fundamentalism, and particularly Christian fundamentalism in the United States of America, which was supporting and promoting the Star Wars' Project or SDI. The idea of this project goes farther than nuclear war because this kind of war is a threat to all of humanity. Therefore, I think that this phenomenon is missing in your paper. In searching for a culture of peace, or cultural synthesis you have to formulate this culture by taking into consideration the fundamentalist perspective. Otherwise, the concept of cultural synthesis will be vague and will not be directed to what you call the 'exclusive culture'. And precisely this exclusive culture, or the culture that excludes other cultures, is implied in religious fundamentalism. Therefore, I think that your paper does not cope with this new important phenomenon.

Ramjee Singh :

Thank you of pointing out the defect in my paper. As a matter of fact, I think that the culture of peace is the preservation of all kinds of culture, including that of fundamentalism. Secondly, the development of a culture of non-violence is against a culture of exclusiveness either in ideologies or in religions. Therefore, Gandhi's religion is based on a doctrine of the equality of all religions. And this doctrine is the only solution to the problem of religious fundamentalism.

Hassan Hanafi :

We are speaking of culture as if we are speaking of an ideal type, or a magic key by which we can solve everything. Cultures exist in societies and in histories. If there is any effort of de-nuclearisation between East and West, this is not because the Eastern leaders were more Christians and the Western leaders were more Buddhists, but because there are new facts which force Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union to solve their internal problems rather than to depend on weapons.

My question is : is the ethical approach completely separate from reality, and from the changing of situations.

Ramjee Singh :

I have tried to substantiate my thesis not only from an ethical point of view but also from a sociological point of view. Let me ask you : do you think that Gorbachev and Reagan have become disciples of Lord Jesus or Buddha ? Of course not, this situation is the demand of the socio-political imperative. So, the culture of peace, or culture of non-violence, is not only an ethical imperative, but also a sociological imperative.

Concerning the concept of culture, I have said that I do not

regard culture only as a metaphysical concept. Culture includes history, tardition, language, philosophy, economics, politics, etc., and when I say culture of non-violence I mean to emphasize only one aspect which is religion.

Ezzat Orani :

You use such terms as 'humanity' and 'mankind' but the atomic threat is essentially Western. It is western civilization that caused all that horror. We must also not forget about what we, the Afro-Asian nations, have to do towards this problem.

I have a comment on your expression 'Islamic atomic bomb.' You know that this is pure propaganda. It is a term used by the mass-media and it implies a lot of prejudice.

Ramjee Singh :

I would be more glad than yourself, if there was no such bomb. But don't we see that many countries, including India, are aiming for the atomic bomb. Concerning your remark that the atomic bomb is essentially Western and what should be the response of the Afro-Asian countries towards it. Historically, this is a fact that the atomic bomb is a western concept. But now even Afro-Asian countries are striving to get it. This situation obliterates the distinction between Western and Eastern aggressivenss and violence. May be the Eastern nations are incapable to build the atomic bomb, but they are as aggressive as those who have it. I think that in this context we have to demolish the distinction between East and West.

Finally, let the Afro-Asian countries take the leadership in the struggle for establishing peace. But, and in response to your comment, the initiative for peace has not come from any Afro-

Asian country, but from a country which is not a religious country, the Soviet Union and Gorbachev.

Reksosusilo :

I have one comment about Gandhi's policy of non-alignment. If we want to avoid the threat and fear of nuclear war we have to align our nations together in order to establish peace in the world. Gandhi says that there should be non-alignment.

Ramjee Singh :

Non-alignment is a political concept and its credit goes to Nehru, Tito, Nasser and Soukarno. Then there were two power blocs, the Nato bloc headed by USA and West Europe and Warsaw pact headed by USSR, and non-alignment meant that the Afro-Asian countries should not align themselves with either of the blocs. I say that non-alignment was the political application of the principle of non-violence because if we align ourselves with either of the military blocs we do so, only to fight, and if we become non-aligned there will be less chance of war. So, Nehru simply applied the principle of non-violence in international affairs by practising the doctrine of co-existence or 'Pancasila'.

Gunther Lennertz :

I would like to ask the following question : how can we persuade all human beings the high standards, and demand for non-violent future if we see that the image of evil and Satanic actions are internal and innate in the human beings.

Ramjee Singh :

If we think that man is inherently evil, then there is no scope for progress, and there is pessimism par excellence. But

if we accept that potentially and inherently we are good, then it is only because of certain conditions that we become bad.

Recently at a conference in India I introduced to the university administration that we must have education of non-violence. There should be a politics of peace, economics of peace, sociology of peace, even within the concept of religion. But religion, I'm sorry to say, has been responsible for much of the violence in the history of civilization. So, either religion must allow us to live together peacefully, or it must go out.

Ron Haleber :

First, I agree with you that in the time of Gandhi his ideas have been effective. But in India now, we see well-educated students burning themselves, and a very historic Muslim mosque is replaced by a Buddhist temple. Second, the German playwright Bertold Brecht said "first comes food then morals", which means that the basic needs of man are more essential than morals because he cannot think of moral standards when he is not able to satisfy his basic needs.

I respect the ethical point of view, and in the time of Gandhi it was effective, but now I think these don't work any more, and, therefore, we have to start analysing from the basic needs of man. Do you agree with that ?

Ramjee Singh :

I'm glad you referred to some incidents in India. This is a very sad story that three hundred and fifteen young men have burned themselves. But you must not identify India of today with the India of Gandhi. I have no hesitation to admit that India of today is not India of Gandhi's dreams. The second point you mentioned is that unless we look into the economic difficul-

ties we cannot have peace. Gandhi said if war is violence, and if bloodshed is violence, exploitation is also violence, inequality, racial discrimination is also violence. So sociology of violence is also as important as the ethics of violence. And that is why I perfectly agree with you that non-violence preaching from the high pedestals of the church, or from a social or political platform does not work if it does not adopt a non-violent economics. The Western model of development must be replaced by another model of development.

Fifth Paper : **Ioanna Kucuradi**

Evandro Agazzi :

You have accepted, more or less, to identify the Western mode of rationality with the positivistic model, but this is not true, it is neither culturally nor intellectually true. You mentioned the Manifesto of the Vienna Circle. This was the Manifesto of a minority which became politically powerful when they went to the United States of America and became the leaders of analytic philosophy, leaders in a political sense. But the European philosophy was not that. There were plenty of traditions in Germany. In Italy there was no logical empiricism. In France the same. In Great Britain, with the exception of the tradition of the philosophy of language and of the analytic tradition, there were plenty of other traditions.

So it is some kind of political dominance that this philosophy had a concrete advantage of being the parasite of science, In this sense, I believe that Western philosophy was full of the exercise of reason, because if you read the classical Western philosophy you find much more logical and philosophical depth than when you read some papers on very restricted topic of analytic philosophy.

I can speak like that because I am a philosopher of science,

and I am recognized also as an analytic philosopher, I also work in metaphysics, and I have been for twelve years a professor of philosophical anthropology. So it is not at all incompatible to be open to a kind of rationality which is not the pure rationality of scientism.

Now, we have also to discard the fashionable idea of post-modernism. Our problem is not to be post-modern, but to be advanced modern. The advanced modernity is really our problem, that is, the problem of making a synthesis of the scientific achievements and scientific rationality. This is true also for the Third World, or the Afro-Asian countries. They need in particular to accept from Western rationality, the Enlightenment, not because they must be free from their metaphysics, their religions and so on, but because they must feel free from imitating our model. This is Enlightenment. I don't accept not only the authority of casts or priests who tell me which is the right belief, but I don't accept the oppressive intellectual authority of a Wittgenstein or Husserl. I read them, and I discuss them but I try to formulate my own judgments according to the problems of my culture and according to the global problems of my generation.

Ioanna Kucuradi :

This is exactly what I have pointed out. What is called modernity, or Western culture, is not only one. We have logical positivism, and we have also Enlightenment which is quite different from positivistic philosophy. What is happening now in the Western philosophy is against the Enlightenment of the Third World. Therefore, I have quoted Kant's words on Enlightenment which is to think for oneself and on one's own account. What Kant said two hundred and sixty years ago is not done today.

Yehia Houweidi :

I would have liked so much that your paper would have given

us some notions on what we are suffering from as Moslems and Arabs in the Middle East on account of tradition. I am afraid here of our traditions in so far as they are dominating our life and are making us captives of the past. Traditions have become taboos, untouchable, and it is very dangerous to handle something that is hostile to all kinds of change. So, if you are suffering from modernity, we here in Egypt are suffering from tradition.

Ioanna Kucuradi :

In Turkey we don't suffer from modernity, we also suffer from tradition. Our problem is that we try to keep alive things that are already dead. This is the question.

Gunther Lennertz :

A German author today spoke about tradition in a theatrical play and he let one character say : I buy every year for myself a new hat, and this is a tradition because my father did it, my grandfather did it, but it is always a new hat.

Hassan Hanafi :

I have one methodological question : since we are an Afro-Asian Philosophy Association, and we are speaking about modernity as concept and as project, I had the feeling that the raw material of analysis would come from the Afro-Asian cultures. But the conceptual apparatus which you have used was completely alien. So, is it possible methodologically, that once we, as Afro-Asian countries, have to study our raw problems from within with our own conceptual apparatus, not from without ?

Ioanna Kucuradi :

No, I don't think there are special apparata to study different cultures. Knowing is the same everywhere and the human mind is the same everywhere.

Mourad Wahba :

Noticing that Islamic fundamentalism emerged in Pakistan by Al-Mawdoudi who proclaimed that Islam is not incompatible with reason my question is : what are the reasons for refusing secularization as being a trend of thought which tackles problems in a relative and not in an absolute way ? Why is it refuted by the Pakistan which is founded on Islam, and you say that Islam does not contradict with reason ?

Ghazala Irfan :

There have been two trends in our country : strong fundamentalism, and the scholars like Saiyed Ahmed Khan who were trying to inculcate other ideas but were outrightly rejected by the ulama. These two antithetical trends have gone side by side, and one has not been able to neutralise the other.

Ramjee Singh :

I have two questions : in Islam in general, why is secularization not accepted ? And if Islam is the highest degree of democracy, as you pointed out, why are most of the Islamic countries under dictatorships ?

If we are absolutists in thought fundamentalism is a logical conclusion, and unless we accept relativity of thought as a philosophical guideline we cannot escape fundamentalism. Some of your sentences reflect such absolutist thought like 'Islam alone'. This attitude, that we are the sole who have the sole monopoly of truth and others are in the clutches of the devil, this is the root of fundamentalism. I agree with your conclusion that there

should not be antagonism between tradition and culture, and that tradition which is good should be preserved because it is the root, and a rootless person cannot develop. That is the anthropological imperative. Therefore we should have good tradition by which I mean the tradition that has a forward-looking perspective.

Ghazala Irfan :

Concerning your question : if Islam incorporates the spirit of democracy why is there dictatorship in Pakistan, my answer is : how come that Sri Lanka, the birthplace of Buddha and Buddhism, has more terrorist activities than anywhere else? And how come that Gandhi, an apostle of peace, was killed by a Hindu fanatic ? In connection with this, and regarding the Quran, the Muslims do believe that it is the last word, but the interpretations are not for all times. And if Islam could be absolutist so could any other religion be. When you speak from a Gandhian perspective it could be just as absolutist as the Islamic perspective.

The other thing, and this is what Professor Mourad Wahba said, why is there no secular tendency within Islam ? I don't have the answer to that question, but whenever there had been secular tendencies somehow they have been condemned. I know that within Hinduism there is secularism, there is even atheism, but there is no such tendency within Islam.

Abu-Rhidha :

I would like to make some clarifications. Fundamentalism means to stick to the fundamental principles of Islam, the theoretical and the practical, by which I mean the creed and the laws. These are fundamental truths which do not follow the relativity of thought. There are also eternal truths which are always valid in every epoch and in every religion.

We are absolutists as Muslims and this is no wonder for all religions are absolutists and this means that they are convinced that they have their own way of demonstrating their Truths. We cannot say that they are fanatic. So, absolutism is not fanaticism if religion is interpreted according to one's sincere faith and belief in truth.

Evandro Agazzi :

What is interesting for me in this discussion is the question of religious fundamentalism. I wonder whether one could find a more radical problem. It seems to me that fundamentalism is not so much to be faithful to a book or to a tradition. The biggest problem of human life is how to relate one's life to the absent, you could call it God or the ultimate meaning of life and reality. But this does not mean that to relate one's self to the absolute, automatically produces solutions for all other problems. This is because you try to apply outside the proper domain something which may be valid within this domain. So, the Western civilization had the historic chance of a big clash between Christian religion and modern science. The case of Galileo was very dramatic but was enormously useful because it became absolutely evident on a very precise point of cosmology. It meant that the Bible, taken literally, was wrong. And from this moment we started the autonomy of politics, of economics, of power, and so on. Maybe, this incident was not so easy to be repeated within an Arab context, but to my mind, this is the real problem : how to preserve the full validity of the religious perspective within the dimension which is proper to it.

Ghazala Irfan :

When we think of resistance to the West, I think the best way to do so is by constant reevaluation of our own selves.

Concerning cosmology, about which Professor Agazzi spoke

there has not been in Islam such a kind of cosmology because Islam has concentrated on the metaphysical rather than the cosmological. And this metaphysical tendency has culminated in Mysticism and Spiritualism. Islam is a totally different tradition, and therefore, we do not need have this total cleavage between what the church advocated and what the autonomy of modern knowledge would advocate.

Sixth Paper : **Mona Abousenna**

Hassan Hanafi :

What you have said about nature, environment, pollution is an European approach to nature conservation and ecology which sees nature as green to be admired and preserved after it has been destroyed as a result of scientific advancement. But we as Afro-Asian countries have completely different problems, problem of poverty and not conservation of nature.

Mona Abousenna :

My paper is concerned, first of all, with a philosophical task which is to define the concept of the environment within a civilizational context and within the framework of the theme of our conference which is the conflict and dialogue of cultures.

The real merit of my paper is the fact that it demonstrates the close affinity between philosophy, science and politics. I may call this the secular trinity, in contradistinction from the holy trinity. This organic unity between the three fields, or what Professor Mourad Wahba referred to in his paper presented at the Philosophy conference on "Unity of Knowledge" held in Cairo in 1980 as "The Three P's" meaning philosophy, physics and politics, is presented in my paper through the concept of environment which is a relatively recent term coinciding with the rise of religious fundamentalism on the one hand and

the advancement of science and particularly space research on the other. The fact that the term environment has been elaborated in different fields of knowledge, culminating in the military field, is a clear indication of that organic unity.

The term 'world system' which was developed in the 1970s is now reemerging after being supplemented by another term, namely, 'world security system', and also 'regional security system'. A more global term has also evolved which is 'new world order' which is until now restricted to the political field and used as a political term whereas in reality it encompasses the three fields of philosophy, politics and science. All these terms which are being used in the nineties coincide with the Gulf crisis, which is, I think, the melting pot and the culmination of what has been happening in the three fields ever since the 1970s. And it is within this perspective that we can understand in depth the problems facing the Afro-Asian countries in the next decade.

What is happening now in the Third World countries, is a radical reshaping, particularly in the Arab region and more precisely in the Gulf area. After the fall of the Eastern bloc, it is now the turn of the Third world to be radically changed. But the radical change brought about in the Eastern countries happened through two things : the social and political institutions, and the masses. In the absence of any effective social or political institutions, and the absence of the masses who could be mobilised to bring about the required change, change in the Third World had to be enforced, and I think, this is the main significance of the Gulf crisis. Now, on the threshold of the twenty first century, all the countries of the world are called upon to play an active role in the shaping of the new world order, and they are required to play that role as equal partners sharing the globe. What lies behind this is the implementation of a global strategy in which the whole world, without any division into cul-

rural levels or political levels, should play an active role in controlling the globe. Therefore, I think that in the next century a term like Afro-Asian countries could very well disappear just as the term 'Third World'. You may wish to continue to raise the slogans of food comes first then thought, but the fact is that the civilizational reality will supersede Afro-Asian philosophers and countries without knowing it.

Ezzat Orani :

I would like to ask you : who will be the master in this perspectve global, new one world ?

Mona Abousenna :

I think this is a very crucial question. In view of the history of human civilization, it has always been dominated by masters, and it had at many times more than one master on the global level and, on the other hand, there were the slaves or the dominated. Therefore, when you pose the question who will be master, you think that it is a logical question in view of the history. But, I think that this question could only be raised within the context of conflict of cultures and not within dialogue of cultures. If we are seeking a genuine dialogue between cultures which would actively contribute towards the formulation of the new culture of the third mellinium which is still not clear to many, then all cultures have to contribute as partners in formulating the content of this new world order, epistemologically as well as culturally, and when this happens then there will be no more slaves or masters.

Ramjee Singh :

I would like to know from you whether you consider nature as a different entity from man and society or not ?

Yehia Houweidi :

You have given a rather limited notion of man which is very materialistic, but there are other dimensions. Man has always been the master of nature. What we need very much now is an internal change to remould our life.

Mona Abousenna :

I would like to clarify two points : one, by nature I mean the two dimensions of human life : the social and the natural in the sense of the forces of nature which both constitute nature or the outside world as far as man is concerned. Second, when I speak about man I don't differentiate between the material and the intellectual or the spiritual, and, for me, man's reason encompasses the material and the intellectual and the spiritual. Man's mastery over nature comprises his religiosity, his intellectual pursuits as well as his material, physical conquest over nature. And it is in this sense of nature, as a double social-natural dimension, that man is capable of mastering nature by his reason. And human civilization is the concrete manifestation of my statement.

Seventh Paper : **Yersu Kim**

Ioanna Kucuradi :

When we speak about cultural relativity we speak about cultural norms which are relative to this or that group, and then the question arises : do we have any criteria by which to evaluate norms ? I don't think we have all the frameworks to judge by. My question is : Is there any basis other than comparing or synthesizing norms ?

Mona Abousenna :

I think that there is something missing, or it is not spelt out clearly enough, which is a kind of frame of reference behind your proposal of a synthesis. Why is it not spelt out within our Afro-Asian context ?

Yersu Kim :

All these remarks and questions boil down to one question: how to deal with the phenomenon of the plurality of cultures and in the framework of the culture which I am proposing. As I tried to make it clear cultures are living organisms, and cultures have their own internal dynamism which enable people to change their culture as a whole. Some cultures may converge and some may not, but the interactive nature of cultures is there. The frame of reference about which Professor Abousenna asked, is to regard the optimality of cultural synthesis as a regulative principle in the Kantian sense. It is acting as if this optimality is somewhere, and only the finitude of man prevents us from recognizing clearly what that optimality might be, but there is always an effort on the part of different cultures to strive towards that optimality or cultural synthesis which is positive as a regulative principle.

Sometimes the members of a certain culture may come to the conclusion that another culture may achieve that synthesis more than their own culture has been able to do and in this way that culture becomes a model. But that must not be necessarily an imperialistic imposition.

Eigth Paper : **Fr. George Anawati**

Yehia Houweidi :

I was very much amazed at the citations from Roger Bacon

in which he said that Islam has to fulfil its task before it vanishes. So, in the thirteenth century Bacon already predicted the disappearance of Islam. How and why did you quote these words ?

Fr. George Anawati :

I was simply referring to the enemies of Islam as an example of religious conflict in the Middle Ages.

Mourad Wahba :

Fr. Anawati might be able to tell us something about his experience in dialogue of religions and dialogue of cultures. He was involved since the 1940s in the dialogue of religions and then shifted to dialogue of cultures. I would also like to suggest to change the title of his paper from "Dialogue of Religions" to "Dialogue of Cultures" because in this way he would combine both dialogues.

My question is : religion is dogmatic by its very nature because dogmas are absolutes and there can only be one absolute, so the conflict between religions is a fact. Now, how could we benefit from the dialogue of cultures in order to de-dogmatise religions so that there can be cultural institutions that could promote dialogue in a peaceful way. But for my surprise, although you have been involved in dialogue of religions since the 1940s, what is happening now in the Middle East within the Gulf crisis. We hear the proclamation about a new Crusade to describe the political and military intervention of the American and European forces in the Gulf. This means that the conflict, whether between cultures or religions, has been institutionalised whereas the dialogue, up till now, has not been institutionalised. If you look for conflict you will find institutions already in existence and practising the conflict. But, up till now, we haven't

got institutions that could practise dialogue, but we only have a few individuals who could practise this dialogue.

Reksosusilo :

If it is true that in the Middle Ages Islam was very strong in science, why is it now that it is Europe which is producing science ?

Abu-Rhidha :

I think that dialogue can be and should be realized through religions, and not in Professor Mourad Wahba's way, because you can remove mountains but you can never remove religions because it is deeply rooted in man.

Ron Haleber :

In the tradition from Arab science to Christianity there is a link between the knowledge of Christianity and Arab and Greek knowledge. Now current research has proved that it was not the church which established those links but it was the laymen. Secondly, a very important role played, in this connection, by the Jews who are not mentioned in your paper. The Jews had networks all over Europe, and they made many translations of big Arabic scientific works in Hebrew and in this way they were propagating the science of the Arab scientists and philosophers.

Fr. George Anawati :

To Professor Mourad Wahba, I think that your dogmatism has become an obsession. What is dogmatism ? I think that the worst dogmatist in this conference is you because you don't change your views.

To Professor Mourad Wahba, concerning the dogmatism of

the church, the church has changed a lot of the dogmas, but if you live in truth you have to believe it, and this is not dogmatism. As Christian I say that it is the grace of Christ which saves me. Muslims or Buddhists may have another idea about salvation. This is not dogmatism, you simply believe in something which you think is true. I don't accept this kind of dogmatism, and I would be much happier if you don't mention this word again.

Concerning absolutism, there is progress in hermeneutics in Christianity and in Catholicism. Through criticism they have understood better the text, they also apply structuralism. So there is no absolutism. But you cannot de-dogmatise religion. If one is Christian he is Christian, and if one is Muslim he is Moslem. When you believe in truth, even if it is literal, you have to affirm it.

About the institutionalisation of dialogue of cultures, this has been founded by the Council of Cultures at the Vatican since fifteen years. (It consists of twenty one representing all continents and all religions). The Pope realized that it is more urgent to speak with other cultures rather than to try to convert them to Christianity.

Ninth Paper : **Hassan Hanafi**

Ghazala Irfan :

You spoke about Eurocentrism as the predominant model, but I think that unless we have an alternative model we cannot combat Eurocentrism,

Mourad Wahba :

I think the main issue in your paper your distinction be-

twen culture with a capital C, and culture with a small c. But what I would like to know from you is what makes a culture with a small c and another culture with a capital C ?

In your analysis you have just said that the culture with a capital C is so because it is a dominating culture, and the culture with a small c is a dominated culture, and that the reason behind this is colonialism. This term 'colonialism' puts an end to any dialogue.

Evandro Agazzi :

I want to tackle the problem of culture with a small c and capital C. If you give the capital C to one culture, this is in a way absurd because you would be promoting a value necessity which is contingent upon history. But there is another sense in which culture is a kind of universal treasure of principles, ideas values, and, in this sense, this is the only capital C. In this sense we are ready to recognize that every culture participates in the universal culture. This is important because no single culture can possess the universal simply because the universal oversteps every culture. But every culture participates as an individual culture in the universal culture, and this is common in the tradition of humanity. So we have no difficulty, in my education, to recognize that the history of Egypt for example, has contributed to this culture in an enormous way. And, maybe, it is very difficult to find in Europe a country which has contributed to this culture in a manner comparable to Egypt. And we are ready to admit and to admire the treasures of wisdom of Buddhism or Confucianism inspite of not knowing that because it is simply a question of enough information.

But the difficulty in this conception is how to evaluate particular cultures from the point of view of this universal culture ?

As an example, if I am inclined to think along the lines of Mourad Wahba, I might perhaps be inclined to say that a culture which is too much impregnated with religion is a little backward. This is a way of thinking. But you can also say that a culture which has developed a deep religious insight is not backward. These are the difficulties because, in this sense, you evaluate a certain culture as regressive or progressive. You say : we have to teach the West. You might teach the West how not to spoil the religious tradition. But if you are yourself convinced that preserving this tradition is equal to preserving superstition then you have nothing to teach to the West. You might perhaps have something to learn from the West.

We have to solve this problem, what makes a culture with a capital C and a small c, before we speak about dialogue or conflict. But what you have spoken about has nothing to do with this cultural problem.

Ioanna Kucuradi :

My question is : how can you justify your claim that all cultures are equal ? I personally think that it is a misinterpretation of another claim namely that all human beings are equal in rights, which is then transferred to the domain of cultures.

I think that you, Professor Hanafi, can teach something in an English university, but what your culture can teach is something else. So, how can we justify the claim that eleven cultures are equal ?

You have said that no culture wants to be on the periphery and all cultures are equal, if that is truly the case then the distinction between these two models becomes useless because if all cultures want to be in the centre, and if all cultures are equal

ly good, then inevitably the relations between cultures are going to be on the model of conflict rather than dialogue.

Another point that disturbs me is your equation of culture with power. Of course power does play an important role within a culture and also in relations among cultures. But the question is : are we not too obsessed with the colonial experiences we all have had as Third World countries ? It is a very traumatic and deep seated experience that we all have had, but relations between cultures are not necessarily based on relations of power.

Hassan Hanafi :

Certainly there are some universalistic aspects in all cultures and once they appear the model of dialogue appears. The dialogue model appears once you have reason, because without reason you cannot have dialogue. Once reason is there as a means of dialogue freedom is there. This happened in Greece with Pericles, in the Motazilites in Islam, in Judaism in Spain, and in Europe in the Enlightenment of the eighteenth century. We are all shooting for the ideals of the Enlightenment but not as it happened in eighteenth century Europe : freedom for me and slavery for you, reason for me and ignorance for you, man for me but colonialism for you. We are looking for a really universal kind of Enlightenment with a universal code of ethics. Modern inventions are not really modern. These microphones, for example, are not the invention of Marconi. Confucius participated in their invention as well as Buddha and others who have contributed to the progress of mankind. Therefore, science is not the invention of the West, we have contributed to it.

To conclude, dialogue is not possible with particularism because particularism is the extreme side of self-identity which goes to skin colour, racialism, egoism, ego-centrism as we see in

Fascism, Nazism, and in this case dialogue is impossible. In a universal trend a conflict is not there because there is reason, human freedom, acceptance of common values.

What have we given ? We have given a lot : de-colonization, liberation movements, national independence, and national sovereignty.

"All cultures are equal" is an imperative. And if they are not equal that is because there is a culture with the big C which produces science and technology. My last statement, culture is power, this is an experience, but I am not reducing culture to power. We are all entering into conflict, and who knows, perhaps behind this attempt of cultural dialogue there is conflict.

Tenth Paper : **Reksosusilo :**

Ramjee Singh :

Indonesia is a veritable example of a land of synthesis of religions and ideologies. The very concept of Pancasila, as we know, is derived from Buddha.

This doctrine of Pancasila in Indonesia is a synthesis of different religions, and we have to learn from Indonesia how the diverse religions in a particular country can be synthesized.

However, there is one problem : you have, in Indonesia, so many religions and so many languages, but still you say that you are one country and one nation with one language. In this not a kind of totalitarianism. If you impose one national language on many sub-national languages, is this not done at the cost of freedom which is against the spirit of Pancasila ?

Reksosulilo :

The people in Indonesia have the ability to absorb all cultures and all religions and all languages. For example, I am originally Japanese and I still speak Japanese with my brothers, but I also know Indonesian language as my own language, and I don't feel it is superimposed on my original Japanese language, or vice versa. Also the Indonesian language is growing by accomodating other languages. So, although we use one language we do not feel oppressed by it.

Ron Haleber :

I have one question : why do not communism and socialism fit into Pancasila ? We all know that there were massacres of communists in Indonesia, and which are still going on.

Reksosusilo :

The problem is the idea of violence in communism. But if communism does not use violence, it could be accomodated by Pancasila. The same applies to the idea of violence in Islam also, Some Moslems try to impose Islam on Indonesia to convert it into a Muslim nation by violence. But if they try not to use violence, they could be accomodated. So, communist and Islamic militant movements use violence, which is against the spirit and principles of Pancasila.

Shahrestani :

Muslims are now using violence against the present military government in order to change the system only. But once the change happens there will be no violence.

Reksosusilo :

Maybe you are right, but the army will not act against any movement if it is convinced that the movement is not against Pancasila. The government is concerned about the unity of the country, and if any movement supports Pancasila the government will not be against it.

* * *

The dialogue of paper No. 11 by Prof. Oruka and paper No. 12 by Prof. El-Ghannouchi did not take place as their authors could not attend the conference. The two papers were read on behalf of their authors.



رقم الايداع ٩٣٢٥ / ١٩٩١

I.S.B.N. 779—002459—6